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An honest list of [law school] course descriptions might look some-
thing like this: ... Contracts. Study rules based on a model of two-fisted 
negotiators with equal bargaining power who dicker freely, voluntarily 
agree on all terms, and reduce their understanding to a writing intended 
to embody their full agreement. Learn that the last contract fitting this 
model was signed in 1879. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Power. How to get it, keep it, and use it have been central questions 
of politics, business, military strategy, and human relationships for mil-
lennia-from the military genius of Sun Tzu2 to the fictional mob leader~ 
ship of Tony Soprano.3 This extended study of power has yielded a 
wealth of nuanced and sophisticated models for assessing, maintaining or 
altering the balance of power in relationships. As a result, the practical, 
1. James D. Gordon III, Essay, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L. 1. 
1679,1696 (1991). 
2. See infra notes 163-166 and accompanying text. 
3. See The Sopranos (HBO television broadcast, Apr. 15,2001). The character of Tony 
Soprano discusses the continuing relevance of Sun Tzu's THE ART OF WAR for successful 
leadership of organized crime operations: ;, 
[d. 
Been reading that-that book you told me about. You know, The Art of War by 
Sun Tzu. I mean here's this guy, a Chinese general, wrote this thing 2400 years ago, 
and most of it still applies today! Balk the enemy's power. Force him to reveal 
himself. You know most of the guys that I know, they read Prince Machiabelli 
[sic], and I had Carmela go and get the Cliff Notes once and-he's okay. But this 
book is much better about strategy. 
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real-world approach to power is fundamentally strategic and recognizes 
that all actors and all relationships possess power. Power is a complex 
phenomenon that arises from numerous sources and may assume forms 
not immediately apparent to an outside observer. Finally, power is not a 
static event but is subject to dynamic change throughout the course of the 
actors' relationship. 
In contrast to the complex and sophisticated real-world understand-
ing of power, American contract law rarely acknowledges power explic-
itly and typically assesses the legal consequences of relational power 
asymmetries from a two-dimensional, status-based perspective. The con-
tract doctrine of "inequality of bargaining power" is the legal equivalent 
of the socially embarrassing aunt or uncle that the family talks about but 
to whom no one really pays attention. Courts dealing with the legal con-
cept of inequality of bargaining power assess relative power tactically, 
limiting their analysis to how the power dynamics appear to exist at a 
particular moment in the contracting parties' relationship. The legal con-
ception of bargaining power disparities also fails to account for numer-
ous sources and forms of power and ignores the capacity of power rela-
tionships to shift dynamically in response to party inputs on the micro 
level and to social, technological and economic changes on the macro 
level. 
This Article addresses the surprising inconsistency between the rich 
understanding gained in the practical study of power and the legal sys-
tem's far more limited and simplistic efforts to police perceived power 
disparities between bargaining parties through the legal doctrine of ine-
quality of bargaining power. Specifically, judicial efforts to assess and 
remedy seeming bargaining power asymmetries systematically disadvan-
tage parties who do not fit within the courts' traditional narratives of dis-
empowerment. At the same time, courts engage in paternalistic social 
and demographic assumptions while routinely ignoring the role that ap-
parently weaker parties have in reducing their own bargaining power. To 
the extent that courts purport to regulate the legal consequences of bar-
gaining power disparities through the inequality of bargaining power 
doctrine, the legal doctrine should bear some semblance to how power 
actually works. Consequently, courts must identify those situations in 
which bargaining power should have legal consequences and develop 
more sophisticated and realistic analyses of that phenomenon. 
Part II of this Article surveys the legal doctrine of inequality of bar-
gaining power as a significant component of the American law of con-
tracts. This doctrine is most evident and explicit in only a few areas, pri-
marily unconscionability, contracts of adhesion, and public policy 
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analysis.4 But inequality of bargaining power also affects analysis of 
many other contract doctrines, including, inter alia, defenses, remedies, 
consideration, contract interpretation, and the parol evidence rule.5 
Given the pervasiveness of the concept of bargaining power asym-
metries throughout contract law, the legal doctrine imposes substantial 
costs upon actors who are traditionally viewed as possessing bargaining 
power, including small businesses and middle-class consumers.6 Specifi-
cally, the legal concept of inequality of bargaining power discriminates 
by not being open to all who suffer from real bargaining power dispari-
ties. As a result, truly disadvantaged parties are denied the benefits of the 
doctrine while those that merely fall within stereotypically "weak" so-
cioeconomic classes benefit regardless of their actual bargaining powerJ 
Part III analyzes the basic concept of power through illustrations 
from a wide variety of contexts, including military strategy, political the-
ory, producer-consumer relations, and employment negotiations. Without 
attempting to summarize the entire field, this Part analyzes the building 
blocks of bargaining power disparities and concludes that power has 
three characteristics that are critical for any legal analysis of relative bar-
gaining power in contracts. First, power is omnipresent in human rela-
tions-every actor has power of some kind and to some degree.8 Second, 
power is complex. It is a highly situational phenomenon arising from a 
large number of potential sources and taking varied forms that may not 
be obvious to the observer.9 Third, power is dynamic. 10 Any power rela-
tionship can change dramatically and instantaneously, depending on the 
actors, their preferences, their relationships with other actors, and any of 
a multitude of additional strategic inputs. 
Even though power relationships are clearly complex and dynamic, 
courts approach certain claims of inequality of bargaining power as if 
power relationships depend upon limited inputs and remain fixed over 
time. As discussed in Part IV, the modem approach to inequality of bar-
gaining power as a legal concept ignores the practical operation of 
power, instead focusing upon ad hoc generalizations drawn from the 
class struggles of the last 150 years. I I Applying typical legal standards 
4. See infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
5. See sources cited infra notes 20-48 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. 
7. See Blake D. Morant, The Questfor Bargains in an Age of Contractual Formalism: 
Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 233, 237 (2003) 
(analyzing negative impact of fonnalistic contract doctrines that deny small businesses protec-
tion of contract rules based upon inequality of bargaining power). 
8. See infra notes 82-100 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 101-61 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 162-212 and accompanying text. 
II. See sources cited infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text. 
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for assessing bargaining power such as availability of meaningful alter-
natives,12 opportunity to negotiate,13 and traditional status-based classi-
fications l4 without regard to the practical analysis of power, courts ig-
nore real power disparities in favor of limited, incomplete, and often 
incorrect legal conceptions of bargaining power asymmetries. 
Finally, Part V concludes that the dynamic nature of power relation-
ships and the inability of courts to identify standards for assessing power 
relationships mean that the legal concept of inequality of bargaining 
power as presently understood and applied is incapable of correctly guid-
ing judicial discretion. If courts continue to apply legal consequences to 
perceived inequalities of bargaining power without conforming the legal 
doctrine to the practical use of power, 15 then the legal system's attempts 
to regulate the actual abuse of superior bargaining power will never be 
effective. 
First, courts must begin to address power strategically, not tacti-
cally. 16 In so doing, they should assess actions the parties could reasona-
12. See infra Part IV.B.l.a. 
13. See infra Part IV.B.l.b. 
14. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
15. My study of inequality of bargaining power as a legal concept has raised personal 
doubts that the doctrine has any usefulness in guiding judicial discretion. See also RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 104 (3d ed. 1986) (raising "the general question 
whether the concept of unequal bargaining power is fruitful, or even meaningful"). But rather 
than being merely incoherent and paternalistic, the doctrine may illustrate a legal conceit that I 
characterize as a "legal myth." As opposed to "legal fictions," which courts knowingly adopt 
for the purpose of manipulating legal doctrines to fit relationships between parties, I prelimi-
narily define legal myths as narratives that work upon the legal decision maker on both a con-
scious and a subconscious level. Like real myths, legal myths can powerfully affect the deci-
sion making process by communicating not only facts and evidence but also motifs and 
archetypes that operate on a much more basic level than the actual narrative before the court. 
While litigants can craft arguments to counter each other's competing cases, they cannot accu-
rately answer the decision maker's unconscious response to the mythic elements of the case. 
A complete analysis of this concept will be the subject of a subsequent article. For the present, 
this Article addresses the need for development of a more sophisticated and nuanced standard 
for assessing relative bargaining power if courts continue using power relationships to guide 
their discretion in contract cases. 
16. The distinction between strategy and tactics is best understood in terms of military 
action. As one commentator stated: 
A campaign consists in the marching of an army about the country or into foreign 
territory to seek the enemy or inflict damage on him. Strategy is the complement of 
this term, and is the art of so moving an army over a country,--on the map, as it 
were,-that when you meet the enemy you shall have placed him in a disadvanta-
geous position for battle or other manreuvers. One or more battles may occur in a 
campaign. Tactics ... relates only to and is coextensive with the evolutions of the 
battle-field. Strategy comprehends your mana!uvers when not in the presence of the 
enemy; tactics, your mana!uvers when in contact with him. 
THEODORE A. DODGE, GREAT CAPTAINS: THE ART OF WAR IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 
ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL, CAESAR, GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, FREDERICK THE GREAT, AND 
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bly have taken to improve their bargaining power, appraise bargaining 
power throughout the parties' interaction, and recognize sources and 
forms of power beyond the traditionally fixed, status-based frameworks 
courts currently employ. Second, despite development of the legal con-
cept of bargaining power as a contract doctrine in the 1930s, the stan-
dards for assessing relative bargaining power, the types and degrees of 
bargaining power disparities justifying judicial intervention into private 
contracts, and the purpose of the doctrine within contract law remain 
largely undeveloped. 17 Absent such development, the legal concept of 
inequality of bargaining power will remain a grossly inaccurate tool for 
policing power relationships between contracting parties. 
II. WHY SHOULD CONTRACT LAW CARE ABOUT INEQUALITY OF 
BARGAINING POWER? 
The legal doctrine of inequality of bargaining power occupies a 
strange place in contract law. As an explicitly acknowledged legal con-
cept, inequality of bargaining power is seemingly of little moment. Since 
the inception of the doctrine,18 American courts largely have restricted 
explicit analyses of bargaining power asymmetries to the periphery of 
contract law. For example, the legal doctrine appears primarily as one 
element of the standard for unconscionability and adhesion contracts, and 
courts occasionally cite it as a reason for refusing to enforce private 
agreements that are objectionable for reasons of public policy.19 Courts 
rarely overturn contracts on the basis of these doctrines explicitly em-
ploying inequality of bargaining power as an element, and inequality of 
bargaining power alone is not a sufficient justification for judicial inter-
vention into contract disputes. 
But beyond contract doctrines that employ the legal doctrine of ine-
quality of bargaining power as an explicit element or standard, implicit 
analyses of the concept of inequality of bargaining power occupy a posi-
tion of central-if undefined-importance in contract law. Specifically, 
bargaining power issues can be observed in the contexts of contract de-
fenses, contract formation, contract interpretation, and contract remedies. 
NAPOLEON 2-3 (Sames & Noble 1995) (1889) (emphasis added). In the bargaining context, 
strategy generally encompasses planning, preparation, and assessment before approaching a 
particular bargaining interaction, as well as a party's general approach to satisfying its needs 
and wants through commercial interactions. Tactics are those tools and techniques-such as 
the use of standard form contracts and high-pressure sales talk-that the bargainers use to ne-
gotiate and conclude the bargain. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 228-41 and accompanying text. 
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Many contract defenses seem to reflect implicit attempts to regulate 
bargains between parties apparently suffering from a gross disparity of 
bargaining power. For example, English courts in the 1970s toyed briefly 
with a legal rule that would permit invalidation of contracts between par-
ties of grossly disparate bargaining power. In Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. 
Bundy,20 Lord Denning explicitly suggested that bargaining power dis-
parities formed the common denominator among equitable and legal de-
fenses to contract: 
Gathering all [categories of cases in which courts set aside transac-
tions---duress of goods, unconscionable transactions, undue influ-
ence, undue pressure, and unfair salvage agreements] together, I 
would suggest that through all these instances there runs a single 
thread. They rest on "inequality of bargaining power. " By virtue of 
it, the English law gives relief to one who, without independent ad-
vice, enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers 
property for a consideratipn which is grossly inadequate, when his 
bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs 
or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue 
influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of 
the other.21 
English courts, however, quickly rejected Denning's proposed ine-
quality of bargaining power doctrine as unworkable.22 But Denning's in-
20. 1975 Q.B. 326 (C.A. 1974). 
21. Id. at 339 (Lord Denning) (emphasis added); see also A. Schroeder Music Publishing 
Co. v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L.) (Lord Diplock) (justifying refusal to enforce 
non-competition clause in musician-publisher standard form agreement on basis of inequality 
of bargaining power); Spencer N. Thai, The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The 
Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 17-19 (1988) 
(describing rise and fall of Lord Denning's attempt to institute inequality of bargaining power 
as a defense to contract). In addition to ThaI's excellent treatment of the English experiment 
with inequality of bargaining power as an independent defense to contract, see generally M.J. 
Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in 
the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L. J. 359, 359 (1976) (describing Lord Denning's sugges-
tion that "many of the traditional defences to contract enforcement, for example, duress, undue 
influence, breach of fiduciary duty, were properly seen as merely exemplary of a general doc-
trine of 'inequality of bargaining power"'); Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Con-
tract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW 
ENG. L. REv. 265, 344-46 (1999) (describing Lord Denning's attempt to promote inequality of 
bargaining power doctrine so that "[i]nstead of needing to pigeonhole injustice or unfairness 
into one of the equitable safe havens, the court would give relief to anyone who entered into an 
unfair contract in which there was a significant inequality of bargaining power"); Thomas 
Glyn Watkin, The Spirit of the Seventies, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 119, 122-23 (1977). 
22. See, e.g., Nat'l Westminster Bank v. Morgan, [1985]1 All E.R. 821, 830 (H.L.) (Lord 
Scarman) (explicitly rejecting Lord Denning's "general principle that English courts will grant 
relief where there has been 'inequality of bargaining power"'); Thai, supra note 21, at 19 (de-
scribing rejection of inequality of bargaining power by English courts). 
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sight still suggests that many contract defenses are essentially second or-
der moral restraints that attempt to enforce a first order moral rule23 to 
protect against some inequity related to the parties' relative bargaining 
power. The problem for Denning, of course, was that his broad notion of 
inequality of bargaining power was insufficiently nuanced to permit 
courts to determine consistently the appropriate legal consequences of 
such inequalities. 
American contract law likewise demonstrates a relationship be-
tween contract defenses and the legal concept of inequality of bargaining 
power. As noted, bargaining power disparities continue to appear as an 
explicit element in unconscionability analyses. Other contract defenses, 
however, implicitly incorporate at least a sense of inequality of bargain-
ing power. Duress and economic duress, for instance, attempt to deal 
with situations in which agreement has been coerced from an apparently 
weaker party through a bargaining power disparity resulting from a 
wrongful threat or action by the apparently stronger party.24 Thus, in 
Duress by Economic Pressure, John Dalzell noted that economic duress 
arises in those situations where one party-by reason of an advantage 
created by the parties' sequential performances-possesses momentarily 
greater bargaining power sufficient to coerce additional payments or new 
terms from the weaker party: 
In these decisions the courts talk much of the inequality of the parties 
as a weighty argument for relief .... 
So far as inequality is to be considered, it is inequality in the particu-
lar situation; and the corporate Goliath might have been in such im-
mediate need of the wharfage rights there involved as to put it quite 
23. See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in THE FALL AND 
RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61, 68-69 (F.H. Buckley ed. 1999) (describing criticism that 
unconscionability doctrines, inter alia, "required direct application of moral theory, rather than 
the application of second-order rules"); cf John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair 
Exchange in French and German Law, 12 TuL. L. REV. 42, 62-72 (1937) (describing Nazi 
efforts to impose first order moral rules barring loans at greater than "customary rate of inter-
est"). 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942) ("The 
word duress implies feebleness on one side, overpowering strength on the other."); cf Richard 
A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293, 297 (1975) 
("The question of duress is not that of the equality of bargaining power in a loose sense that 
refers to the wealth of the parties. It is the question of what means are permissible to achieve 
agreement. "). 
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at the mercy of an unconscionable David in an advantageous posi-
tion.25 
147 
Likewise, the undue influence defense raises substantial issues of 
the power imbalance that necessarily arises between parties contracting 
within a special or fiduciary relationship.26 Instead of the purposeful co-
ercion apparent to all parties in cases of duress, however, the undue in-
fluence defense looks to more subtle indications of impropriety and 
overbearing that may indicate some abuse of the bargaining power made 
possible by the trust and confidence in the parties' relationship. Simi-
larly, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may be analyzed as an inequality 
of bargaining power generated by a monopoly on truthful information 
held by one party to a transaction.27 On a more general level, courts may 
find some classes of contracts void as contrary to public policy based 
partly upon apparent bargaining power disparities between the parties.28 
Bargaining power issues recur in other doctrines in contract law, but 
more subtly. Selection or rejection of particular interpretive rules such as 
contra proferentum often depends upon whether a party can convince a 
court of a bargaining power disparity.29 Similarly, the reasonable expec-
25. John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C. L. REv. 237, 244, 244 n.21 
(1941) (citing Heiserman v. Burlington C.R. & N. Ry., 18 N.W. 903 (Iowa 1884); McGregor 
v. Erie Ry., 35 N.J.L. 89 (N.J. 1871); New Orleans R.R. v. Louisiana Constr. Co., 33 So. 51 
(La. 1902». 
26. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing 
with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 29 (2000) (noting im-
portance of policing special relationships for power imbalance); cf Brian Alan Ross, Note, 
Undue Influence and Gender Inequity, 19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 97, 98 (1997) (discussing 
solicitousness of courts in policing meretricious relationships between female decedents and 
their heirs in will contests). 
27. See Note, The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of Fair Ex-
change in Contract Law, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 1090, 1096 (1935) [hereinafter The Peppercorn 
Theory] ("In addition to the outlawing of fraud and duress as bargaining pressures the courts 
have refused enforcement of advantages gained by exercise of a power resulting from fortui-
tous circumstances not within the ethical range of accepted economic practice.") (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
28. See, e.g., Wolfv. Ford, 644 A.2d 522,526 (Md. 1994) ("When one party is at such an 
obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the effect of the contract is to put him at the 
mercy of the other's negligence, the agreement is void as against public policy.") (quoting 
Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821, 824 (Md. App. 1972»; Heyde Cos. v. Dove Healthcare, 
LLC, 654 N.W.2d 830, 833, 837 (Wis. 2002) (holding restrictive covenant between employ-
ment agency and health care provider void as contrary to public policy of protecting employ-
ees ''who often have unequal bargaining power" from unfairly restrictive covenants not to 
compete). 
29. See, e.g., First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Purolator Sec., Inc., 388 N.E.2d 17,21-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1979) (existence of disparity in bargaining power "may affect the court's interpretation of con-
tractual provisions"); Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1991) ("[I]n light of the manifest inequality of bargaining power between an insurance com-
pany and a purchaser of insurance, a court may on occasion be justified in deviating from the 
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tations doctrine purports to regulate power imbalances between insurance 
companies and their insureds by interpreting some insurance contracts to 
conform to the reasonable expectations of the insured, regardless of the 
actual language of the agreement. 30 Judges have invalidated specific con-
tract terms-particularly forum selection clauses-where the contract 
was obtained through "fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargain-
ing power."31 And courts invalidate eXCUlpation clauses-lying at the 
crossroads of tort, contract, and public policy-"where the parties are not 
on roughly equal bargaining terms."32 Even the availability of certain 
equitable remedies may depend upon the appearance of inequity created 
by the presence of gross disparities of bargaining power.33 
plain language ofa contract of insurance.") (quoting Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Em-
pire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 567 (Pa. 1983»; Votto v. Am. Car Rental, Inc., 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 
17,2003 WL 21716003, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16,2003) ("The concept that a contract 
of adhesion should be interpreted and enforced differently from an ordinary contract has 
evolved from cases which have involved contractual provisions drafted and imposed by a party 
enjoying superior bargaining strength .... ") (quoting Madden v. Kaison Found. Hosps. 552 
P.2d 1178,1186 (Cal. 1976». 
30. See, e.g., Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 440-42 (Cal. 1975) (inter-
preting ambiguity in insurance contract against insurer and holding insurer bound by insured's 
reasonable expectations of coverage upon premium payment absent unambiguous term to the 
contrary and actual explanation of restrictive term to insured); Werner Indus. v. First State Ins. 
Co., 548 A.2d 188, 192 (N.J. 1988) (rejecting application of reasonable expectations doctrine 
for commercial risk policy because "both sides of the bargaining table ... were sophisticated 
with regard to insurance"); see also Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At Variance with 
Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961,967 (1970) ("reasonable expectations" doctrine de-
scribes practice of courts varying plain terms of written insurance contract to reflect purported 
reasonable expectations of insured). But see Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 
776, 782 (Mich. 2003) (reasonable expectations doctrine "is contrary to the bedrock principle 
of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit"). 
31. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 12 (1972) (emphasis added); see 
also Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So.2d 370, 372-73 (Ala. 2001) (larger size of de-
fendant and use of non-negotiable contract terms was not sufficient to invalidate forum selec-
tion clause on basis of "overweening bargaining power."). Similarly, some courts and com-
mentators have suggested that exculpatory provisions should be invalidated if, inter alia, "the 
parties are in a substantively unequal bargaining position." Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 
349 N.E.2d 744, 785 (Ind. App. 1976) (citing Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective 
Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIS. L. REv. 19, 23-31 (1975) 
(surveying cases involving non-enforcement of exculpatory clauses in lease contracts where 
parties are of unequal bargaining power)}, superseded on other grounds, 369 N.E.2d 404 (Ind. 
1977). 
32. Note, The Significance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law of Exculpation, 
37 COLUM. L. REv. 248, 249 (1937) (analyzing cases in which courts upheld or invalidated 
exculpatory contract provisions). 
33. Cj Campbell Soup. Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) (refusing specific 
performance where bargain deemed "too one-sided" and oppressive); M. Witmark & Sons v. 
Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 955 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
equitable remedies such as specific performance should not lie where, inter alia, "the defen-
dant was an author, one of a class of persons notoriously inexperienced in business, and ... in 
desperate financial straights, while the plaintiff was a successful and experienced publisher"); 
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Legal concepts of relative bargaining power even insinuate them-
selves into cases in which bright-line legal rules, at face value, would 
make the parties' relative bargaining positions irrelevant. At least two 
empirical studies, for example, have found that courts are reluctant to 
apply the parol evidence rule strictly in the face of gross disparities of 
bargaining power.34 As one author concluded, "the parol evidence rule 
does not apply in situations involving a disparity in the bargaining posi-
tion or expertise of the parties. The party who alleges inferior bargaining 
position or an abuse of discretion usually gets his or her evidence to the 
judge or jury."35 Similarly, although courts generally avoid explicit in-
quiries into the adequacy of consideration exchanged between contract-
ing parties, grossly inadequate consideration may be evidence of flaws in 
the bargaining process, including gross disparities of bargaining power, 
that justify closer scrutiny of the transaction.36 
The legal concept of inequality of bargaining power thus may be 
outcome determinative across cases involving a wide array of contract 
doctrines. But courts rarely discuss inequality of bargaining power ex-
plicitly. Accordingly, there are no generally accepted standards for ap-
praising whether disparities of bargaining power unduly affect a transac-
Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1907) ("[W]here the consideration is so grossly in-
adequate as it is in the present case, and the contract is made without any knowledge at the 
time of its making on the part of either of the parties thereto of the nature of the property to be 
affected thereby, or of its value, no equitable principle is violated if specific performance is 
denied .... "). 
34. See Michael A. Lawrence, Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: Status 
in the Law o/Contract, Revisited, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 1071, 1095 (1991). With particular at-
tention to Wisconsin court decisions, Lawrence's work expanded the earlier study of Profes-
sors Spitz and Childres who had likewise empirically demonstrated a connection between the 
parties' relative status, bargaining power and the willingness of courts to admit parol evidence. 
See Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law o/Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,7, 
24 (1972) (analyzing relevance of party status to availability of certain contract rights such as 
application of the parol evidence rule and noting rule usually does not apply to party alleging 
inferior bargaining position). 
35. Lawrence, supra note 34, at 1094-95. 
36. See The Peppercorn Theory, supra note 27, at 1095 ("Indeed, undesired disparity in a 
transaction would seem possible only where one party erred as to the market values of the 
products exchanged or where the parties were unequal in bargaining power."); cf Note, The 
En/orcibility 0/ a Promise Not to Compete After an Employment at Will, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 
347,348 (1929) ("While inadequacy of consideration is no bar to relief at the employer's suit, 
in some instances, where the consideration has been 'grossly' inadequate or 'shocking to the 
conscience' or the enforcement of the agreement would be 'harsh and oppressive,' equity has 
relegated the employer solely to his remedy at law."). See also Justin Sweet, Liquidated Dam-
ages in California, 60 CAL. L. REv. 84, 85 (1972) (noting that consideration limits pure free-
dom of contract "by not enforcing gift promises and by balancing extremely unequal bargain-
ing power through the mutuality concept") (emphasis added); cf Frank P. Darr, 
Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1819, 1825 (1994) (noting that con-
sideration is "a paternalistic doctrine" and arguing that price unconscionability doctrine is in-
sufficient to protect consumers against more powerful merchants). 
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tion. As a result, contract doctrine seems to hold conflicting parallel 
views on the appropriate legal response to issues of power and its effects 
on the bargaining process. 
It is important at this point to distinguish the legal doctrine of ine-
quality of bargaining power from the practical concept of bargaining 
power. Specifically, the legal doctrine represents an attempt by the legal 
system to assign legal consequences to perceived gross disparities of 
bargaining power in a transaction and to assess the degree of those dis-
parities post hoc through the judicial process. The legal doctrine covers 
both the contract doctrines that explicitly employ inequality of bargain-
ing power as a fonnal element and those legal doctrines where bargain-
ing power disparities may affect the outcome of the case but are not ex-
plicitly at issue. 
In contrast, the practical concept of inequality of bargaining power 
addresses how power is used, manipulated, and perceived in real world 
interactions. There is no question that some parties are "weak" when 
compared to the other party or parties to a transaction. Bargaining power 
disparities are a real phenomenon that can affect the ability of the "weak" 
party to obtain its preferred tenns in a contractual interaction with a 
"strong" party.37 Often, courts attribute bargaining weakness to certain 
status groups, such as women, consumers, the poor, and the unedu-
cated,38 thus pennitting members of those groups to claim whatever pro-
tections arise in contract law from such an apparent lack of bargaining 
power. Alternatively, a court may employ a process-based approach to 
assessing bargaining power to conclude that a party had no bargaining 
power because she "lacked meaningful alternatives" or "had no opportu-
nity to negotiate tenns."39 Given the substantial overlap between these 
latter process-based analyses and the fonner status-based characteristics, 
the apparent distinction between these approaches to assessing relative 
bargaining power quickly breaks down, as discussed, infra, in Part IV.B. 
In essence, the relationship between status-based characteristics typically 
described as weak-such as poverty, lack of education, lack of business 
sophistication, and so on-is so closely related to questions of whether a 
party lacked meaningful alternatives to the bargain or had no opportunity 
to bargain as to blur any distinction beyond recognition. Numerous re-
ported opinions and academic discourses begin and end their analyses of 
relative bargaining power by concluding that a poor, uneducated, or oth-
erwise traditionally disadvantaged party has no meaningful alternatives 
37. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (noting general defmition of power as 
ability to affect a preferred outcome). 
38. See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra Part IV.B.!. 
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to the contract offered them or could not have negotiated the contract 
terms simply because that party was poor, uneducated, or a member of a 
traditionally disadvantaged class.4o 
On the other hand, courts and commentators often ignore bargaining 
power issues relating to parties outside stereotypically "weak" catego-
ries. The most obvious victims of the incomplete development of the le-
gal doctrine of inequality of bargaining power are middle class consum-
ers and small business owners. For instance, Blake Morant's recent 
empirical study of bargaining behavior by small businesses determined 
that the rigid and formalistic conception of bargaining power disparities 
that most courts employ combined with a competitive free market effec-
tively denied small businesses access to equitable agreements.41 Simi-
larly, other commentators have recognized that explicit relief for bargain-
ing power disparities through unconscionability or adhesion contract 
doctrines are reserved almost exclusively for consumers and the poor.42 
But in light of the gross disparities of bargaining power that often exist 
between small businesses and their vendors and customers, and given the 
importance of small businesses to the American economy in general,43 
40. See infra notes 243-52, Part IV.B.2. and accompanying text. 
41. See Morant, supra note 7, at 267. 
42. See, e.g., Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 48 ("The vast majority of successful 
unconscionability claims involve poor, often unsophisticated, consumers challenging oppres-
sive adhesion contracts foisted on them by retail merchants or credit sellers. In fact, the courts 
have generally been unreceptive to unconscionability claims by middle class purchasers or by 
merchants against other merchants.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Jane P. Mallor, 
Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L. J. 1065, 1066-67 (1986) (dis-
cussing general hostility to claims of unconscionability by merchants); cf 2A RONALD A. 
ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-302:108, :126, :128 (3d 
ed. 1997) (observing generally that inequality of bargaining power can support unconscionabil-
ity finding in both commercial and non-commercial settings, but noting "[a]lthough a com-
mercial setting does not necessarily bar a claim of unconscionability, it is the exceptional 
commercial setting where a claim of unconscionability will be allowed") (surveying cases). 
Even legislative attempts to address perceived bargaining power disparities often fail to ad-
dress real inadequacies experienced by small businesses. See, e.g., Pamela Edwards, Into the 
Abyss: How Party Autonomy. Supports Overreaching through the Exercise of Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 36 1. MARSHALL L. REv. 421, 455 (2003) (noting that legislation mandating 
enforcement of choice of law clauses creates exceptions for consumers "to protect individuals 
who are thought of as tending to have lesser bargaining power" but ignores unequal bargaining 
power between commercial entities). But cf W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE 
LATE 20TH CENTURY REfORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 143 (1996) (arguing that "[c]ourts 
now apply the unconscionability defense to business consumers and individual consumers 
without distinction") (citing Mallor, supra); Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic 
of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493, 554 (1989) (noting increasing attempts to apply uncon-
scionability standards to merchant-to-merchant contracts, but describing such attempts as 
"preembryonic" and limited to "exceptional and atypical cases"). 
43. See, e.g., Morant, supra note 7, at 239-44 (discussing the importance of small busi-
nesses to U.S. economy); MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY Of SMALL BUSINESS IN 
AMERICA xiii-xv, 124 (1991) (same); OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., TOP 
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the unavailability of remedial contract doctrines to such entItIes may 
have real and significant negative impacts upon economic activity.44 
The impact of this incomplete and undeveloped approach to assess-
ing the legal import of bargaining power asymmetries between contract-
ing parties is significant. A more sophisticated approach to legal analysis 
of bargaining power may appear at first blush to offer little to stereotypi-
cally "weak" contracting parties. Such generalizations regarding per-
ceived bargaining power may accurately reflect the actual bargaining 
power of individuals fitting the generalization. As a practical matter, 
poor individuals often do lack bargaining power-the power to obtain a 
preferred outcome in a transaction-in many situations and are often sys-
tematically deprived of the ability to offer meaningful consent to prof-
fered contracts. 
But those same generalizations may also arise from the private bi-
ases of judges and other observers. Ultimately, biased stereotypes of 
weakness may be destructive to the well-being and social integration of 
the affected class. Thus, as some have argued, judicial interventions to 
"correct" perceived bargaining power disparities may help individual 
litigants in the short term but ultimately prove harmful in terms of social 
perceptions and additional contracting costs imposed on the class.45 
For parties who typically fall outside of the "weak" status-
classifications, however, the benefits of a sophisticated and fully-
developed bargaining power jurisprudence would be significant. Under 
current treatments of the doctrine, for example, small businesses and 
10 REASONS TO LOVE SMALL BUSINESS (February 13, 2004) (noting, inter alia, that small 
businesses make up over 99.7% of employers, "create more than 50 percent of the nonfarm 
private gross domestic product," and create 75% of net new jobs), http://www.sba.gov/advo 
/press/04-06.html. Beyond the substantial direct economic benefits from production and em-
ployment, small businesses also employ disproportionate numbers of women and minority in-
dividuals. See BLACKFORD, supra at 58-60, 117-20, and 124 ("To the extent that they suc-
ceeded at all in business management and ownership, women and minorities moved ahead in 
small finns."); Morant, supra note 7, at 242 (discussing importance of women and minority-
owned businesses). Additionally, the existence and prevalence of small businesses are a foun-
dation stone in our national mythos. Although unquantifiable, that psychological symbolism 
has been recognized as an important benefit of small business participation in the American 
economy. See, e.g., A.D.H. KAPLAN, SMALL BUSINESS: ITS PLACE AND PROBLEMS 3-5 
(1948) (describing post-World War II sentiment that independence symbolized by small busi-
nesses contrasted sharply with centralized economies and totalitarian regimes and offered 
every individual the possibility "of becoming his own boss"); BLACKFORD, supra at xiv 
("[M]any Americans have seen the owners of small businesses as epitomizing all that is best 
about the American way of life."). 
44. See Morant, supra note 7, at 245-46 (assessing impact of inability to obtain relief for 
bargaining power disparities on small businesses). 
45. See infra notes 330-38 and accompanying text (discussing potential negative impacts 
of legal narratives regarding participants in the legal system for their personal and social well-
being). 
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middle-class consumers gain little by claiming that they lacked bargain-
ing power in a transaction. The courts' failure to develop sophisticated 
and nuanced standards for assessing bargaining power means that such 
parties are denied access to theories of recovery that would be available 
to stereo typically "weak" parties who are similarly situated in terms of 
the dynamics and context of contract formation. 
This proposition is not merely academic. If the legal doctrine of 
inequality of bargaining power affected the outcome solely in those cases 
where the parties' relative bargaining power is explicitly at issue, the 
practical impact would be minimal. Courts rarely overturn contracts for 
unconscionability,46 and the mere determination that a contract is adhe-
sive has limited effects upon the enforceability of the agreement. But 
inequality of bargaining power-whether conceived as a legal doctrine 
or some more amorphous judicial concept--extends throughout contract 
law. Rather than a doctrine that gives rise to a limited judicial interfer-
ence in otherwise valid contracts, the legal doctrine creates a substantial 
potential that many parties suffering from a real bargaining power disad-
vantage will be denied relief or that parties who do not suffer from any 
real bargaining power weakness will nonetheless receive the benefits of 
the legal doctrine of inequality of bargaining power.47 Given the poten-
tial for uncertainty, injustice, and unpredictability inherent in current le-
gal conceptions of bargaining power disparities, the lack of jurispruden-
tial development is surprising. To the extent that bargaining power 
disparities are worthwhile tools for legal discrimination,48 courts should 
develop a much more nuanced and sophisticated approach to the legal 
analysis of actual bargaining power disparities. 
III. THE NATURE OF POWER 
The legal concept of inequality of bargaining power must begin, 
fundamentally, with an understanding of "power." Specifically, the phe-
nomenon of power has fascinated social theorists, military strategists, 
politicians, economists, businesspeople, and negotiators, who have, in 
turn, generated a substantial literature regarding the nature of power and 
how it may be manipulated. Many courts, however, appear to ignore this 
46. See Morant, supra note 7, at 265-66 (noting even consumers are rarely able to assert 
unconscionability defense successfully). 
47. But see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort 
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. 
REv. 563, 622-23 (1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Motives in Contract] (arguing that liberal 
courts should use the inequality of bargaining power doctrine as a weapon to favor disempow-
ered classes). . 
48. See supra note 15. 
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body of knowledge in favor of gut-level conclusions regarding the rela-
tive power of the parties before them. 
The development of a sophisticated legal approach to analyzing 
power issues requires an understanding by legal decisionmakers and 
commenters of how parties use and assess power in real-world applica-
tions. Part III.A begins this process by examining practical definitions of 
the concept of "power" both within and without the legal system and the 
inherent difficulties in isolating a definition that can work in the legal 
context. Part III.B continues by crafting a framework for assessing dif-
ferent forms of power. Specifically, power is omnipresent, complex, and 
dynamic. All actors have some form of power in their relationships, the 
phenomenon of power is incredibly complex and may take on forms not 
readily apparent to legal observers, and power relationships have the ca-
pacity to change dynamically at any time throughout the relationship. By 
recognizing these fundamental characteristics of power, legal decision-
makers may be better able to craft the nuanced models of power relation-
ships necessary to assign credible legal responses to practical uses of 
power. 
A. Definitions of Power 
Power has long eluded adequate definition. As one prominent social 
theorist stated, power describes something key to the human experience: 
That some people have more power than others is one of the most 
palpable facts of human existence. Because of this, the concept of 
power is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast. 
If these assertions needed any documentation, one could set up an 
endless parade of great names from Plato and Aristotle through Ma-
chiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto and Weber to demonstrate that a large 
number of seminal social theorists have devoted a good deal of atten-
tion to power and the phenomena associated with it.49 
Despite this attention, the systematic study of power as a social and 
political phenomenon is a recent development. 50 Even in the social and 
political sciences, where it might be expected that some clarity would be 
achieved given the integral role of power, scholars have failed to estab-
lish a commonly accepted or clear definition. 5 I 
49. Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY 
AND RESEARCH 79 (Roderick Bell et al. eds., 1969). 
50. See id. 
5!. See id. (describing the study of power as "a bottomless swamp"); see also Nina Burk-
ardt et aI., Power Distribution in Complex Environmental Negotiations: Does Balance Mat-
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"Power" is elusive because the word is often used to define and de-
scribe many different aspects of the human experience. 52 Power typi-
cally describes-in courts, politics, war, sports, and other contexts-an 
ability to affect or obtain a preferred outcome.53 But beyond such gener-
alities, further attempts to produce a unified definition disintegrate into 
such disputes as arguments over the source(s) ofpower;54 whether power 
ter?, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 247 (1997) (surveying past attempts to define power 
in social and political sciences and noting wide disagreements over definitions). 
52. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 49, at 79 (describing cynical suspicion that power may be 
"a Thing to which people attach many labels with subtly or grossly different meanings in many 
different cultures and times [such that it] is probably not a Thing at all, but many Things"). 
53. See, e.g., Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 8 ("Most observers agree that the 
critical element of power is the ability to have one's way, either by influencing others to do 
one's bidding or by gaining their acquiescence to one's action."); SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 
23 ("Bargaining power is the power to set the terms of a contract."); JEFFREY PFEFFER, 
POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS 2 (1981) [hereinafter PFEFFER, POWER] ("Most definitions of 
power include an element indicating that power is the capability of one social actor to over-
come resistance in achieving a desired objective or result."). Even this basic definition is in-
complete. For example, to the extent that the definition implies a contest between two actors, 
many negotiators would argue that it assumes a zero sum game in which one side must lose in 
the power relationship for the other to gain. See, e.g., Talcott Parsons, On the Concept of Po-
litical Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 
251, 251-52 (noting tendency of social theorists to assume power is a zero-sum phenomenon 
and that there is a fixed quantity of power available in relation systems); see also PFEFFER, 
POWER, supra at 4-6 (suggesting that exercise of raw power imposes costs, while exercise of 
legitimate power-i.e., authority-"far from diminishing through use, may actually serve to 
enhance the amount of authority subsequently possessed"). Fisher and Ury famously shifted 
the negotiation paradigm a little over two decades ago in advocating a problem-solving ap-
proach to bargaining. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 9-14 (2d ed. 1991). Within this new paradigm, bargainers 
seek to maximize value for both sides by recognizing their mutual interests and attempting to 
craft a "win-win" solution. See generally id. at 17-94. Importantly, while Fisher and Ury ac-
knowledged the existence of bargaining power disparities in some situations, id. at 97 ("[n]o 
method can guarantee success if all the leverage lies on the other side"), they also noted that in 
cooperative bargaining, power arises, inter alia, from developing good alternatives to negoti-
ated agreements and crafting agreements based upon options for mutual gain. See id. at 56-80, 
97-106. Other sources of bargaining power in the problem-solving paradigm include develop-
ing good working relationships with the opposing party, understanding interests, inventing 
elegant options, and using external standards oflegitimacy. See id. at 179-183. 
54. See, e.g., GEOFFREY DEBNAM, THE ANALYSIS OF POWER: CORE ELEMENTS AND 
STRUCTURE 1 (1984). Debnam describes three schools of thought on the structure of power. 
The reputational or elitist school presumes that power is "socially structured, and that its study 
must start from a statement of the nature of its structure." [d. In contrast, the decision-making 
school-associated primarily with Robert DahI-"denie[ s] that power is necessarily struc-
tured ... and arguers] that the only valid evidence about power [is] to be derived from a study 
of action in the decision-making arena." [d. The third school-the neo-elitists-argues that 
the operation of power within social structures is generally diffuse and therefore requires 
"greater sensitivity to problems of evidence" in assessing that operation. [d. This third ap-
proach parallels the central thesis of this Article that the judicial approach to assessing power 
relationships focuses only on simple social structures as the source of power imbalances be-
tween actors and must adapt to recognize that power is a complex and sophisticated phenome-
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includes physical coercion, influence, positive sanctions, negative sanc-
tions,55 as well as a host of other variables; whether power can exist out-
side of relationships,56 and various other disagreements that have neither 
end nor solution.57 Some definitions of power include:' 
, • "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do some-
thing that B would not otherwise do."58 
• "Power is the ability to impose cost."59 
• "'Power' (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance ... "60 
• Power is "the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, 
to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the man-
ner which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being 
modified in the manner in which he does not."61 
• "[P]ower refers to all kinds of influence between persons or 
groups, including those exercised in exchange transactions, 
where one induces others to accede to his wishes by rewarding 
them for doing so."62 
• "Power ... is the knowing capacity to determine some aspect(s) 
of the future, or to determine the range of available futures from 
which such choices are made. "63 
• Power is man's "present means, to obtain some future apparent 
Good."64 
non requiring a more nuanced approach to evidence of relationships between bargaining par-
ties. 
55. See, e.g., Peter Blau, Differentiation of Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN 
THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 293 (noting distinction and relationships between 
coercive physical power, influence, and influence through negative and positive sanctions). 
56. See R. Harrison Wagner, The Concept of Power and the Study of Politics, in 
POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 3 (disputing that 
power necessarily requires relationships to exist); DEBNAM, supra note 54, at 1-2 (describing 
ongoing social sciences debate over whether power arises from particular social structures or 
from decision making process). 
57. See Marcia Lynn Whicker et aI., The Troublesome Cleft: Public Administration and 
Political Science, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 531, 534 (1993) ("Attempts to use power as a main 
variable for political science ... have reached a limit."). 
58. Dahl, supra note 49, at 80. 
59. YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE 18 (2002). 
60. MAx WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 152 (A.M. 
Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947). 
61. R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 211 (1931). 
62. Blau, supra note 55, at 293 (1969). 
63. Douglas W. Rae, Knowing Power: A Working Paper, in POWER, INEQUALITY, AND 
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT A. DAHL 17,40 (Ian Shapiro and 
Grant Reeher eds., 1988). 
64. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 150 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) 
(1651). 
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• Power is "the production of intended effects. "65 
This list of definitions of power only touches the surface-one 
scholar argues, in fact, that "there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, 
of. . . definitions of social power, or of the power of men over other 
men, in the literature of social science .... "66 
The power struggle, so to speak, over a definition may derive in part 
from the fact that students of power have been attempting to combine 
many different things under the umbrella of a single definition, sort of a 
general theory of power.67 Another potential reason for the inability of 
observers to capture the notion of power may be that the concept itself is 
inherently pre-verbal and the ultra-rationality of modem academic lan-
guage lacks the tools to convey a meaningful sense of that concept. The 
variety and complexity of social, political, psychological and economic 
inputs may make accurate and comprehensive observation and explana-
tion of the raw, elemental workings of power impossible. Or, perceptions 
of power change over time so that the definitions of the past fail to de-
scribe the sources or uses of power in the present. For instance, the 
power of a church or a community to ostracize, excommunicate or ban a 
person-although still significant today-is much diminished from the 
real consequences of such actions in the past. 68 Regardless, no single 
definition has accurately captured either power in general or the totality 
of its component elements.69 
The disagreements surrounding every aspect of power flow into the 
legal arena where courts appear especially reticent to grapple with the 
exercise of power, or even acknowledge its existence outside of a few 
discrete forums. On the one hand, "power" often substitutes for the de-
rivative concept of "authority"-the ability of the state, through its 
agents, to coerce individual actors within the polity into obeying the sov-
ereign's commandsJo In this sense, power always connotes the sover-
eign's right to enforce individual compliance through the state's monop-
65. BERTRAND RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 35 (1938). 
66. D.H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES AND USES 2 (1979). 
67. See Dahl, supra note 49, at 79. 
68. See, e.g., Julia Duin, McCarrick Tempered Letter on Pro-Choice Politicians, WASH. 
TIMES, July 7, 2004, at Al (describing attempts by American Catholic bishops to avoid Vati-
can directive to deny communion to politicians who support abortion rights). 
69. See Burkardt, et aI., supra note 51, at 250 (surveying scholarly attempts to define 
power for research purposes and noting "power has not been precisely defined"). 
70. See RICHARD EpSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 6 (2003) [hereinafter EpSTEIN, 
SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM] (arguing that government compulsion to protect individual prop-
erty, autonomy and contract rights within the state is always necessary to some degree and not-
ing, "[t]he key is to make sure that we choose it, so that it is not imposed by conquest"). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the necessary role of authority in supporting the continued exis-
tence of any organized group, see THOMAS MOLNAR, AUTHORITY AND ITS ENEMIES (1976). 
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oly on the legitimate use of force. Applied correctly, such coercion may 
be ''justified on the ground that it allows all individuals to achieve a 
higher state of well-being than they could do by their own efforts .... "71 
Power also may refer to the legal capacity or authorization to do 
some act.72 Used in this way, power concerns the capacity of individuals 
to enter enforceable agreements on their own behalf. Courts specifically 
investigate and analyze this concept of power, for example, in cases of 
infancy, incompetence or inebriation. The "capacity" connotation of 
power also represents the idea of the right or authority to enter into bind-
ing commitments on behalf of others, as with agency and competency. 73 
The connotation of power as capacity still relates loosely to the "au-
thority" dimension in that it describes that set of agreements not subject 
to enforcement through operation of the power of the state by appeal to 
the sovereign authority. The sovereign has declared that in cases of inca-
pacity it has removed from the incapacitated person some or all power or 
authority to bargain legally. Those who bargain with the incapacitated 
may be denied the benefits of their "tainted" bargain 74 as the state re-
fuses the competent party seeking enforcement access to its coercive ma-
chinery. 
Even the sovereign's control of the economic regulatory scheme 
governs the capacity of actors within that regime to determine the out-
come of their interactions with other actors. Thus, the economic regime 
itself-the recognition of a need to regulate the distribution of scarce re-
sources among individuals with varying demands for those resources-
may be said to be inherently coercive.75 Importantly, participants within 
71. EpSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 70, at 7. 
72. See, e.g., WESLEY N. HOHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS ApPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23, 50-60 (Walter w. Cook ed., 1923) (analyzing 
power as one element of complex scheme of jural relations and jural correlatives and defining 
legal power as the ability to affect the legal relation of another actor and illustrating concept of 
legal power, inter alia, by reference to power of agents to bind principals and power of offerees 
to create contractual relations by accepting offers). 
73. See, e.g., I FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 712 (2d ed. 
1914) (distinguishing between authority of agent granted by principal and power of agent to 
bind principal in absence of legitimate authority). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 6 (1958) defmes power as "an ability on the part of a person to produce a change in a given 
legal relation by doing or not doing a given act." While power may be exercised legitimately 
or illegitimately by an agent to bind its principal, authority means a particular kind of power of 
an agent "to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the prin-
cipal's manifestations of consent to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958). 
74. See, e.g., Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd. of N.Y., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) 
(invalidating contract executed by mentally incompetent party despite that pension payment 
method designated in contract was financially rational at time of contracting). 
75. See Warren J. Samuels, The Concept of 'Coercion' in Economics, in WARREN 1. 
SAMUELS ET AL., THE ECONOMY AS A PROCESS OF VALUATION 141 (1997) ("At an extremely 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 159 2005
2005] INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER 159 
these systems likely are not to view the operation of such ground rules as 
giving rise to greater power in one actor over the otherJ6 But these 
background rules may give rise to the strongest bargaining power in a 
transaction. In a transaction for the sale of real property in a capitalist re-
gime, for instance, the underlying regime of property rights generally 
support the owner's right to refuse to sell. As a result, the property owner 
possesses substantial power in determining the outcome of the transac-
tion. If that were the only relationship relevant to the parties' power in 
this transaction, the owner could be said to have power over the potential 
buyer with respect to the question of whether the exchange takes place. 77 
In the legal sense, power also may refer to a relation between two 
interacting parties. 78 The interaction may be involuntary-as with crimes 
or torts--or voluntary, as with contracts and other private orderings. In 
this application, power is uniquely concerned with the ability of private 
parties to influence or coerce 79 one another to their respective preferred 
outcomes.80 Power in this sense is most clearly a contest, not an ability, 
high level of abstraction ... one can perceive that the economy by its very nature is a condi-
tion or process of generalized, existential coercion quite independent of any other, more spe-
cific, connotation or facet of coercion .... "); see also HOHFELD, supra note 72, at 50-60. 
76. See Samuels, supra note 75, at lSI (distinguishing intrasystemic perceptions of coer-
cion specific to particular economic systems from intersystemic perceptions of coercion). 
77. See id. at lSI-53; see also The Peppercorn Theory, supra note 27, at 1092 ("Bargain-
ing power exists only because of government protection of the property rights bargained, and 
is properly subject to government contro1."). While government recognition of property rights 
is clearly not the only source of bargaining power, see infra Part I1LB.2.a, the Peppercorn 
Note captures the key point that a great deal of bargaining power analysis depends upon back-
ground rules enforced by the State. 
78. Note that in this context, even the state may be treated much like a private party at the 
bargaining table. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300-304 
(1942) (impliedly comparing bargaining power of steel manufacturer in wartime with that of 
federal government); see also id. at 314, 336 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing United 
States did not have bargaining power to compel unwilling organization to build ships for war 
effort and that "[d]uring wartime the bargaining position of the Government ... is inherently 
weak"). 
79. See, e.g., Blau, supra note 55, at 293 (1969) (distinguishing between power based on 
ability to coerce others through threatened negative sanctions and influence based on ability to 
convince others through promises of rewards and incentives). See also Robert L. Hale, Coer-
cion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470-71 (1923) 
[hereinafter Hale, Coercion and Distribution] (noting pervasiveness of coercion in every legal 
system). 
80. Such private orderings always take place against the background power of the state to 
police the conduct of each of the parties. In a legal context and on a very abstract level, the 
concept of an economy, as well as particular economic systems, allocate power that is both 
visible and real between actors in any social transaction. This power includes power arising 
from operation of the economic system within which the actors are engaging in their social 
transactions. Every economic system imposes ground rules upon the actors within that system 
that allocates power among those actors. This is obvious in a socialist economic system, 
where state managers direct economic transactions. See Samuels, supra note 75, at 150-51. 
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right, authority, or capacity.Sl Each party to this contest expends his or 
her power in attempting to obtain a preferred outcome vis-a-vis the other 
party to the transaction. 
B. Characteristics of Power 
The sources of disagreement over a working defmition of power 
nonetheless illustrate three key characteristics of power that render 
power difficult to employ as a legal concept: Power is (1) omnipresent, 
(2) complex, and (3) dynamic. 
1. Power is Omnipresent 
Power exists in every relationship between two or more actors. It is 
impossible to describe an interaction in which power is not present to 
some extent.S2 The statement "A has power" is meaningless. The first 
impulse of the reader of such a statement should be to ask "Power to do 
what?" While we may state the answer in terms of A's ability to affect 
her physical surroundings (such as by lifting a rock), we have still de-
scribed A's power in terms of her relationship with something else. Con-
Samuels notes that coercion-and by direct implication the use of power by a stronger actor to 
control and direct the actions of a weaker actor-is intrinsic to any economic system: 
Each economic system-whatever the taxonomy: capitalism, socialism, mixed 
economy, and so on~omprises a distinctive mode of organization and control of 
economic life; a particular system of freedom, control and power; a particular sys-
tem of the human control, discipline and use of the human labor force; a particular 
system of institutions in control and liberation of individuals; a different regulatory, 
or coordinating, mechanism; and so on. It is not surprising, therefore, that coercion 
can be perceived in both the very nature of particular economic systems and in the 
operation of each system. 
[d. But such coercive forces also exist in capitalist regimes, where basic rules such as regulat-
ing rights in property and defIning the types of transactions that will be enforced by state ac-
tion act coercively upon the participants in that regime. See id. at 151-53 (discussing coercive 
nature of capitalist economic systems and surveying arguments that capitalist regimes are co-
ercive despite apparent commitment to voluntary individual action as motive force of eco-
nomic transaction). Samuels notes that capitalist systems may be described as coercive in the 
goal of such systems to organize human labor, "channel the human desire to succeed by com-
pelling individuals to get ahead only by serving others through producing a saleable good or 
service," and by coercing producers to minimize costs through the competition mechanism. 
See id. at 152. 
S1. Cf Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 13-14 (describing exercise of power as a 
contest and noting that "[a]bsent the actual contest, each side must guess about the other's 
power"). 
S2. See. e.g., Dahl, The Concept of Power, supra note 49, at SO ("First, let us agree that 
power is a relation, and that it is a relation among people."); see also PFEFFER, POWER, supra 
note 53, at 3 ("It is also generally agreed that power characterizes relationships among social 
actors."). 
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sequently, it is impossible to assess the meaning of "A has power" with-
out including something or someone upon which A can act. In contrast, 
the statement "A has power over B" does have meaning. It communi-
cates that in some sense A can act upon B in a way that B cannot act 
upon A-and thereby affect B in a way that A itself cannot be affected. 
The statement describes something about the relationship between A and 
B and something about the outcome of that relationship. 
This is particularly salient in a legal context. Law systemizes and 
regulates human relationships-it forms the social, economic and politi-
cal grease that permits society to operate. Even outside the law (assum-
ing such a backward step is possible), power requires a relationship to 
have meaning. Power in a purely Hobbesian state of nature-the chaotic 
war of all against a1l83-exists theoretically only in a situation where 
there are no laws or rules to guide behavior.84 In that system, one indi-
vidual may gain a temporary advantage with respect to all other "ordi-
nary" individuals.85 While such individual power likely is minimal at 
best-even the strongest must sleep86-forms of power will exist in any 
relationship. 
While power exists independently of law, at the same time law can 
create and promote certain forms and sources of power. Agreed on rules 
create power of a special kind as mandated by the terms established by 
the rules, and also inhibit, prohibit, permit or promote natural forms of 
power. Once individuals acting in common agree upon a set of rules or 
laws to guide their behavior, even if the rules are as gross as "let's wait 
until the jerk is asleep and bash his head with a rock," the relation be-
83. See HOBBES, supra note 64, at 185 ("[D]uring the time men live without a cornmon 
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a 
warre, as is of every man, against every man."). 
84. Cf id. at 188 ("Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no 
Injustice."). Hobbes, despite his infamous speculation that Native Americans lived in such a 
state of nature, admitted that it was unlikely that a state of nature ever existed as a general 
proposition: 
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre 
as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are 
many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of 
America . .. have no government at all .... 
Id. at 187. 
85. Hobbes concludes that human beings are equal in abilities, so long as the equality is 
measured over time and it is recognized that any apparent advantages of one person over an-
other are by nature temporary and may be overcome as others vie for the same advantages. 
See id. at 183 ("[T]he difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one 
man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as 
he."). 
86. See id. at 183 ("For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill 
the strongest, either by 'secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same 
danger with himselfe."). 
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tween law and power arises. Collectively, the power of the group will be 
far more than the power of the one. To the extent that relationship devel-
ops to a Rule of Law system, law functions to remove the conditions of 
the Hobbesian state,87 creates limits to individual power and defines the 
conditions in which there is a communitarian balance of power while 
(theoretically) still allowing the individual a substantial freedom of ac-
tion. 
The presence of power in a relationship between one or more actors 
is inescapable, and this fact is especially obvious in market-based eco-
nomic interactions. As the Kansas Supreme Court observed in State v. 
Coppage,88 the financial situation of employees generally limited their 
ability to reject onerous contracts: 
The Legislature, in passing the act in question, probably also took 
into consideration a fact of general knowledge that employees, as a 
rule, are not financially able to be as independent in making contracts 
for the sale of their labor as are employers in making a contract of 
purchase thereof. 
To many the demands for housing, food, and clothing for their fami-
lies and the education of their children brook no interruption of 
wages to the bread-winner. Necessity may compel the acceptance of 
unreasonable and unjust demands.89 
In any competitive system involving actors of varying levels of 
skill, with different needs, desires and goals, every scarce resource-
including bargaining power-will be subject to unequal distributions. As 
Robert Hale recognized in the 1920s, coercion-the use of power to 
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
88. 125 P. 8 (Kan. 1912). 
89. Id. at 10-11; see also SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 14-15 (analyzing Kansas Supreme 
Court's reasoning regarding relative bargaining power in Coppage). The United States Su-
preme Court implicitly accepted the Kansas Court's relation between property and the ability 
to hold out for better terms, but concluded that wealth-and thus, implicitly, power-
disparities are an inevitable result of any economic or legal system that recognizes individual 
property rights and freedom of contract: 
[S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in cornmon, some persons 
must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to 
uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same 
time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary re-
sult of the exercise of those rights. 
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). Cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madi-
son) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights 
of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The pro-
tection of these faculties is the first object of government."). 
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force another to act in a preferred manner-lies at the foundation of 
every distributional transaction, even in regimes that purport to enforce 
freedom of contract.90 Hale argued that distribution of income in a free 
market regime "depends on the relative power of coercion which the dif-
ferent members of the community can exert against one another. "91 
Within such a community, every person-individually or in concert with 
others having similar interests-possesses coercive tools that can compel 
or influence others to increase distribution of societal resources to that 
individual or interest group, including the power to withhold labor, to use 
existing wealth to purchase a greater share of resources, to establish 
competing enterprises, and to petition for favorable government action.92 
Because power is present in every relationship and every actor has 
some degree of power of some type (whether active or obstructionist in 
nature), judicial intervention into private contracts cannot meaningfully 
tum upon the determination that one party to a relationship lacks power. 
No such situation exists nor can exist. Even the most intuitively obvious 
case of an apparently "absolute" disparity of bargaining power-the 
hoary "your money or your life" demand by the highwayman or tax col-
lector-never really removes all power from the victim of the duress.93 
A victim of the most extreme coercion still possesses some power to 
choose between unpleasant alternatives: 
We have talked of contracts signed under duress as lacking "real con-
sent. ... " When I feel that I must choose between having a bullet 
lodged in my head and signing a contract, my desire to escape the 
bullet would hardly be described as unreal or merely apparent; and 
the signing of the contract is simply the expression of that fear of 
90. See Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 79, at 474; Robert L. Hale, Bargain-
ing, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 625 (1943) [hereinafter Hale, 
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty] (free market society creates inequality of distribu-
tion and therefore inequality of bargaining power). 
91. See Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 79, at 474. 
92. See id. ("But were it once recognized that nearly all incomes are the result of private 
coercion, some with the help of the state, some without it, it would then be plain that to admit 
the coercive nature of the process would not be to condemn it. "). 
93. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) ("If a party's manifesta-
tion of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no rea-
sonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim."). Other examples of apparently 
absolute bargaining power disparities abound in contract law. Cases of fraud can be seen as an 
absolute disparity of bargaining power-{)ne party to the contract misrepresents material in-
formation upon which the injured party reasonably relies and thereby presents the injured party 
with only the illusion of power to bargain over the outcome. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 ("If a misrepresentation as to the character or essential terms 
of a proposed contract induces conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by one who 
neither knows nor has reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the 
proposed contract, his conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent."). 
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death. . .. Faced with the choice that was offered, the victim of du-
ress gives a genuine consent rather than suffer the alternative conse-
quences.94 
The victim of the most egregious fonns of duress still retains con-
siderable power over the situation. He may comply, or he may resist. The 
power of confronting unjust opponents as a choice was made obvious by 
Gandhi's and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s use of passive disobedience as a 
tool to achieve their social aims. If the victim resists and fails-and thus 
concludes the encounter as a martyred corpse, an unconscious body or a 
part of the penal system such as Nobel Peace Prize winners Nelson Man-
dela of South Africa95 and Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma96-the victim 
still retains the power to affect the outcome of the interaction with the 
stronger party. Unconscious victims require disposal or their evidence 
can increase the likelihood of apprehension; corpses create their own 
problems of concealment and disposal, and convicts impose substantial 
costs upon the penal system.97 All of these outcomes, however, have a 
real impact upon the ability of the criminal or tax collector to engage in 
their livelihood and thus demonstrate the power of the victim to affect 
the outcome of his or her interaction with the criminal or tax collector. 
Thus, even in situations involving apparently absolute disparities of 
power, the weaker party still has some degree or fonn of power. That 
power may be insufficient to obtain the most preferred outcome to the 
situation-i.e., a happy ending in which the heroic fonner victim over-
94. Dalzell, supra note 25, at 238-39. 
95. See, e.g., Thomas Kamm, Mandela Declares Victory in Election, Mixing Conciliatory 
Tone, Warnings, WALL ST. 1., May 3, 1994, at AlO (describing Nelson Mandela's election as 
president of South Africa after twenty-seven years in prison). 
96. See, e.g., Colin L. Powell, It's Time to Turn the Tables on Burma's Thugs, WALL ST. 
J., June 12, 2003, at A16 (describing political struggles of Aung San Suu Kyi to restore de-
mocracy to Burma, despite numerous periods of imprisonment and physical attacks by ruling 
Burmese military dictatorship). 
97. For example, many non-violent activists "go limp" when their civil disobedience 
prompts police to initiate an arrest because doing so imposes greater costs in terms of time and 
manpower upon the arresting officers than cooperating. See, e.g., Bruce Hartford, Notes from 
a Non-Violent Training Session (1963), at http://www.crmvet.org/info/nvl.htm (last visited 
Nov. I, 2004) (noting different tactics for going limp as described during training for activists 
in 1963); CPT Public Witness, Arrest, Jail and Court: Making Choices, at 
http://www.cpt.org/publicwitness/arrest.php (last visited Nov. I, 2004) (advising making 
choice between cooperating with arresting officer or going limp before time of arrest); 
ENVIRONMENT DEFENDERS OFFICE VICTORIA, HASSLE-FREE NON-VIOLENT ACTION: A 
RESOURCE FOR ACTIVISTS 8, at http://www.edo.org.auledoviclPublications/4_hassleFreeNon-
violentAction.PDF (last visited Sept. 28, 2004) (recommending protesters refrain from resist-
ing arrest, defined as "doing anything other than voluntarily going along with the police officer 
or going limp and allowing yourself to be carried away"). Likewise, generation of corpses or 
unconscious bodies creates higher risks of severe or capital punishment and greater difficulties 
in disposing of evidence. 
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comes the aggressor-but the actual achievement of preferred outcomes 
is not relevant to the question of whether an actor has power in any given 
situation. 
Actors dependent upon a practical, real-world analysis of power 
must assume the omnipresence of power on both sides of their relation-
ships. The highwayman, for example, cannot presume that merely be-
cause he has a gun and has issued the famous "stand and deliver" direc-
tive that his victims are powerless and incapable of successful resistance. 
The tax collector must continue to exercise her coercive powers through 
various enforcement mechanisms lest the taxpayer decide to abscond, re-
fuse to pay, or engage in fraud. Likewise, given that all parties have 
some power in every relationship, the legal system's response to power 
must-like the practical analysis of power-address not the presence or 
absence of power as an outcome determinative factor, but rather the 
quantities of bargaining power on either side of a transaction.98 Conse-
quently, contract law requires courts to examine bargains for abuses of 
"superior" bargaining power.99 At that point, the inquiry shifts from at-
tempting to discern the absence or presence of power to assessing the 
sources of power and the degrees to which each party to the interaction 
possesses the particular kind of power deemed relevant to the situa-
tion,100 and whether it existed at a point in time .deemed meaningful by 
the court. 
98. Assessing the quantity or amount of bargaining power held by parties to a transaction 
may in fact be an irreducibly complex endeavor. See, e.g., James G. March, Preferences, 
Power, and Democracy, in POWER, INEQUALITY, AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF ROBERT A. DAHL 50,51-53 (Ian Shapiro & Grant Reeher eds., 1988). As March 
observes, the attempt to compare relative power presupposes that "there exists a metric by 
which the extent to which one person has induced others to contribute to this [sic] or her inter-
ests can be compared with the extent to which others have done so." Id. at 51. But given that 
power depends largely upon subjective preferences that change over time (cf TAWNEY, supra 
note 61, at 211-12 (noting relationship between power and preferences)), power cannot be un-
ambiguously measured between two parties to a transaction. See March, supra, at 51-53. 
99. See, e.g., SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 23 ("A lack of bargaining power in one or both 
parties is a reason for limiting their freedom of contract, their contracting power, or both. "). 
100. This principle is partly enshrined in the doctrines explicitly employing inequality of 
bargaining power. For example, the comments to U.e.e. § 2-302 explicitly acknowledge that 
the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is not to upset allocations of risk resulting merely 
from superior bargaining power. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cm!. 1 (1989). Likewise, other contract 
defenses depending in part upon inequality of bargaining power purport to avoid interfering 
with contracts where the party with superior bargaining power does not abuse that bargaining 
power in achieving a favorable outcome. See Barry J. Reiter, The Control of Contract Power, 
I OXFORD 1. LEGAL STUD. 347, 368-70 (1981) ("The courts are concerned with preventing the 
exaction of too great an advantage from positions of power, irrespective of whence the power 
derives."). 
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2. Power is Complex 
Power is a "complex, multidimensional parameter."101 This com-
plexity arises from two primary sources. First, power is a situational 
phenomenon. I 02 The amount of power an actor may have in any given 
situation depends entirely upon the situation and the other actor or actors 
in the power relationship.103 Power may be generated from a multitude 
of sources, but no single factor, or set of factors, can give an actor power 
to control every situation. Second, power has many forms and comprises 
not only visible displays of a real ability to affect an outcome, but also 
includes hidden assets and the ability to deceive others regarding the na-
ture, extent or source of one's own power. Combined, both factors con-
tribute to the difficulties and costs of accurately assessing and measuring 
relative power disparities, either at the time of the interaction or on a post 
hoc basis. 
a. Sources of Power 
An actor's power can derive from a potentially infinite number of 
sources and contexts. 104 On a political, national, or international level, 
sources may include military capability, economic strength, political in-
fluence, and willingness to engage in conflict or exercise power. 105 Or-
101. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING 
AND NEGOTIATION 257-58 (1975). 
102. See WEBER, supra note 60, at 153. 
103. See Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 11-12. "Power's complexity stems no 
doubt from its highly situational nature---even slight changes in a setting may substantially 
affect the underlying power dynamics." Id. at II. 
104. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 60, at 153 ("The concept of power is highly comprehen-
sive from the point of view of sociology. All conceivable qualities of a person and all con-
ceivable combinations of circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given 
situation.") (emphasis added); MICHAEL PALMER & SIMON ROBERTS, DISPUTE PROCESSES: 
ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION MAKING 70 (1998) ("[W]hile respective 
sources of power inform the outcome of negotiations, power sources are multiple and impon-
derable. "). Hobbes, for example, lists over thirty different sources of power in his discussion 
on the nature of that phenomenon, including strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, riches, 
reputation, patriotism, organization, fortune, affability, and knowledge. See HOBBES, supra 
note 64, at 150. 
105. See, e.g., I MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER: A HISTORY OF 
POWER FROM THE BEGINNING TO A.D. 1760, at 2 (1986) (identifying four sources of social 
power: "ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships"); Marcia Lynn 
Whicker et aI., The Troublesome Cleft: Public Administration and Political Science, 53 PUB. 
ADMIN. REv. 531, 533-34 (1993) ("Various forms of power, such as military power, economic 
power, and political penetrative power have been found to form the power capabilities of na-
tion-states."); UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, SMALL WARS MANUAL ~ 2-3 (1940) [herein-
after SMALL WARS MANUAL] (listing enemy political status, economic status, information, 
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ganizations may obtain power from wealth, ability to dominate relevant 
markets, the goods or services provided by that organization, claims to 
moral, intellectual, political, or economic legitimacy, and many other 
factors. 106 
For individuals, power likewise typically is seen as related to an in-
dividual's personal wealth, political connections, education, experience, 
and socio-economic status.107 Individuals within organizations may ac-
quire power over others through the ability to dole out positive and nega-
tive sanctions to subordinates while resisting negative sanctions from su-
periors l08 or the ability to motivate the organization to support their 
personal goals. 109 And individual power can arise from access to infor-
mation, knowledge, or skill, and-· most importantly-a willingness to 
use power once obtained. 1 10 
Complicating the identification of sources of power is the fact that 
the concept of "power" means different things in different contexts. In 
the military context, power often means the ability to cause an enemy to 
capitulate by proper application of force and violence, including intimi-
dation through threat and destructive potential. I I I In the political realm, 
security services, military materials, organization, and skill, as well as terrain and climate as 
factors relevant to assessing enemy strength in small wars). 
106. See PFEFFER, POWER, supra note 53, at 4-6 (discussing process of legitimation by 
which raw power is transformed into legitimate authority). 
107. See, e.g., Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 566-67 (noting that power 
disparities arise from class hierarchies, patriarchy and race); Brooke Overby, Contract in the 
Age of Sustainable Consumption, 27 1. Corp. L. 603, 615 (2002) (questioning assumption of 
equal bargaining power where parties have disparate ages, wealth, races, and/or genders); Ar-
thur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REv. 485, 556-57 ( 1967) (discussing tendency of equity courts to ascribe grossly stereotypical 
degrees of bargaining power to various classes, including the elderly, women and English 
seamen). 
108. See PFEFFER, POWER, supra note 53, at 5. Pfeffer notes that in many organizational 
structures, lower level employees may possess substantial power since by refusing to obey di-
rectives of superiors, the lower level employees could greatly hinder the operations of the or-
ganization. Id. That power to disrupt the organization, however, is limited by the employees' 
lack of authority to do so-if they engage in such actions it is likely the manager would im-
pose negative sanctions upon the employees that would limit their future power to disrupt. See 
id. at 4-5. The ultimate balance of the legitimate authority of the manager and the power of the 
lower level employee defines how well the organization will operate. See id. at 5-6. 
109. See also HOBBES, supra note 64, at 150 ("The Greatest of humane Powers, is that 
which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, 
or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will .... "). 
110. See Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 16 (noting that power arises from willing-
ness to use power); H. Lee Hetherington, The Wizard and Dorothy, Patton and Rommel: Ne-
gotiation Parables in Fiction and Fact, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 289, 311-15 (2001) (observing im-
portance of perceptions of other side's power, superior information, deception, and negotiation 
skills to successfully negotiating favorable outcomes). 
III. See generally SMALL WARS MANUAL, supra note 105 (detailing strategy and tactics 
for fighting "small wars"). 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 168 2005
168 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
power means the ability to marshal societal resources in support of a par-
ticular goal. I 12 Psychologically, power-or the perception of power-to 
influence the events or persons around us may be necessary for our men-
tal well-being. I 13 In the religious context, power may refer to a perceived 
association with supernatural forces or the charismatic ability to motivate 
the hearts and minds of adherents. I 14 Economic power may mean the 
ability of individuals, business entities or nations to withstand economic 
losses while maintaining a given standard of living. In the legal context 
"power" can substitute for authority, capacity,115 or-in the case of con-
tract transactions-the ability to obtain preferred terms in the parties' 
bargain.116 Although power may take different forms in different con-
texts, these disparate forms can to some extent inform analysis of power 
in other contexts. I 17 
Even attempts to categorize the sources of power in a single con-
text-bargaining-presents an array of potential sources of power that 
defies easy summary. As Hale observed, coercive power in the bargain-
ing context starts with a recognition by party A that party B has some-
thing A wants. I 18 The moment of formation of A's desire creates the first 
bargaining power, depending solely on the strength of A's desire.1l9 In 
situations where A's desire for what B has is great and A will bear sig-
nificant costs ifhe is unable to obtain what B has, we might describe A's 
situation as one of "necessity" and identify A's bargaining power as 
112. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 64, at 150-51. 
113. See Yuval Feldman, Control or Security: A Therapeutic Approach to the Freedom of 
Contract, 18 TOURO L. REv. 503 (2002). 
114. Cf JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 38-46 (1983) (discussing 
role of personality in personal power of figures such as Moses, Confucius, Aristotle, Plato, 
Jesus, Mohammed, Marx and Gandhi). 
115. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. 
116. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 
947,974-75 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract at Wilf]. 
117. See, e.g., Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM. 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 149, 149 (1983) (noting confluence of negotiating power and military 
power in international relations: "At the international level, negotiating power is typically 
equated with military power. "). 
118. See Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 90, at 604. Hale 
argues that economic power begins with a party's desire for something that he does not have: 
Id. 
The owner of a shoe factory is in no danger of going ill-shod. . .. But he cannot 
live on shoes alone. Like everyone else, he must buy food or starve. . .. Any per-
son, in order to live, must induce some of the owners of things which he needs, to 
permit him to use them. The owner has no legal obligation to grant the permission. 
But if offered enough money he will probably do so; for he, too, must obtain the 
permission of other owners to make use of their goods, and for this purpose he too 
needs money-more than he has at the outset. 
119. See id.; TAWNEY, supra note 61, at 211-12 (noting relationship between preferences 
and power). 
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weak, compared to B. Alternatively, A may have little desire for B's 
goods or services, leading to the perception that B will have relatively 
little power to coerce or influence A's acceptance ofB's preferred terms. 
After the initial moment of desire, A's bargaining power-the abil-
ity to satisfy his desire at the least cost or to obtain a greater share of the 
surplus between the two parties' reservation prices l20-depends upon an 
ever increasing set of inputs determined by A's interaction with B. At the 
moment A approaches B, bargaining power depends initially upon (1) 
B's desire to retain the good or not perform the requested service; (2) the 
protection (or lack thereof) the underlying legal and economic regimes 
afford B's ability to retain or refuse the good or service; and (3) B's de-
sire-if any-to obtain something of value from A.121 
Once the parties begin bargaining, they initiate a contest over who 
can marshal the greatest amount of bargaining power and apply those re-
sources toward the goal of obtaining the greatest possible value from the 
other party at an exchange price equal to or less than their respective re-
serve prices. Without an actual contest, it is impossible to identify the 
power resources each party could bring to bear on the contest. 122 Even 
with such a contest, perceptions of power-by the parties themselves or 
in a post hoc judicial analysis-will rarely match the reality of the par-
ties' interaction. 
Further, the potential sources of power that may be brought to bear 
in the bargaining context are too numerous to catalog. Negotiation ex-
perts commonly identify a broad array of potential sources of bargaining 
power that may roughly be based upon characteristics of the parties and 
upon characteristics of the situation or transaction. Characteristics com-
monly associated with bargaining power in the negotiation context often 
include status-based characteristics such as monopoly,123 size or the abil-
ity to marshal organizational power,124 wealth,125 gender,126 educa-
120. See Epstein, Contract At Will, supra note 116, at 974-75 (defining bargaining power 
as the ability to obtain a greater share of the surplus than the other party to the bargain). 
121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
122. See Adler & Silverstein. supra note 26, at 13-14 (suggesting that without actual exer-
cise of power between parties, each side must guess at other side's actual resources). 
123. See Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 616-20 (assessing validity of 
traditional notions of unequal bargaining power caused by the public nature of the industry, the 
use of adhesion contracts, size, monopoly power, necessity, and shortage). 
124. See GALBRAITH, supra note 114, at 54-64 (analyzing relationship between power and 
organization); JEFFREY PFEFFER, MANAGING WITH POWER: POLITICS AND INFLUENCE IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 71-77 (1992) (power arises from personal characteristics, including status 
within organizations and ability to control resources within the organization, as well as situ-
ational factors); cf PALMER & ROBERTS, supra note 104, at 70-71 (noting particular problems 
arising from negotiation across ranks and in stratified contexts such as sovereign-subject, em-
ployer-employee, and producer-consumer contracts). 
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tion,127 and business sophistication. 128 The nature of the transaction it-
self may likewise give rise to bargaining power asymmetries, for exam-
ple where the subject matter of the bargain is deemed a public goodl29 or 
a necessity such as housing. 130 Finally, situational characteristics refer to 
sources of bargaining power arising from relatively mutable factors pe-
culiar to the specific bargaining interaction at issue. Such characteristics 
125. The relation between wealth and power has a long pedigree. See, e.g., GALBRAITH, 
supra note 114, at 47 ("The association between property and compensatory power is so sim-
ple and direct that in the past it has been considered comprehensive."); Adolf A. Berle & Gar-
diner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), reprinted in 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 155, 155-56 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) (discussing 
role of increasing concentration of wealth in corporate forms in shifting power from individu-
als to large business organizations); cf HOBBES, supra note 64, at 150 ("Also Riches joined 
with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends and servants: Without liberality, not so; 
because in this case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey."); Proverbs 22:7 
(King James) ("The rich ruleth over the poor, and the borrower is servant to the lender."). 
126. See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: 
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 10-12 (2003) (analyzing negotiation habits and psy-
chology based upon gender and noting areas in which women suffer from significant bargain-
ing power disadvantages); Overby, supra note 107 (questioning American contract law as-
sumption of equality of bargaining power and freedom of contract when considered in light of 
sources of inequality such as, inter alia, gender, wealth, age and race). 
127. See, e.g., Ahem v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (acknowledging 
plaintiff's ignorance of air conditioner maintenance and repair as one element of bargaining 
power analysis). 
128. See, e.g., Sanks McDowell, Party Autonomy in Contract Remedies, 57 S.U. L. Rev. 
429, 431 (1977) (observing that parties on higher level of distribution chains for goods and 
services have greater economic power, derived from greater business sophistication). 
129. See, e.g., Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 973 
(Wash. 1988) (holding that school district exercised decisive advantage of bargaining strength 
in requiring parents of schoolchildren seeking to participate in school district's wrestling pro-
gram to execute release as condition of participation in public program); Tunkl v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) ("As a result of the essential nature of the ser-
vice, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a de-
cisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his ser-
vices. "). 
130. Courts often hold, for example, that tenants have no bargaining power in dealing with 
prospective landlords and must meekly accept whatever terms the landlord seeks to impose 
through standard form lease contracts, without inquiry whether the tenant could have bar-
gained for different terms. See, e.g., Ransburg v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393, 401 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2002) ("[A]s a result of the essential nature of the service and the economic setting of the 
transaction, a residential landlord has a decisive advantage in bargaining strength against any 
member of the public who seeks its services."); Feld v. Meriam, 4 Phila. Co. Rptr. 511, 522 
(Pa. Com. PI. 1980) ("[T]he tenant has no bargaining power and must accept his landlord's 
terms. There is no meeting of the minds and the agreement is in effect a mere contract of ad-
hesion, ... a prospective tenant for an apartment being unable to bargain away an exculpatory 
clause, is not [a free bargaining agent].") (quoting Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301,304-05 
(1966»; see generally Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Les-
see, Negligence or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 19 (1975). 
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include the degree of necessity experienced by the parties,131 perceptions 
of the other party's power,132 the skill and expertise at bargaining that a 
party brings to the negotiation table,133 party access to information, 134 
cooperation and development of common interests between bargaining 
parties,135 the quality and nature of alternatives to a negotiated outcome 
available to each of the parties,136 and the legitimacy or moral power of 
the parties' negotiating positions. 
This partial list cannot exhaust the possible sources of power in the 
bargaining context. Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of this aryicle to 
attempt a catalog of even the broad categories of power sources that have 
been described and observed by negotiation experts, judges, and other 
legal commentators. Rather, it is important to note that assessment of 
even this partial list of potential factors in the bargaining power equation 
gives rise to a multifactor balancing test in which many of the factors are 
unquantifiable and often hard to define in terms of how they are reflected 
in the real world. 137 
Additionally, the mere fact that a party has the potential to use these 
sources of power does not require that the party actually use that power. 
In many cases, a party may be unaware of its actual power, may be un-
willing to incur the costs associated with the exercise of power, or may 
131. See, e.g., LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 25-26 (2d 
ed. 2001) (noting power disparities-in terms of lacking good alternatives to negotiated out-
come-arising from negotiating out of necessity); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Theory and the Limits o/Contract Law, 113 Yale L.l. 541, 553-54 (2003) (identifying bargain-
ing power as a function of (I) the parties' relative patience, and (2) each party's "disagreement 
point" or "next best option"). 
132. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 
§ 12.03[1] (4th ed. 2001) ("The strength of each party is determined more by perception than 
by actual circumstances.") (citing G.R. SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE III (1999) and 
R. LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION 296-97 (1994) (emphasis added)); Hetherington, supra note 
110, at 311-12 (explaining that bargaining power is largely based upon perceptions of the op-
posing party). 
133. See SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 30-31 (describing relationship between bargaining 
power and efficient contracting methods, including use of standard form contracts). 
134. See id. at 26-29 (describing importance of information to developing superior bar-
gaining power of producers over consumers). 
135. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 53, at 179-81 (describing the development of common 
interests between parties as source of bargaining power); LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING 
DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS, FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 17-19 
(2d ed. I 994)(same). 
136. FISHER ET AL., supra note 53, at 179, 183-84 (arguing that development of a good 
"Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement" ("BA TNA") generates substantial bargaining 
power and noting that parties legitimately may attempt to improve their own BA TNAs or 
worsen their opponents'); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 151-
81 (2002) (relating techniques for improving one's own BA TNA or diminishing opponent's 
BA TNA to gain greater bargaining power). 
137. Cf March, supra note 98, at 51-53 (noting difficulties inherent in measuring power). 
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just make a bad decision not to use power when in fact such use would 
be advantageous. In each of these cases, the failure to employ resources 
and thereby affect the outcome of the interaction is at base the fault of 
the party who fails to use power, not the opponent. 138 
h. "Forms" of Power 
Legal analysis depends primarily upon observed exercises of power 
or threats to exercise power proved to be held by one of the parties to the 
transaction. In the typical contract of adhesion case, for example, courts 
assume that the drafter of the adhesion contract had greater power than 
the adherent because the drafter presented the contract on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis and the adherent signed the contract. A court can observe 
the apparent exercise of power by the drafter and accept it as real. Alter-
natively, a drafter may threaten to withhold a valuable benefit that it has 
the authority to withhold. Again, the court sees the exercise of power and 
acknowledges that power as real. In essence, courts assess power as if 
they were monitoring a game of chess-the pieces are visible, the threats 
are known, and the moves are made in full view of the players. 
But this chess-like view of the interplay of power between two ac-
tors is often an incomplete picture of the actual use of power, regardless 
of whether the context is a commercial transaction or a military battle.139 
In contests of power, parties typically expend substantial energies at-
tempting to deceive each other regarding not only their intentions, goals 
and bargaining positions, but also to prevent the other party from obtain-
ing information about their actual degree of power. 140 This class of 
138. This is true despite that in most interactions, the opponent will be doing everything 
possible to prevent the other party from perceiving or using power to affect the interaction. 
139. Cf Emma Young, Chess! What is it good/or?, THE GUARDIAN, March 4, 2004, at 8, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.ukllife/feature/story/0.13026.1161128.00.html. 
[d. 
One major difference between chess and war is that chess does not contain what the 
military terms "information uncertainty." Unlike a battle commander, who may 
have incomplete intelligence about his opponent's level of weaponry or location of 
munitions depots, one chess player can always see the other's pieces, and note their 
every move. 
140. See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra note 53, at 129-143 (advocating techniques for protec-
tion of one's own negotiating position, settlement authority, and flexibility in the event of de-
ception or other "dirty tricks" by the opposing party); CRAVER, supra note 132, at §§ 6.01-
6.03 (describing techniques for protecting and obtaining information regarding bargaining po-
sitions and goals); HON. ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF NEGOTIATION FOR LA WYERS 68-69 
(1985) (relating dangers of over-disclosure of information and tactics for protection of party 
information in negotiations); DAVID R. BARNHIZER, THE WARRIOR LAWYER 237-243 (1997) 
(listing strategies for protecting information about clients' negotiation position); PALMER & 
ROBERTS, supra note 104, at 75-76 (In competitive negotiations, negotiator "manipulates both 
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power may be wholly hidden from the other side's knowledge, or a party 
may devote substantial effort to projecting a false image to the other side. 
Rather than chess, power interactions are better analogized to Seven-
Card Stud or Texas Hold-'em poker where all parties have incomplete 
information about each other's hands and actively practice deception re-
garding the strength of their own positions. 141 If one player folds, those 
cards remain hidden. The winning player may actually have the full 
house he claims to hold, but only has to reveal his cards if at least one 
other player is willing to call his bluff. 
The addition of hidden, deceptive and unexercised forms of power 
creates three dichotomies that may be used to describe a party's power-
power may be visible or hidden; real or false; and exercised or unexer-
cised. First, a party's ability to affect the outcome of the bargaining proc-
ess may be visible to the other party or hidden. Visible power is a form 
of power that is known to the other side in any interaction. In the military 
context, for example, the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured De-
struction ("MAD") depended not only upon both the United States and 
the Soviet Union maintaining highly visible stocks of nuclear missiles, 142 
but also upon repeated statements that each side was willing to use their 
nuclear weapons in response to any attack. 143 
In contrast, to be useful, hidden power often depends upon secrecy 
and the other side's ignorance of that power. For example, in negotia-
tions to conclude the Mexican-American War, the Mexican negotiators 
had secretly acquired an American draft treaty and negotiation instruc-
tions stating that the American negotiator should attempt to gain cession 
of Baja California, unless the Mexican negotiators refused to give up the 
region. 144 The Mexicans used this informational asset to preserve Baja 
California for Mexico. 145 In this instance, the information asset was hid-
people and process, in particular, trying to uncover as much as possible about the position of 
the other party and, at the same time, to mislead the other side about that negotiators' [sic] own 
situation."). 
141. See, e.g., Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 13-15 (noting that perceptions of bar-
gaining power are often as important as actual power, but parties' attempts to project false im-
pressions of power injects substantial uncertainty into measurement of bargaining power). 
142. See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, WE Now KNOW: RETHINKING COLD WAR HISTORY 85-86 
(1997) (following use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, United States and 
Soviet Union "turned out tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, most of which they aimed 
provocatively at one another"). 
143. For a detailed assessment of nuclear deterrence doctrines and strategies during the 
Cold War, see STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
(1998). 
144. See, e.g., Matthew Biggers, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, An Essay, available at 
http://historicaltextarchive.comlsections.php?op=viewarticle&artid=545 (last visited Oct. 29, 
2003). 
145. See id. 
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den from the American negotiators-indeed, had the American team 
known of the asset it would have lost all value because they would have 
known to demand Baja despite Mexican protests. 
Second, a party's power may be either real or false. Real power 
means power that, if used, would impose costs on the other side and ef-
fectively would assist the user in achieving a preferred outcome. The nu-
clear deterrent mentioned above146 might be one example of real power, 
although given that each side's threat to launch missiles if attacked was 
fortunately never tested, the world will never know. On the other hand, 
"Dirty" Harry Callahan's sixth round in his .44 Magnum represents a 
clear example of power in that it was proved real by the "punk" who was 
apparently "feeling lucky."147 
False or deceptive power, however, is power that depends upon one 
party's perceptions of the other party's capacity to achieve a preferred 
outcome. Deceptive power cannot be exercised or it becomes worthless. 
Montgomery's tactics at EI Alamein during the North Africa campaign 
of World War II provide one example of deceptive power. To convince 
Rommel that the main Allied attack would come from the south of the 
German-Italian position, Montgomery initiated a substantial plan of de-
ceptions, including elaborate mock-ups of Allied tanks and a false logis-
tical pipeline, placed to convince observers that Montgomery contem-
plated an eventual southern offensive. 148 At the same time, the real 
Allied tanks were disguised as trucks to hide their actual positions. 149 
Had Rommel at any time attacked the mock tanks, they would have 
proved worthless to holding the Allied position. But the deception suc-
146. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
147. 
I know what you're thinking, punk. You're thinking, did he fire six shots or only 
five? And to tell you the truth, I forgot myself in all this excitement. But being as 
this is a .44 Magnum, the most powerful handgun in the world and will blow your 
head clean off, you've got to ask yourself a question: do I feel lucky? Well do ya, 
punk? 
DIRTY HARRY (Malpaso Co. & Warner Bros. 1971). The punk attacked, and Harry Callahan 
had fired only five shots. 
148. See FIELD-MARSHALL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY, EL ALAMEIN TO THE RIvER 
SANGRO: NORMANDY TO THE BALTIC 22-23 (1948) [hereinafter MONTGOMERY] (describing 
elaborate visual deception leading up to October 23, 1942 battle of El Alamein); ALEXANDER 
MCKEE, EL ALAMEIN: ULTRA AND THE THREE BATTLES 141 (1991) (same). Beyond con-
structing the false pipeline to the south and maintaining mock tanks on a southern front, Mont-
gomery also built numerous false structures and placed remotely detonated explosives under 
false ammo dumps to be exploded in the event German planes bombed the ammo dumps. See 
TIM CLAYTON & PHIL CRAIG, THE END OF THE BEGINNING: FROM THE SIEGE OF MALTA TO 
THE ALLIED VICTORY AT EL ALAMEIN 286-87 (2002). 
149. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 148, at 17 ("In the Sherman we had at last a match for 
the German tanks."). 
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cess fully diverted Rommel's attention, kept his forces rooted in a defen-
sive position primarily focused on the "developing" southern battle line, 
and ultimately contributed substantially to Montgomery's successful at-
tack from the north. 150 
Third, power may be exercised or unexercised. Exercised power is 
that which a party attempts to use to obtain a desired outcome. Exercise 
alone does not say anything about whether the exercising party was ef-
fective in obtaining the preferred result, only that the party expended re-
sources to try to get to that result. Unexercised power means that a party 
has power that he or she did not use. As with the Cold War MAD doc-
trine that required both the West and the Communist Bloc to maintain 
sufficient power in the form of nuclear weapons to destroy the world 
many times over, power may be effective at achieving preferred ends in 
some situations only if it remains unexercised. 151 
Of course, these categories are highly artificial I 52-the overlap be-
tween hidden power and deceptive power, for example, is likely substan-
tial. I53 Similarly, is a threat an exercise of power or only a promise that 
150. See id. at 22-23 (observing that failure of German artillery to shell British troops hid-
den in slit trenches along planned northern attack route indicated "that we would indeed 
achieve tactical surprise"). 
151. See sources cited supra notes 142-43. 
152. Moreover, there may be other useful classifications of various forms of power that 
may profitably inform a court's analysis of relative bargaining power. In commenting on an 
earlier draft of this Article, for example, Blake Morant suggested that power also may manifest 
"indirectly or vicariously" as in the case of govemment set-asides for small businesses that 
may increase the bargaining power of traditionally disadvantaged parties. This form of power 
would contrast with "direct" forms of power-situations where an actor takes direct action and 
expends personal resources within the power relationship with the opposing transacting party. 
Such a dichotomy could assist courts in recognizing the importance of background economic 
and legal principles in assessing the parties' power relationship. Cf United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 303 (1942) (noting background law permitting government to 
take control of manufacturing company if parties could not agree on contract terms as element 
in considering government's claims of duress). 
153. These three dichotomies give rise to eight possible combinations to describe a party's 
power in a transaction: (I) visible, real, exercised power; (2) visible, real, unexercised power; 
(3) visible, false, exercised power; (4) visible, false, unexercised power; (5) hidden, real, exer-
cised power; (6) hidden, real, unexercised power; (7) hidden, false, exercised power; (8) hid-
den, false, unexercised power. Obviously, some forms of power in this taxonomy will be less 
useful than others at achieving an actor's preferred outcome. Hidden, false, unexercised 
power, for example, may comprise only those sources of power arising from the other party's 
uncertainty regarding the situation. But such uncertainty cannot be wholly discounted. As 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated with respect to analyzing information about ter-
rorist connections with the regime of deposed dictator Saddam Hussein: 
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, be-
cause as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. 
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don't 
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the threat-maker will not exercise his or her power so long as the oppos-
ing party complies? And if the threat is merely a bluff, does the threat 
represent real or false power? In reality, that answer is only marginally 
relevant. 
The value of this matrix lies not in classification of power, but 
rather in refocusing attention on forms of power that strategists and prac-
tical students of power have long recognized, used, and attempted to ac-
count for,154 but that courts and the legal system have traditionally ig-
nored. Where the practical user of power must presume that her opponent 
possesses hidden reserves, that her opponent is attempting to deceive her, 
that some forms of power cannot be exercised, courts approach power 
from a purely post hoc position that promotes inquiry into what did hap-
pen rather than what could have happened. Courts appear well-equipped 
to evaluate power that is visible and real. But other types of power, such 
as the Mexican negotiators' hidden knowledge of the American negotia-
tion position, would rarely be evident to a fact finder. Likewise, unexer-
cised power that is merely threatened, false power that is never tested, or 
real power that is never used present significant difficulties to fact find-
ers attempting to assess the balance of power between two parties. As a 
result, courts are ill-equipped to make judgments attempting to address 
inequities arising from those coercive forces. 155 Because visible, exer-
cised power is most easily evidenced in the adversarial contests of the 
courtroom, legal analysis has become fixated upon the low-hanging fruit, 
and has largely ignored the more sophisticated and subtle level of inter-
action at which the game of power is really played. 156 
Beyond the notion that there are dimensions of power that courts are 
incapable of, or not accustomed to, observing, even the effects of a large 
know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and 
other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks at Dep't of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 
2002) (responding to alleged reports of non-existence of any evidence of "direct link between 
Baghdad and some of these terrorist organizations"), available at http://www.defense 
link.milltranscripts/2002/t02122002_t2l2sdv2.html. Although widely mocked, see, e.g., Hart 
Seely, The Poetry of DB. Rumsfeld: Recent Works by the Secretary of Defense, SLATE, Apr. 
2, 2003, at http://slate.msn.comlidl2081042, Secretary Rumsfeld's observation is important 
because it captures precisely the caution strategists must employ in assessing the other party's 
power-there is always the potential for even the most apparently innocuous situation to turn 
out badly. That possibility means that even hidden, false, and unexercised power may have the 
potential to affect an outcome in the right circumstances. 
154. See sources cited supra note 153 (relating Secretary Rumsfeld's attempts to account 
for uncertainty and deception by military opponents). 
155. See Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 90, at 625 (arguing 
that courts are not suited for redressing the balance of coercive forces and should not prevent 
legislatures from reallocating coercive economic power between economic actors). 
156. See infra Part II1.B.3. 
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power disparity are unclear in many cases. In the negotiation context, 
greater apparent power "does not necessarily produce more favorable 
agreements for the powerful."157 Similarly, in studies of the effects of 
power disparities versus balanced power in complex environmental ne-
gotiations, balanced power has often been associated with successful ne-
gotiations,158 while great disparities in bargaining power were associated 
with unsuccessful negotiations. 159 While this conclusion may be counter-
intuitive, it illustrates that greater visible power presents only an incom-
plete picture of the real power relationship. 
Additionally, that one side has great visible, real power in the bar-
gaining process may just as easily permit that party to make concessions. 
In assessing the relative capacity of parties negotiating employment con-
tracts, for example, Richard Epstein rejected the traditional conclusion160 
that the employer necessarily has greater bargaining power than the pro-
spective employee: 
First, the employer often bargains through subordinate managers and 
thus faces an agency cost problem avoided by the worker who bar-
gains on his own account. Second, the worker's opportunity cost for 
his time will often be lower than the employer's, so that the increased 
time he can spend on the transaction may offset the employer's 
greater skill, if any, per unit of time. Third, the worker may be able to 
learn something about the employer's reservation price (i.e., the 
maximum wage he would be willing to pay) because the employer 
must reveal some information about his willingness to pay in negotia-
157. Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 6. "Disproportionately greater power on the 
part of one party in a negotiation often reduces the likelihood of a favorable outcome for the 
powerful party, producing what Professor William Ury calls the 'power paradox': the harder 
you make it for them to say no, the harder you make it for them to say yes." Id. at 16-17 (cita-
tion, internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). 
158. See JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 199, 213-15 (1975) (surveying experimental studies on ef-
fects of equal bargaining power and unequal bargaining power upon quality of experimental 
bargained outcomes and observing that 19 of 27 reviewed studies support the proposition that 
"equal power among bargainers tends to result in more effective bargaining than unequal 
power," while five studies showed no difference, and three studies showed equal bargaining 
power leading to less effective bargaining). 
159. See Burkardt, supra note 51, at 252, 269, 273 (noting that relative balance of power 
between negotiating parties tends to support successful negotiations while power imbalance 
between parties tended to inhibit successful negotiations); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shatter-
ing Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 175-76, 190-97 (2002) (concluding that cooperative or problem-solving 
negotiators are more likely to be rated by peers as effective negotiators than adversarial or 
competitive negotiators). 
160. See, e.g., State v. Coppage, 125 P. 8, 10-11 (Kan. 1912) ("To many the demands for 
housing, food, and clothing for their families and the education of their children brook no in-
terruption of wages to the bread-winner. "). 
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tions with other long-term workers. Finally, it is not clear that the 
employer gains any real advantage because of his greater relative 
wealth, if any. To be sure, the wealthy employer can hold out for a 
larger share of the surplus because he has less, proportionally, to lose. 
Yet by the same token the employer's resolve may be weaker be-
cause he has less to gain by holding out. 161 
Yet, as discussed in Part IV, courts rarely look beyond the parties' 
visible displays of bargaining power before determining which party is 
the weaker and which the stronger. 
3. Power is Dynamic 
Power is not a static, set-piece game with the outcome pre-
determined. Rather, as military analysts-particularly Eastern analysts-
have long recognized, power is a dynamic relationship that either party is 
capable of altering at any time. 162 The Chinese classic on military strat-
egy, The Art of War, for example, deals explicitly with the dynamic na-
ture of military power as a process of strategy by which a commander 
could ensure the enemy's defeat even before entering the contest. The 
key to Sun Tzu's strategic system was assessing opportunities before-
hand and positioning oneself to take advantage of these opportunities: 
So it is that good warriors take their stand on ground where they can-
not lose, and do not overlook conditions that make an opponent prone 
to defeat. Therefore a victorious army first wins and then seeks battle; 
a defeated army first battles and then seeks victory. 163 
The Art of War emphasizes the dynamic nature of power and the 
importance of assessing the opponent's and proponent's strengths and 
weaknesses and then adopting a position that maximizes the likelihood of 
a favorable outcome. 164 Sun Tzu directs the strategist to know himself 
161. Epstein, Contract At Will, supra note 116, at 975-76. 
162. The parallels between military power and contests and negotiation have been often 
noted. Roger Fisher, for example, observed that "[a]t the international level, negotiating 
power is typically equated with military power." Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting 
and Using Influence, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 149, 149 (1983). 
163. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 90-91 (Thomas Cleary trans., Shambhala Publications 
1988). 
164. See, e.g., id. at 48 ("Assess the advantages in taking advice, then structure your forces 
accordingly, to supplement extraordinary tactics. Forces are to be structured strategically, 
based on what is advantageous."). 
Military formation is like water-the form of water is to avoid the high and go to 
the low, the form of a military force is to avoid the full and attack the empty; the 
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and the enemy,165 as well as to assess external factors such as weather, 
seasons, night and day, and terrain. Where the balance favors one side, 
that side should attack; where the balance of factors disfavors one side 
that side should work to alter the balance until it can be victorious.166 
The dynamics of power relations play out on both an individual 
level and at a macroscopic level. The individual level of power relations 
concerns the responses that individuals may make to create or alter a par-
ticular power relation. The macroscopic dynamics of power relations, on 
the other hand, concern broad shifts of power relations across social, 
economic, political and legal bounds. 
a. Individual Dynamics of Power Relations 
For three millennia, the study of human relationships has primarily 
focused on power relations between social actors and on how to change 
the balance of power. 167 Students of power have long recognized that in-
dividual power ebbs and flows regularly and that individuals may have 
substantial control over their gain or loss of power. As one commentator 
on political and social power expressed, power is susceptible to dissipa-
tion at any moment: 
[Power] is thus both awful and fragile, and can dominate a continent, 
only in the end to be blown down by a whisper. To destroy it, nothing 
more is required than to be indifferent to its threats, and to prefer 
flow of water is detennined by the earth, the victory of a military force is deter-
mined by the opponent. 
So a military force has no constant fonnation, water has no constant shape: the abil-
ity to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called 
genius. 
[d. at 112-13. 
165. See id. at 9. 
So the rule for use of the military is that if you outnumber the opponent ten to one, 
then surround them; five to one, attack; two to one, divide. 
If you are equal, then fight if you are able. If you are fewer, then keep away if you 
are able. If you are not as good, then flee if you are able. 
[d. at 74-75. 
So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in 
a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and 
lose one; if you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled 
in every single battle. 
!d. at 82. 
166. See id. at 84 ("In ancient times skillful warriors first made themselves invincible, and 
then watched for vulnerability in their opponents."). 
167. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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other goods to those which it promises. Nothing less, however, is re-
quired also. 168 
The ability of actors to render power impotent by ignoring it defines 
the tension between freedom of contract, personal autonomy in the prac-
tical context within which actual bargaining occurs and the purely legal 
responses to perceived gross disparities in bargaining power. Actors in 
the practical bargaining context may affect the balance of power in many 
ways at any time. 169 A non-exclusive list of the ways in which an appar-
ently weaker party may alter the power balance in a relationship in-
cludes: 
• Abandoning the interaction 
• Acquiescing to the demands of the apparently stronger party 
• Changing preferences 
• Testing the other party's apparent power 
• Developing competition 
• Shopping for a better alternative 
• Engaging in legal action to rescind a bad interaction 
• Engaging in extra-legal responses 
Abandonment as a means of altering the parties' power relationship 
has been discussed. Unless the parties are contracting in a state of emer-
gency, duress or necessity such as the choice offered Indiana Jones when 
confronted with the proposition "Throw me the idol, I'll throw you the 
whip,"170 every party theoretically has the power to walk away from the 
proposed bargain and satisfy its needs or wants elsewhere. 171 Alterna-
tively, the apparently weaker party can acquiesce in the other party's 
demands, radically shifting the balance of power in favor of the non-
acquiescing party. By acquiescing, the apparently weaker party relieves 
168. TAWNEY, supra note 61, at 212. 
169. Cf HARVARD BUSINESS ESSENTIALS, NEGOTIATION 21 (2003) (advocating that par-
ties create alternatives to bargaining rather than take a deal out of necessity); WEBER, supra 
note 60, at 153 ("All conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combinations of 
circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation."). 
170. RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981). Indiana Jones' guide, Satipo, 
made this "offer" to Jones after Satipo had used Jones' bullwhip to swing across an open pit as 
the two attempted to escape from a collapsing temple complex after removing a golden idol 
from the temple's sanctum. [d. Underlining the proposition t4at power is situational and that 
greater apparent power does not necessarily yield superior results, Satipo---deprived of Jones' 
expertise-moments later stepped on a booby trap and died. See id. 
171. See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra note 53, at 97-103 (recommending assessment of Best 
Alternative to Negotiated Agreement ("BATNA") to protect against making unfavorable deals 
when negotiating against party with greater bargaining power). 
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the apparently stronger party of the costs that would be incurred if the 
stronger party were forced to exercise his or her power. In 
Similar to the walk-away power, a party with a perceived power 
disparity may alter his or her preferences in such a manner as to elimi-
nate or even overcome the disparity.173 For example, a car buyer may 
decide, after engaging in protracted negotiations, to prefer a different 
brand of automobile, enabling her to make a "take-it-or-leave-it" final 
offer to the car dealer or to walk away from the deal altogether. Like-
wise, a party may determine to invest greater resources in developing ad-
ditional information regarding the opposing party's position, or shopping 
for a better bargain. Given that power in a bargaining context often de-
pends upon one party subjectively preferring what the other party has,174 
any change in that subjective preference will alter the balance of power 
in the relationship. 175 
Moreover, when one party gains grossly superior bargaining power 
over those with whom it regularly contracts, entrepreneurs may seize the 
opportunity to compete with the grossly superior bargaining power. 176 
In. See John C. Harsanyi, Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the 
Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND 
RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 227 (suggesting that any scheme to measure power between par-
ties must account for costs associated with actual exercise of power and opportunity costs of 
abandoning the bargain). 
173. See James G. March, Preferences, Power, and Democracy, in POWER, INEQUALITY, 
AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT A. DAHL 51-53 (Ian Shapiro & 
Grant Reeder eds., 1988) (observing interpersonal power is based partly upon "individual in-
terests or preferences"). 
174. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
175. See March, supra note 173, at 51-53; Blau, supra note 55, at 296 ("The fewer the 
wants and needs of an individual, the less dependent he is on others to meet them. Needs, 
however, do not remain constant. By providing individuals with goods and services that in-
crease their satisfaction, their level of expectations tends to be raised, and while they were pre-
viously satisfied without these benefits, they are now desirous of continuing to obtain them."); 
cf TAWNEY, supra note 61, at 212 (discussing fragility of power in relation to changing pref-
erences). 
176. See GALBRAITH, supra note 114, at 73 ("The usual and most effective response to an 
unwelcome exercise of power is to build a countering position of power."). Robert S. Adler & 
Elliot M. Silverstein note that gross bargaining power disparities may cause the apparently 
weaker party to react against the power disparity in ways that reduce the likelihood of a suc-
cessful transaction, including resistance to perceived coercion, rejection of "demeaning" offers 
to save face, adopting a stubborn and obstreperous negotiating position, and in general sus-
pecting the apparently stronger party of bad faith motives. See Adler & Silverstein, supra note 
26, at 16-20. Likewise, Steven McJohn suggests that power disparities may give rise to a 
status competition within the negotiation that ultimately ignores the potential of a mutually 
productive outcome in favor of attempting to gain status by "winning" the negotiation. 
Stephen M. McJohn, Default Rules in Contract Law as Response to Status Competition in Ne-
gotiation, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 39,40 (1997) ("The process of negotiation itself, however, 
may become a competition. Rather than simply trying to achieve their original goals, parties 
sometimes shift in whole or in part to 'win' the bargaining. "). 
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In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 177 for instance, the Automo-
bile Manufacturers Association arguably possessed monopolistic control 
over the terms of the warranty offered with every new carP8 As a result, 
the Henningsen court held warranty terms excluding all warranty liability 
except the repair of defective parts returned at the buyer's expense to be 
void as against public policy.179 That situation sharply contrasts, how-
ever, with the auto warranty market today. Manufacturers now expressly 
compete on warranty provisions and coverage. Additionally, numerous 
third-party insurers now offer extended warranties for both new and used 
vehicles. 180 The purported gross disparity of bargaining power that so 
limited choice in Henningsen to a single set of standardized terms cre-
ated market opportunities that invited both intra-industry competition and 
the creation of a new niche market for third-party warrantors. 
Additionally, the apparently weaker party may attempt to force an 
actual contest of power with the apparently stronger party to influence 
the outcome of their interaction. Importantly, the actual contest of power 
does provide some evidence of the relative bargaining power of the par-
ties. 181 Moreover, this contest forces the powerful party to exercise its 
177. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In the seminal Henningsen case, the plaintiff's wife was 
injured by a defective automobile sold by the defendant dealership under a standard form sales 
contract promulgated by the Automobile Manufacturers Association that expressly limited the 
manufacturer's warranty solely to a duty to replace defective parts returned to the manufac-
turer's factory. See id. at 78-79. After noting the "grossly unequal" bargaining positions be-
tween the consumer and the manufacturer (who, at that time, used the same standard form 
sales contract as virtually every other automobile manufacturer), and the fact that the consumer 
had no opportunity to shop around for a better warranty term, the court held the warranty ex-
clusion void as against public policy. See id. at 94-97. 
178. See id. at 87. 
179. See id. at 94-97. 
180. Besides dealer and manufacturer extended warranty programs, numerous firms adver-
tise an array of warranty and extended warranty offers on automobiles and other consumer 
products. See, e.g., http://www.warrantydirect.com (last visited Oct. II, 2004) (offering five 
levels of extended warranty protection for automobiles); http://www.autoprotection.com 
/coverage (last visited Oct. II, 2004) (multiple extended warranty plans); http://www. 
Isourceautowarranty.com (last visited Oct. 11,2004) (same). Notably, many of the extended 
warranty firms expressly compete not only in terms of coverage plans and price, but also repu-
tation, see, e.g., http://www.lsourceautowarranty.comlShowContent.asp?content=home (last 
visited Oct. II, 2004) ("We have a 97% Customer satisfaction rating for claims handling."), 
direct written versus reinsurance, see, e.g., http://aawarranty.comlfaq.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2004) ("Quality warranty providers purchase insurance to make sure that if for some reason 
the trust reserve account runs out of money, that present and future claim obligations are 
met."), and other non-price terms see, e.g., id. (listing multiple non-price terms for comparison 
between extended warrantY providers, including reliability, honesty, privacy policy, the ability 
to review the policy before entering agreement, administration of the policy, and others). 
181. See Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 13-14 ("Absent the actual contest, each 
side must guess about the other's power."); Roderick Bell, Political Power: The Problem of 
Measurement, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 
13-27 (noting that observers may attempt to measure power by (I) observing the actual out-
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power, thereby incurring additional costs in consummating the transac-
tion, including both the direct costs of exercising its power and indirect 
costs in terms of third party perceptions regarding the propriety, justice, 
or fairness of that use of power. 182 
One problem with great power is that it tends to anger both the peo-
ple with whom one is dealing-thus threatening future relations-and 
similarly situated third parties who observe that use of power, unless that 
power is carefully managed and controlled. Consequently, the effects of 
large visible power disparities may often be counterintuitive. For exam-
ple, the United States' overwhelming military and technological superi-
ority in the Vietnam War caused the North Vietnamese Army ("NV A") 
to develop competing military and political strategies to counter the 
American advantage in air power, logistics, artillery, and mobility. In 
battle, NV A forces sought to close quickly with and infiltrate American 
forces to counter American air power and artillery.183 Although Ameri-
can forces never lost a major military engagement against the NY A, 184 
the North Vietnamese tactics enabled the NY A to stretch out the conflict 
sufficiently to weaken American resolve, inflict unacceptable levels of 
casualties and "win the minds" of the American people toward the anti-
war position. 185 This also preserved sufficient NY A combat forces to al-
come of the interaction, or (2) predicting the amount of power held by each party through 
analysis of known, observable factors). 
182. See Harsanyi, supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also Kenneth E. Boulding, 
Toward a Pure Theory of Threat Systems, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND 
RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 287-88 ("[D]efiance puts a burden of response on the threatener 
and hence is in some sense a challenge to him. The threatener then has to decide whether or 
not to carry out the threat. If he does carry out the threat, this is likely to have a cost to him as 
well as to the threatened."). 
183. For a graphic and compelling depiction of early uses of this strategy by North Viet-
namese forces, see generally LT. GEN. HAROLD G. MOORE (RET.) & JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY, 
WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE ... AND YOUNG (1992) (relating details of the battle of the Ia 
Drang Valley in November 1965 between American troops and NY A regulars and describing 
attempts by NY A to close with and infiltrate American ranks to minimize American artillery 
and air power advantages). 
184. See, e.g., Malcolm C. Garland, Letter, We Won on Battlefield, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 2, 
1991, at AI8 ("[T]he Republic of Vietnam was defeated after we withdrew, but American 
forces never lost a significant battle. "); Interview by Ted Koppel and Peter Jennings with Gen-
eral Winant Sidle, World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 29, 1985) ("The 
Army never lost a major battle in all those years."). 
185. See, e.g., Interview by Stephen Young with Col. Bui Tin (Retired), in How North 
Vietnam Won the War, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1995, at A8 (interview statements of North Viet-
namese Army Col. Bui Tin (Retired) regarding importance of American anti-war movement to 
NV A victory over South Vietnam). 
[The American anti-war movement] was essential to our [the North Vietnamese] 
strategy. Support for the war from our rear was completely secure while the Ameri-
can rear was vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to world news over 
the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement. Visits 
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low them to coinplete their invasion of the Republic of South Vietnam 
following the 1973 American withdrawaP86 
Nor are such apparent "upsets" limited solely to the military battle-
field. Microsoft, for example, has been the target of competitive attacks 
on many fronts, at least partly due to its image as a monolithic near-
monopoly bent on world domination. Competitors have portrayed Micro-
soft as the proverbial 900-pound gorilla and successfully enlisted gov-
ernments in antitrust actions against Microsoft. 187 Competing systems, 
such as Apple's Macintosh OSX and the open-source Linux and 
FreeBSD operating systems, have developed an almost cult-like follow-
ing. 188 And software engineers around the world have contributed-
gratis-millions of person-hours developing open source substitutes for 
Microsoft products. 189 Although many of these competing options likely 
to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda and fonner Attorney General Ramsey Clark and 
ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield re-
verses. 
[d. (noting further that "through dissent and protest [AmericaJlost the ability to mobilize a will 
to win"). Similar military examples based on fighting a war of attrition against a technologi-
cally or numerically superior enemy can be found in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
the Israeli victory against invading Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War. 
186. See, e.g., id. (noting that after staggering losses by North Vietnamese forces during 
the failed Tet Offensive of 1968, North Vietnam had reestablished forces in the south by 1971 
and finally defeated the Republic of South Vietnam in 1975 after President Ford failed to re-
spond to NY A attacks against Phuoc Long); Stephen B. Young, Vietnam War: Washington 
Was Right, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1995, at A22 (describing NY A infiltration of 150,000 troops 
into South Vietnam after withdrawal of American combat forces in 1972 and further infiltra-
tion of 260,000 troops between 1973 and 1975 in violation of Paris Peace Accord). 
187. See, e.g., Bryan Gruley et aI., RE: Joel, Bill, a Chevy Vega and the 'Schnooks ., WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 18, 1998, at B9 (describing 2,300 em ails Justice Department attorney in charge of 
the Microsoft antitrust suit, many of which expressed strong approval of government's action 
against Microsoft); Chris Gaither, Real Files Lawsuit Against Microsoft Rival: Software Giant 
Uses Monopoly Power To Control Digital Media, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19,2003, at Cl 
(discussing antitrust actions by RealNetworks, Inc. and Netscape Communications, Inc. 
against Microsoft for alleged abuse of monopoly power through bundling of media player and 
internet browser software with Windows operating system); Daniel Dombey, Brussels Set to 
Rule Against Microsoft, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at 1 (reporting European Commission pre-
liminary decision that Microsoft had engaged in anti-competitive behavior by tying Windows 
Media Player software to Windows operating system). 
188. See, e.g., Bill Orr, Timefor Linux, A.B.A. BANKING J., Aug. 2003, at 51-52 (noting 
devotion of Linux programmers to working in that medium and contributing programming to 
improving Linux); Dan Kennedy, Why We Love to Hate Microsoft, BOSTON PHOENIX, June 
27, 2000, available at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/00/06122/ 
MICROSOFT.htrnl (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) ("There are the legions of folks urging con-
sumers to boycott Microsoft, ranging from geeky Macintosh and Linux aficionados to geeky 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader."); cf David Beckman & David Hirsch, Going Soft on Micro-
soft, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2002, at 64 (discussing author's fonner devotion to non-Windows operat-
ing systems). 
189. See Orr, supra note 188, at 51-52 (describing open source Linux operating system as 
"gradually being perfected by those who donate their talents to creating a better operating sys-
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are profit-based, much of the popularity of such attacks on and competi-
tion with Microsoft products is driven by an intense dislike of Micro-
soft's visible power to dominate the marketplace. 190 
Perceptions of grossly unequal power may also generate an extra-
legal backlash. Microsoft software products-such as the ubiquitous 
Windows operating system, the Microsoft Word word processing pro-
gram, and the Microsoft Outlook email client-have all been targets of 
attacks by hackers and virus authors at a greater rate than any competing 
software. 191 Computer science analysts have commented that recent vi-
rus attacks, such as the MyDoom virus released in late January 2004, 
have targeted corporate giants such as Microsoft and SCO Group, Inc. 
because those entities are perceived as attempting to destroy the open-
source software movement competing with Microsoft's Windows operat-
ing system. 192 While such practices cannot wholly level the playing 
tern" and noting "[g]litches are found and fixed as soon as the Linux legions spot them"). 
Such open source substitutes generally are available free or at a lower cost than competing Mi-
crosoft products. Major open source products include OpenOffice, which competes with the 
Microsoft Office suite of business applications, see About Us: OpenOjJice.org, http://www. 
openoffice.orglabout.html#description (last visited Oct. 12,2004) (describing OpenOffice as a 
suite of productivity applications that "works transparently with a variety of file formats, in-
cluding those of Microsoft Office"), and the Netscape, Opera and Mozilla Internet browsers. 
190. See Orr, supra note 188, at 51 (relating industry consensus that dramatically increas-
ing Linux share of server market is due in part to "[ t ]he widespread perception that Microsoft 
may be getting into a position where it could strangle competition in corporate IT"); David 
Shenk, Slamming Gates, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Jan. 26, 1998 at 20, 20-22 (noting widespread 
expressions of hate and loathing directed toward Microsoft, as well as profit motives and low 
barriers of entry that promote competition in software industry). 
191. See, e.g., David Bank, Virus Misses Microsoft but Stirs Fear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 
2004, at A3 (noting that Microsoft makes a "tempting target for virus writers because its Win-
dows software runs on about 95% of the world's personal computers" and suggesting that vi-
rus attacks against Microsoft are "intended to tap into the populist appeal of the Linux operat-
ing system, which both companies oppose"); Lee Gomes, Love Bug Prompts Security Experts 
to Poke at Microsoft's Weak Points, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2000, at Bl (describing security 
flaws across Microsoft software line, including Internet Explorer, Outlook, and Microsoft 
Word). In response to such attacks, Microsoft has created a reward fund for information on 
hackers who attack its systems, further demonstrating that the virus attacks attracted by Micro-
soft's market dominance have begun to affect negatively Microsoft's bottom line. See Gary 
Fields et aI., Microsoft Sets Up Reward Fund to Help Authorities Find Hackers, WALL ST. 1., 
Nov. 6, 2003, at B6 (noting that viruses such as SoBig, MSBlast, and the Blaster worm had 
hurt sales of Microsoft products and that Apple Computer, Inc. and Linux-based competitors 
had started to increase their market share because those platforms are perceived to be more 
secure than Microsoft products). 
192. See supra note 191 and accompanying text; see also Rebecca Buckman, Virus Gives 
'Love' a Bad Name, WALL ST. 1., May 5, 2000, at Bl (noting that Microsoft software is attrac-
tive to virus writers because of Microsoft's market domination). Similarly, in discussing war-
ranties in my first-year Contracts classes, several students have volunteered that they are fully 
aware that extended warranties on consumer electronic equipment are not a good deal on their 
face-the warranties are usually expensive relative to the risk insured and many consumers 
fail to take advantage of them. But in dealing with consumer electronics with relatively short 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 186 2005
186 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
field, it is likely that greater perceived power imbalances stimulate 
greater extra-legal acts by those who feel disadvantaged. 193 
Beyond direct power contests and extra-legal measures against pos-
sessors of perceived extraordinary power, relatively weak parties may 
petition for judicial, legislative, or regulatory intervention to ameliorate 
perceived systemic power imbalances. 194 The Microsoft anti-trust action 
owes its genesis at least in part to perceptions that Microsoft was abusing 
its market power by forcing computer manufacturers to exclude compet-
ing browsers and other software from their pre-loaded software pack-
ages. Likewise, courts have demonstrated a proclivity for using uncon-
scionability and other equitable doctrines to reform contracts where the 
power imbalance is too oppressive and the terms are at least marginally 
unfair. 195 And numerous statutory and regulatory schemes purport to ad-
dress bargaining power disparities. 196 
obsolescence cycles, the students explained that they often return working products within the 
warranty period in order to gain an upgraded device. More than one student claimed that she 
had exchanged several MP3 players in this manner. 
193. Cj Frances Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil Dis-
obedience, 18 GA. L. REv. 929, 950-57 (1984) (discussing use of civil disobedience to dele-
gitimate oppressive legal regimes). 
194. See sources cited supra note 187 and accompanying text. The FCC's recent rulemak-
ing on cellular telephone number portability is a good example of a legislative / regulatory al-
teration of relative bargaining power between consumers and producers. In Powertel, Inc. v. 
Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the court held cellular telephone cus-
tomers had no meaningful alternatives to accepting contract amendment mandating arbitration 
given costs to consumers in canceling current service contracts, losing current cellular num-
bers and contracting with new service providers. Now that cellular telephone numbers are 
freely transferable between cellular providers under a Nov. 10, 2003 FCC order, see Telephone 
Number Portability, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,831 (Dec. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 52), 
and given that shopping between competing plans is as easy as strolling the ubiquitous kiosks 
at the local mall or doing a simple Google search, the reasoning in Powertellikely no longer 
accords with the reality of obtaining cellular telephone service. See infra notes 42 and 155 and 
accompanying text (discussing legislative solutions to perceived bargaining power asymme-
tries). 
195. See DiMatteo, supra note 21, at 270-71 (assessing equitable interventions by courts to 
police contracts lacking fairness in exchange); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Fumiture Co., 350 
F.2d 445, 448-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (acknowledging power of courts at common law and under 
U.C.C. § 2-302 to refuse to enforce unconscionable bargains). 
196. Numerous legislative schemes attempt to redress perceived unequal bargaining 
power, including labor relations, see, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 151 (1935) (citing "inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess 
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers" as justification for 
federal regulation of labor relations with capital); unfair and deceptive trade practices, see, 
e.g., Massachusetts Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 
(1997); and high pressure sales tactics, see, e.g., S.c. CODE ANN. § 37-2-502 (1976) (provid-
ing buyers in home solicitation sales three business days to cancel and rescind agreement); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3811 (2003) (same). See also Edwards, supra note 42, at 455 ("Much 
of the legislation mandating enforcement of parties' choice of law clauses address perceived 
inequalities in parties' bargaining power by carving out exceptions for consumer transactions 
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b. Macroscopic Dynamics of Power Relations 
In addition to the individual-level responses to power discussed 
above, power relationships change over time within and among groups 
on a macroscopic level. 197 The situation again is one of action and reac-
tion, ebb and flow of leverage, strength and interest as the use of or op-
position to power within a society creates feedback that itself leads to 
broad-based dynamic shifts in power relations. These macroscopic 
changes to power relations take place on several levels including strate-
gies to counter opposing power; changes in the effectiveness of sanctions 
and incentives underlying particular power structures; changes in status-
based characteristics of groups or individuals over time; and changes in 
social and economic relationships over time. First, collective groups that 
perceive themselves to lack power necessarily react against that per-
ceived lack and seek to develop and implement strategies that counter 
others' power over them. Thus, as Holmes opined in Vegelahn v. Gunt-
ner,198 the best response by individual laborers to the power of employ-
ers' capital was for laborers to combine in unions to contend more effec-
tively in bargaining for wages and other terms of employment. 
Second, power also depends upon the effectiveness of possible 
sanctions or anticipated incentives. 199 But the efficacy of sanctions and 
incentives changes over time as societal and individual preferences 
and other agreements, such as employment contracts and other personal service contracts, to 
protect individuals who are thought of as tending to have lesser bargaining power."). 
197. Cf Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 
576-83 (1983) (analyzing role of deviationist doctrine in promoting progressive dissolution of 
fixed orders of society, followed by refonnation and rejustification of societal rules in new 
fonns in a constant cycle of "routine and revolution"). 
198. 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). The Vegelahn majority affIrmed an injunction restrain-
ing union members from picketing the plaintiff's business and held that "a combination to do 
injurious acts expressly directed to another, by way of intimidation or constraint ... is outside 
of allowable competition, and is unlawful." Id. at 1078. Holmes dissented, arguing that courts 
should not interfere with individual rights to combine in opposition to the greater bargaining 
power of employers. See id. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
199. See Blau, supra note 55, at 293-94 (discussing changing baselines and mutation of 
positive sanctions such as employment and wages into negative sanctions such as the threat to 
terminate the employee). 
Id. 
Regular rewards make recipients dependent on the supplier and subject to his 
power, since they engender expectations that make their discontinuation a punish-
ment. A person who has a job is rewarded for perfonning his duties by his earnings, 
and as his wages are positive sanctions it seems at first that no power is in-
volved .... However, being fired from ajob cannot plausibly be considered to con-
stitute merely the absence of rewards; it clearly is a punishing experience. The 
threat of being fired is a negative sanction that gives the employer power over his 
employees, enabling him to enforce their compliance with his directives. 
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change and develop in response to those sanctions and incentives. For 
example, the positive sanction of promising a job and continuing em-
ployment will be more or less effective over time depending on many 
factors such as appreciation for the work, competition (or lack thereof), 
and the workplace environment. 200 As any or all of these factors change 
over time, the balance of power between employer and employee itself 
will alter.201 
Third, even the status-based classifications upon which courts de-
termine power disparities are subject to change. In the case of relatively 
immutable characteristics such as gender or race, socio-economic factors 
underlying the prior lack of relative power by members of those groups 
are subject to change over time. For example, many disabilities affecting 
the political, legal, economic and cultural power of women and racial or 
ethnic minorities in the early twentieth century have been ameliorated or 
in some cases eliminated in the last several decades.202 Likewise, indi-
vidually mutable characteristics such as wealth, education, or business 
sophistication sometimes can be altered with an investment of time and 
effort. Thus, in the English case of Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. 
Macaulay, the court invalidated the exclusive services contract between a 
music publisher and an artist partly on the basis of an inequality of bar-
gaining power.203 But as Trebilcock notes, as artists become more suc-
cessful over time, they gain negotiating power with respect to their con-
200. See id. 
201. See id. 
202. Clearly, many traditionally disadvantaged or oppressed groups, including women and 
racial and ethnic minorities, have suffered and continue to suffer substantial political, eco-
nomic, cultural and legal disabilities compared to other social groups or classes. But at the 
same time, that these and other traditionally disadvantaged classes have made significant 
strides toward full participation in the American polity since the early 20th century is beyond 
cavil. A cursory survey of even the purely legislative attempts to redress discriminatory power 
imbalances among various groups in American society since the mid-1960s reveals substantial 
increases in the power of those groups to enforce political, cultural, economic and legal rights. 
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 101(a), 42 U.S.c. § 1971 (2000) (prohibiting use of dis-
criminatory voting procedures), § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (2000) (prohibiting segregation of 
public facilities), § 401, 42 U.s.c. § 2000c (2000) (prohibiting segregation of public educa-
tional facilities), § 601, 42 U.S.c. § 2000d (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in awards of 
federal financial assistance), § 703,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin with respect to employment); Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or 
rental of housing on the basis of race, color, sex, familial status, religion or national origin); 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in 
credit transactions on the basis of applicant's race, color, religion, national origin, sex or mari-
tal status, or age). 
203. [1974] 3 All E.R., 616, 623-24 (H.L.) (Lord Diplock) (characterizing music publish-
ing industry as concentrated "in relatively few hands," giving publishers the power to dictate 
terms of exclusive services contracts to musicians). 
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tracts. 204 Similarly, wealth characteristics of parties may change dra-
matically over a period of months or years as individuals and firms move 
in and out ofprosperity.205 
Fourth, status-based classifications shift in response to other power 
relationships. It is arbitrary to restrict the assessment of relative power 
disparities between two parties to a bipolar function in which each party 
is treated as an autonomous entity, independent of the world around it. 
Power exists only in relationships, and relationships never involve solely 
two actors. Every party acts within a web of power relationships at all 
times206 that may render that party relatively incapable of achieving a 
desired outcome in one context and relatively able in another. To borrow 
from Justice Holmes' famous dictum regarding regulatory takings, al-
though a party may appear helpless in a given context, that party shares 
204. See Trebilcock, supra note 21, at 365-71 (noting that musician bargaining power 
changed over time and that music industry at time of Schroeder was actually highly competi-
tive and that unknown artists could rationally chose the Schroeder-style contract over facially 
more beneficial tenns because of additional intangible benefits). Even the Schroeder court 
acknowledged that successful musicians over time gained bargaining power with respect to 
their publishers. See Schroeder, [1974] 3 All E.R. at 624 ("[M]usic publishers in negotiating 
with song-writers whose success has been already established do not insist on adhering to a 
[standard fonn contract]."). 
205. Many commentators suggest that individuals in the United States experience a high 
degree of income mobility throughout their lives. See, e.g., W. Michael Cox & Richard Aim, 
By Our Own Bootstraps: Economic Opportunity and the Dynamics of Income Distribution, in 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, ANNUAL REpORT 6-10 (1995) (relating longitudinal 
study showing substantial income mobility among earners in the period 1975-1991 and noting 
only 5% of bottom quintile earners in 1975 remained there in 1991, while majority moved to 
middle class or better in the same period); Mark D. Wilson, Income Mobility and the Fallacy 
of Class-Warfare Arguments Against Tax Relief, in THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 1418 
BACKGROUNDER I (Mar. 8, 2001), available at http://www.heritage.org/ResearchiTaxes 
IBGl418.cfm (last visited Oct. II, 2004) (summarizing studies on income mobility within 
United States and observing "[t]he dynamic U.s. economy is characterized by an extraordinary 
degree of income mobility"); Daniel P. McMurrer & Isabel V. Sawhill, How Much Do Ameri-
cans Move Up and Down the Economic Ladder?, in THE URBAN INSTITUTE, 3 OPPORTUNITY 
IN AMERICA 2 (Nov. 1996) (noting that income mobility in the U.S. is substantial by compari-
son to other countries). But see Paul Krugman, The Death of Horatio Alger, THE NATION, Jan. 
5, 2004, at 16 ("The myth of income mobility has always exceeded the reality: As a general 
rule, once they've reached their 30s, people don't move up and down the income ladder very 
much."). 
206. Michael Mann's theory of power and society persuasively addresses the fundamental 
interconnectedness of all power relationships within a society. See generally, MANN, supra 
note 105. Specifically, Mann's theory begins with two fundamental propositions. First, 
"[s]ocieties are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of 
power." Id. at 1. For Mann, societies cannot be defined as unitary totalities, but rather inter-
connecting power networks unconfined by spatial or cultural boundaries. See id. at 1-2. Sec-
ond, Mann posits that "societies" are best described in tenns of interrelations of four sources of 
social power: "ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships." /d. at 2. 
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an "average reciprocity of advantage"207 (or disadvantage) with respect 
to power relationships in all other aspects of society. 
As Slawson notes, no one occupies a fixed place in the hierarchy of 
bargaining power.208 Actors in society will find themselves possessing 
or lacking power depending on whether they are contracting in their role 
as a producer of goods or services, with corresponding advantages in in-
formation costs and contracting efficiency, or a consumer who lacks in-
formation about the subject matter of the contract and who will likely be 
bound to the producer's preferred contract terms.209 Slawson, however, 
approaches the dynamic nature of power relationships from the perspec-
tive that contractual interactions are discrete events, usually involving a 
producer of a good or service and a consumer of a good or service.210 
But even this view may be incomplete. First, an increasing amount 
of contract activity arguably takes place on a relational level that pro-
motes a continuing basis of interaction extending across the boundaries 
of such discrete contractual interactions.211 Thus, the producer may find 
itself locked into a quasi-symbiotic relationship with the consumer in 
which the consumer-individually or as a class-comes to exercise 
comparatively great bargaining power in the relationship.212 For exam-
207. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
208. See SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 32 ("No one has a fixed place in this hierarchy. All 
of us occupy different levels depending on whether we are the producer or the consumer of the 
product concerned."). 
209. See id. at 31-32. 
210. See id. Thus, while an individual may occupy different levels in the pro-
ducer/consumer hierarchy depending on the individual's information costs and contracting ef-
ficiency, Slawson characterizes unequal bargaining power as a justification for legal interven-
tion in contracts. See id. ("The long-held assumption that 'sophisticated businesspeople' do 
not need the law's protection when they contract with each other is no longer correct. We all 
need the law's protection except when we contract about what we produce." (citation omit-
ted)); see also id. at 23 ("A lack of bargaining power in one or both parties is a reason for lim-
iting their freedom of contract, their contracting power, or both. "). 
211. See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. 
REv. 589, 595-96 (1974) (distinguishing between one-time, discrete contracting events and 
relational contracts and noting "most actual exchanges are at least partially relational"); Ian R. 
Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as SOciology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de 
Vas, 143 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT [J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON.] 272, 276 (1987) (describing contractual relations as lying on continuum 
between discrete transactions at one end and intertwined contractual relationships at the other 
end). 
212. See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra note 53, at 178 ("[I]n this increasingly interdependent 
world, there are almost always resources and potential allies that a skilled and persistent nego-
tiator can exploit .... "); cf Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 608 (noting that 
consumers possess bargaining power largely on a collective basis). I recently experienced an 
example of increased bargaining power as a result of relational contracting principles when the 
fifth gear synchronizer failed on my 2000 Toyota Rav4 with 62150 miles on the odometer. A 
quick Internet search revealed not only numerous consumer complaints about this particular 
problem, but also that Toyota had issued a Transportation Safety Bulletin ("TSB"Mtherwise 
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pIe, recent shifts in segmentation of consumer markets has forced many 
producers of goods and services to customize their offerings for increas-
ingly sophisticated and segmented markets and has created an increas-
ingly sophisticated and demanding consumer base: 
The same technological advances that are fragmenting the mass audi-
ence also are empowering a new class of digitally savvy consumers 
who compile, edit, and otherwise customize the media they consume 
to their own personal requirements. "Companies must recognize that 
they increasingly have to engage gods and are not dealing with help-
less consumers anymore .... ,,213 
As producers focus on narrower segments of the total market, the 
relative bargaining power of individual consumers increases either as a 
result of greater opportunities for shopping or negotiation or as the num-
ber and quality of altemati ves to proffered transactions increases.214 
Second, bargaining power is not solely attributable to characteristics 
of the parties themselves, but also depends largely upon myriad interac-
tions and power relationships between third parties that affect the parties' 
abilities to exercise their bargaining power.215 Consequently, a consumer 
who executes an adhesion contract with an institutional lender for a 
mortgage may be said to be in a position of unequal bargaining power 
with respect to negotiating the terms of the contract.216 The consumer 
and the lender, however, do not contract in a vacuum. The consumer's 
employer may have equal or greater bargaining power than the lender in 
negotiating a revolving credit agreement that enables the employer to 
employ the consumer and provide a competitive salary. Although the 
consumer may be at an apparent disadvantage if only one transaction is 
examined, the consumer herself benefits from relationships with other 
known as a "secret warranty"-that covered the repair up to 60,000 miles. Based upon this 
information and the fact that I and my family had been loyal Toyota customers for 20 years, 
the dealer agreed to split the cost of the $1250 repair despite that my car was out of warranty. 
213. Anthony Bianco, The Vanishing Mass Market, Bus. WK., July 12, 2004, at 61, 65 
(quoting Rishad Tobaccowala, Executive Vice President, Starcom MediaVest Group). 
214. Cf Kennedy, Motives in Contract Law, supra note 47, at 608 (noting that consumers 
in general exercise power over producers not as individuals but through mechanism of demand 
and aggregation of purchasing power). 
215. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 131, at 553-54 (noting that parties' relative 
bargaining power in the firm to firm contracting context will often depend upon alternative 
relationships with third parties, such as access to capital markets and alternative business op-
portuni ti es). 
216. Cf Overby, supra note 107, at 613-21 (analyzing predatory lending practices and use 
of adhesion contracts in reverse mortgage agreements with the elderly and arguing "consumers 
should be protected from such contractual abuses as one-sided standard contracts, exclusion of 
essential rights in contracts and unconscionable conditions of credit by sellers"). 
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entities that themselves employ bargaining power disparities that advan-
tage the consumer in terms of higher wages, job benefits, prestige, and so 
on. Ultimately, bargaining power issues may be subject to an irreducible 
complexity not subject to unpacking by judicial interventions. 
IV. INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER As A LEGAL CONCEPT 
Despite the importance of the concept of power to human relation-
ships, once the inquiry shifts from the practical exercise of power to the 
legal response to issues of bargaining power, the complexity, dynamism 
and sophisticated recognition of the presence or capacity for power in all 
relationships vanishes. In place of the sophisticated and nuanced ap-
proach, the legal doctrine of inequality of bargaining power provides 
only an incomplete and two-dimensional picture of the power relation-
ship. Of course, all legal doctrines represent only shorthand heuristics-
or the legal equivalent of algorithrns-designed to translate actions and 
facts into more or less formal narratives217 that a legal decision maker 
can compare against other, similar narratives and particularized legal 
standards to produce the legal consequences attendant upon such practi-
cal actions.218 In all cases, the legal system approaches real concepts and 
actions through a medium in which Plato's flickering shadows on a cave 
wall are accepted as reality.219 Legal narratives are necessarily incom-
plete and indeterminate to some extent in their attempts to create legal 
consequences for real world actions.220 Consequently, the legal approach 
217. Cj Morant, supra note 7, at 261-67 (discussing impact ofneo-formalist influences on 
modem judicial approaches to contract law and noting that such formalistic approaches often 
ignore the real bargaining power disparities suffered by small businesses). 
218. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-6 (1st ed. 
1948) (describing legal reasoning as a process of classification of apparently similar cases into 
categories subject to application of legal rules which themselves change dynamically through 
the act of application); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274,275-78 (1929) (describing the activity 
of judging as the process of familiarization of the decision maker with the facts and record of 
the case, after which the judge awaits some intuition that permits application of the appropriate 
legal rule to the facts at issue). As Judge Hutcheson eloquently described it, the judicial proc-
ess depends often on nothing more than a flash of insight that resolves the competing argu-
ments of the parties into a settled answer: 
I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly cogitating 
upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, 
the hunch-that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-spark con-
nection between question and decision, and at the point where the path is darkest for 
the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way. 
Id. at 278. 
219. PLATO, PLATO'S REpUBLIC 168-70 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hacket Publishing Co. ed. 
1974) (relating famous "allegory of the cave"). 
220. Cf Herman Oliphant, Stare Decisis-Continued, 14 A.B.A. J. 159, 159 (1928): 
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to inequality of bargaining power necessarily never can fully reflect the 
reality of bargaining power disparities.221 
The statement that one party to a bargain has greater power than the 
other party not only should tell something about the relationship between 
the parties, but also, to the extent that the legal system attempts to regu-
late that relationship, the standards applied should seek to reflect the 
practical consequences of that relationship across situations involving 
similar bargaining power asymmetries. To the extent the legal decision 
maker purports to police inequalities of bargaining power-and not some 
other goal such as wealth redistribution to the impoverished, to members 
of apparently oppressed classes, or to other types of actors222-then legal 
standards adopted for achieving that goal should reflect the real conse-
quences of bargaining power disparities as closely as is reasonable given 
the limitations of the legal system. But the concept itself has proved so 
slippery and indefinable, so vague and nebulous, and so open to uncer-
tainty that its utility for explaining any element of the bargaining rela-
tionship is doubtfuJ.223 
Judges are men and men respond to human situations. When the facts stimulating 
them to the action taken are studied from a particular and current point of view, 
which our present classification presents, we acquire a new faith in stare decisis. 
From this viewpoint we see that courts are dominantly coerced, not by the essays of 
their predecessors but by a surer thing,-by an intuition of fitness of solution to 
problem. . .. To state the matter more concretely, the decision of a particular case 
by a thoughtful scholar is to be preferred to that by a poorly trained judge, but the 
decision of such a judge in a particular case is infinitely to be preferred to a decision 
of it preordained by some broad "principle" laid down by the scholar when this and 
a host of other concrete cases had never even occurred to him. 
221. See id. at 159-61 (arguing that judicial intuition based upon necessarily minimal par-
ticipation of judges in increasingly complex social realities provides an incomplete basis for 
judicial decision making and advocating greater use of empirical social studies in the judicial 
process). 
222. Cf Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 615-24 (arguing that the doctrine 
of inequality of bargaining power masks distributive and paternalist motives by legal decision 
makers). 
223. Other commentators have likewise questioned the utility of the concept of bargaining 
power disparities. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 15, at 102-104 (questioning utility of concept 
of unequal bargaining power in light of economic efficiency explanations for non-price com-
petition in standard fonn contracts); Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 623 
("[Inequality of bargaining power] may be internally incoherent, and it may achieve only 
rather randomly good results even when used skillfully. But it is a weapon on the side of 
equality, of the left and not of the right, however imperfect."); cf Randy E. Barnett, A Consent 
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 284-86 (1986) (critiquing use of "unequaJ bar-
gaining power" and substantive fairness as justification for judicial enforcement of, or interfer-
ence, with individual preferences). Surprisingly, however, beyond these basic observations 
that the concept of inequality of bargaining power is potentially vague or unjustified, there re-
mains no detailed doctrinal analysis of the subject. As noted above, I anticipate that the use-
fulness of inequality of bargaining power as a tool for guiding judicial discretion will be the 
subject ofa future article. See supra note IS. 
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A. Development of Inequality of Bargaining Power as a Legal 
Concept 
As a distinct legal concept, the doctrine of inequality of bargaining 
power is a relatively recent invention. Its provenance lies in the late 19th 
Century social and economic reactions to the perceived abuses of laissez-
faire economic regulation and Lochner-era freedom of contract doc-
trine.224 Although the phrase "inequality of bargaining power" did not 
occur in a reported opinion until 1925,225 bargaining power disparities 
were first noticed and given rhetorical and legal import in the labor dis-
putes of the 1880s and 1890s.226 But beginning in the 1930s, inequality 
of bargaining power changed from a rhetorical tool of organized labor 
and its judicial and academic sympathizers to a legal doctrine applied to 
contract in general. 227 In the 1940s and 1950s, bargaining power became 
entrenched in contract law, particularly after adoption of Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("U.C.C.") § 2-302 which expressly authorized courts to 
224. Lochner v. New York represents the nadir of nineteenth century freedom of contract 
ideology and laissez faire economic theory. 198 U.S. 45, 60-64 (1905) (holding unconstitu-
tional state interference in private employment contracts absent legitimate police power justifi-
cation); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) ("[T]he employer and the employe 
have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference 
with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a free land. "); Kevin M. 
Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the Modern Business Corpo-
ration, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.1. 117, 128 (1992) (observing at close of Lochner era "[t]he realiza-
tion grew that only the wealthy had a chance to freely negotiate and that freedom of contract 
was a slogan that protected vested interests against the forces of industrial society"). 
225. See Topeka Laundry Co. v. Court oflndus. Relations, 237 P. 1041, 1044 (Kan. 1925) 
("Each statute undertook to remedy the mischief [of substandard wages for women and mi-
nors] by fixing a standard below which wages might not be depressed ... because ofinequal-
ity of bargaining power between employer and employee .... ") (emphasis added). 
226. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081-82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that courts should not interfere in attempts by individuals to combine to 
compete with employers for a greater share of the return from their labor); see also Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1,26-27 (1915) (Holmes, 1., dissenting) (arguing constitution does not pro-
hibit individuals from organizing in unions "to establish the equality of position between the 
parties in which liberty of contract begins"); State v. Coppage, 125 P. 8, 9-11 (Kan. 1912) (ac-
knowledging disparities in economic power of employees and employers in negotiating terms 
of employment); Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(arguing "unity of organization is necessary to make the contest of labor effectual"). 
227. See, e.g., United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 479-80 
(1932) (analyzing bargaining power disparities in antitrust context and assessing whether firms 
abused combined bargaining power to restrain trade); Austin v. Nat'l Employment Exch., 266 
N.Y.S. 306, 311 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1933) (noting power disparities between unemployed execu-
tive and executive placement service in negotiating contract terms); cf United States v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 301-03 (1942) (rejecting claims of U.S. government that war 
contingencies deprived it of bargaining power in negotiating shipbuilding contracts). 
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assess the parties' bargaining power under the rubric of unconscionabil-
ity.228 
Since adoption of U.C.C. § 2-302 (and the subsequent publication 
of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208), inequality of bargaining 
power has been strongly linked with unconscionability. This linkage is 
somewhat odd in light of the absence of references to bargaining power 
disparities in traditional formulations of the unconscionability doc-
trine.229 Unconscionability had long existed as a legal doctrine before 
Karl Llewellyn spearheaded the push for codification. As early as the 
mid-17th Century, the common law recognized the power of courts to . 
refuse to enforce contracts that overstep accepted bounds of faimess.23o 
But the push to bring unconscionability into the open and away from 
"covert"231 public policy analyses232 also had the unintended side effect 
of promoting inequality of bargaining power from a hazy concept em-
ployed at the edges of contract doctrine to a new status as a de facto nec-
essary precondition for a fmding of unconscionability. 
Even in the context of unconscionability and contracts of adhe-
sion-where inequality of bargaining power is most often applied as an 
explicit element--courts, legislators and commentators have little idea 
228. See U.e.e. § 2-302 & cmt. 1 (1952). 
229. See, e.g., Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82,100 (Ch. 1751) ("[Uncon-
scionability] may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself; such as 
no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest 
and fair man would accept on the other; which are unequitable and unconscientious bargains: 
and of such even the common law has taken notice .... "). 
230. See Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of u.c.c. Section 2-302: Why Unconscion-
ability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L. J. 287,289-90 (2000) (discussing development and 
history of unconscionability doctrine); William B. Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 121, 124-25 (1967) ("[T]he notion of uncon-
scionability, although that word was not then used to describe it, may be traced in the English 
common law at least as early as 1663." (citing James v. Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (1663) (re-
fusing to enforce contract calculating purchase price of horse based upon 2 pence for first nail 
in horse's shoes, doubled for each of additional 31 nails))); Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable 
Quandary: u.c.c. Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REv. 359, 361 
(2001) ("Two centuries before the [U.C.e.] made the unconscionability doctrine available at 
law, the courts had woven public policy and ideas from equity and tort into innovative princi-
ples that would save consumers from unfair bargains."); Teeven, supra note 224, at 136-43 
(surveying history of unconscionability doctrines since fifteenth century). 
231. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 364-65 (1960) (prefer-
ring explicit prohibition on enforcement of unconscionable contracts contained in V.C.C. § 2-
302 to past practice of using ambiguous justifications to overturn contracts because "[ c ]overt 
tools are never reliable tools." (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 
702-03 (1939) (reviewing O. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937))); Leff, supra note 107, at 527 
(1967) (purpose of V.e.C. § 2-302 explicit authorization to invalidate unconscionable con-
tracts was to avoid "skewing of legal doctrine that may be caused by an emotional pressure to 
get a more heartwarming particular result"). 
232. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989). 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 196 2005
196 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
how to deal with bargaining power disparities. With respect to uncon-
scionability, for instance, many jurisdictions observe that inequality of 
bargaining power alone is sufficient for a determination of procedural 
unconscionability. Thus, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co.,233 the court first defined unconscionability "to include an absence of 
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract 
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."234 According 
to Williams, "gross inequality of bargaining power" could negate the 
meaningfulness of choices available to the weaker party.235 Other courts 
limit inequality of bargaining power as one of several elements of proce-
233. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
234. /d. at 449. 
235. Id. Williams further observed that defects in the manner in which the contract was 
formed-such as lack of opportunity to understand the terms or the fact that key terms were 
"hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices"-could also ne-
gate the weaker party's meaningful choices in entering the contract. See id. Although Wi/-
liams primarily discussed bargaining power disparities in the context of meaningfulness of 
choice, later courts and commentators have generally reformulated this inquiry as requiring 
both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. See, e.g., SLAWSON, 
supra note 42, at 141 ("Instead of 'absence of meaningful choice,' one now says, 'procedural 
unconscionability,' and instead of [terms] 'unreasonably favorable to the other party,' one now 
says, 'substantive unconscionability. "'); LetT, supra note 107, at 533-41 (distinguishing be-
tween procedural and substantive prongs of unconscionability analysis). According to Wi/-
liams, absence of meaningful choice in the contracting process could arise from either gross 
inequality of bargaining power or from contracting defects that caused the weaker party to en-
ter the agreement without opportunity to understand or discern the terms of the contract. See 
id. at 449-50. The absence of meaningful choice standard has come to be understood as pro-
cedural unconscionability, while Williams' inquiry into the reasonableness or fairness of the 
contract terms themselves parallels the substantive element of the unconscionability test. See 
also Weaver Bros., Inc. v. D.C. Rental Rous. Comm'n, 473 A.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(describing disparity in bargaining power and terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger 
party as two elements of test for unconscionability (citing, among others, Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture, Inc., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965»); Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) ("Under the procedural rubric come those factors 
bearing upon ... the real and voluntary meeting of the minds of the contracting party: age, 
education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who 
drafted the contract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alterations 
in the printed terms were possible, whether there were alternative sources of supply for the 
goods in question." (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 
268 (E.D.Mich. 1976»; Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 866-67 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (procedural unconscionability addresses manner of obtaining agreement to dis-
puted term, including unequal bargaining power); Ahern v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1990) ("Factors relevant to finding contract unconscionable include gross disparity 
in the values exchanged or gross inequality in the bargaining positions of the parties together 
with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party."); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. 
Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719, 721-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (assessing unconscion-
ability under two-prong test: (I) "[ w ]hat is the relative bargaining power of the parties, their 
relative economic strength, the alternative sources of supply ... [and] (2) [i]s the challenged 
term substantively unreasonable?" (quoting Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 171 N.W.2d 689, 692 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1969»). 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 197 2005
2005] INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER 197 
dural unconscionability. 236 Other courts address inequality of bargaining 
power as one of several factors to be weighed in the unconscionability 
analysis. For example, Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.237 
listed "unequal bargaining power" as one of ten factors courts should 
consider in assessing unconscionability in general. 238 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 and U.C.C. § 2-302 
imply that bargaining power disparities are a necessary but not sufficient 
element of a successful unconscionability defense. With respect to sales 
contracts, the drafters' comments to § 2-302 attempt to clarify the role of 
inequality of bargaining power in the unconscionability analysis: 
The basic test is whether, in light of the general commercial back-
ground and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the 
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract .... 
The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair sur-
prise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power.239 
Likewise, comment d explicitly indicates that bargaining power dis-
parities are one indication of unconscionability: 
Weakness in the bargaining process. A bargain is not unconscionable 
merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position, 
nor even because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the 
weaker party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, together 
with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may con-
firm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception 
or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful 
236. See, e.g., Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 537 N.y'S.2d 787, 791 (N.Y. 1988) 
(procedural element of unconscionability comprises lack of meaningful choice and focuses on 
"such matters as the size and commercial setting of the transaction, whether deceptive or high-
pressured tactics were employed, the use of fme print in the contract, the experience and edu-
cation of the party claiming unconscionability, and whether there was disparity in bargaining 
power") (internal citation omitted). 
237. 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976). 
238. See also Layne v. Gamer, 612 So. 2d 404,408 (Ala. 1992) ("In addition to fmding 
that one party was unsophisticated and/or uneducated, a court should ask (1) whether there was 
an absence of meaningful choice on one party's part, (2) whether the contractual terms are un-
reasonably favorable to one party, (3) whether there was unequal bargaining power among the 
parties, and (4) whether there were oppressive, one-sided, or patently unfair terms in the con-
tract.") (emphasis added); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 181 
(Iowa 1975) ("[AJ court considering a claim of unconscionability should examine the factors 
of assent, unfair surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining power, and substantive unfairness.") 
(emphasis added). 
239. V.C.c. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989) (internal citation omitted). 
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choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to as-
sent to the unfair terms.240 
But while § 208 prominently relies upon inequality of bargaining 
power as evidence of an unconscjonable transaction, neither the text of 
§ 208 nor the comments thereto make any attempt to define that concept. 
For example, comment d addresses all of the indicia of weaknesses in the 
bargaining process in terms of the relationship between the stronger party 
and the weaker party to the allegedly unconscionable contract, without 
any definition of what constitutes a bargaining power disparity that 
would make one party "stronger" and the other "weaker." 
Factors which may contribute to a finding of unconscionability in the 
bargaining process include the following: belief by the stronger party 
that there is no reasonable probability that the weaker party will fully 
perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker 
party will be unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract; 
knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable rea-
sonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental infir-
mities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of 
the agreement, or similar factors.241 
Of the criteria described by comment d, only the last-the 
"stronger" party's knowledge that the "weaker" party cannot protect its 
interests-appears to deal with elements of inequality of bargaining 
power.242 But the use of the qualitative determinations-"stronger" and 
"weaker"-to describe the parties before addressing the allegedly weaker 
party's ability to protect its interests sugges'ts that the determination of 
stronger and weaker is to be made before assessing physical or mental 
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language 
of the agreement. 243 Consequently, while inequality of bargaining power 
remains a necessary but not sufficient condition to a determination of un-
conscionability under both the V.C.c. and the common law, neither the 
V.C.C. nor the Restatement have defined standards for determining that 
condition, 
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) (emphasis added). 
241. Id. (emphasis added), 
242. See id. 
243. See id. 
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B. Modern Judicial Attempts to Define Inequality of Bargaining 
Power 
199 
Modern American courts have largely failed to infuse the concept of 
inequality of bargaining with legally coherent meaning. The judicial in-
quiry can be divided into two rough categories.244 First, many courts ad-
dress inequality of bargaining power in terms of the weaker party's lack 
of meaningful alternatives, necessity ,245 the nature of the good or ser-
vice,246 or inability to negotiate terms.247 Second, courts often employ a 
host of potential factors relating to characteristics of the parties and char-
244. There are, of course, other categories and characterizations for the judicial inquiry. 
High pressure sales practices, for example, may be said to give rise to bargaining power 
asymmetries even if the court does not explicitly address power issues per se. Cf, Kugler v. 
Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 649 (N.J. 1971) (high pressure door-to-door sales tactics implicitly 
contributing to exploitation of uneducated, inexperienced, low income consumers). But while 
it is possible to infer a bargaining power disparity from such alternative measures, courts ap-
pear generally to have settled upon the two categories discussed herein as appropriate for ex-
plicit recognition of bargaining power asymmetries. 
245. See, e.g., Ransburg v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393, 400-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (resi-
dential lessees are in an unequal bargaining position with landlords because of essential and 
public nature of residential housing); Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tenn. 1992) 
("[A]s a result of the essential nature of the service and the economic setting of the transaction, 
a residential landlord has a decisive advantage in bargaining strength against any member of 
the public who seeks its services."). 
246. See, e.g., Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 526 (Md. 1994) (party offering essential ser-
vice to the public "possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member 
of the public who seeks his services" (quoting Winterstein v. Wi1com, 293 A.2d 821, 825 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1972»); Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 171 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1969) ("[W]here goods or services used by a significant segment of the public can be obtained 
from only one source, or from limited sources on no more favorable terms, an unreasonable 
term in a contract for such goods or services will not be enforced as a matter of public pol-
icy."). 
247. The focus on lack of alternatives and inability to negotiate terms appears most often 
in the context of the procedural prong of an unconscionability determination, specifically 
where the court attempts to make a fmding regarding "oppression" by the allegedly stronger 
party against the weaker party. See, e.g., Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 
2001) ("[Procedural unconscionability) is manifested by (1) 'oppression,' which refers to an 
inequality of bargaining power resulting in no meaningful choice for the weaker party, or (2) 
'surprise,' which occurs when the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a document."); 
Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80,83-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (employ-
ing nearly identical analysis to determination of whether employment contract was contract of 
adhesion and whether parties had inequality of bargaining power sufficient to create oppres-
sion and procedural unconscionability); Votto v. Am. Car Rental, Inc., 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 17, 
2003 WL 21716003, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2003) ("The concept that a contract of 
adhesion should be interpreted and enforced differently from an ordinary contract has evolved 
from cases which have involved contractual provisions drafted and imposed by a party enjoy-
ing superior bargaining strength . ... " (quoting Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 
1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976» (emphasis added); cf Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 
265 (3d Cir. 2003) (determining that a contract of adhesion "generally" satisfies the procedural 
prong of an unconscionability analysis). 
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acteristics of the transaction to imbue the inequality of bargaining power 
doctrine with standards to guide the exercise of judicial discretion. Typi-
cal characteristics of individual parties relied upon by courts248 to sup-
port an inference of inequality of bargaining power include wealth,249 
business sophistication,250 education or knowledge,251 race,252 gen-
der,253 "size" of the parties,254 monopoly power,255 and consumer 
status.256 And as a final alternative, many courts eschew standards for 
248. For a survey of common party attributes found to contribute to inequality of bargain-
ing power, see 2A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§§ 2-302:101 to 2-302:131 (3d ed. 1997). 
249. See, e.g., Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (describ-
ing contracts of adhesion as "standard-form contracts offered by large, economically powerful 
corporations to unrepresented, uneducated, and needy individuals on a take-it-or-leave-it ba-
sis .... " (quoting Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996») 
(emphasis added). 
250. See, e.g., Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (Ind. 1971) (declaring in-
demnification term in franchise agreement unconscionable in part because of franchisee's lack 
of business sophistication and education); Graziano v. Tortora Agency, Inc., 359 N.Y.S.2d 
489,491-92 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (finding lease term not unconscionable because tenant was 
corporation, and tenant's principal was "licensed as a real estate broker, is a knowledgeable, 
sophisticated businessman and well known as such in the community"). 
251. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (noting relevance of party's "obvious education or lack of it" to meaningfulness of that 
party's choice in entering contract); Albert Merrill Sch. v. Godoy, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378, 381-82 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (disproportionate education levels and weaker party's unfamiliarity with 
technical and legal English, together with deceptive practices, create inequality of bargaining 
power). 
252. See Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 643, 652-54 (N.J. 1971) (sale of educational 
books at price two and a half times higher than retail price to "minority group consumers and 
consumers of limited education and economic means" held unconscionable and deceptive 
trade practice); Adams v. John Deere Co., 774 P.2d 355, 360 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (noting 
bargaining power is "as much a function of market power as it is of size"). 
253. See, e.g., Ahem v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 793 (III. App. Ct. 1990) (female home-
owner ignorant about air conditioner repair who felt "intimidated" by defendant repairman had 
inferior bargaining power); cf Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231,232 (Mass. 1992) (female 
plaintiff characterized as "naive, insecure, vulnerable in contract matters, and unduly influ-
enced by" ex-convict defendant boyfriend who had "introduced her to drugs" without specific 
finding of disparity of bargaining power). 
254. See, e.g., Am. Cloak & Suit Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brooklyn Ladies' Gamlent Mfrs.' Ass'n, 
Inc., 255 N.Y.S. 614, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931) ("In the cloak and suit industry we have no 
giant corporations like those in the steel and motor fields. The individual employer is quite 
powerless to bargain on his own terms with a powerful labor organization .... "); Royal In-
demo Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520,524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("There is 
no showing that these giant industrial organizations were of unequal bargaining power."). Al-
though courts regularly refer to disparate "size" as creating an inequality of bargaining power, 
it is unclear what "size" really means in this context. In connection to institutions and business 
organizations, size may refer to wealth or the number of members within that organization. 
255. See, e.g., Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 607-08. But see POSNER, 
supra note 15, at 102-04. 
256. See, e.g., Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 338 N'y.S.2d 67,69-70 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1972) (residential lessee is a consumer, does not deal on equal terms with landlord, and cannot 
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assessing inequality of bargaining power, relying instead upon a "we-
know-it-when-we-see-it" approach.257 The inconsistency with which dif-
ferent courts approach these separate analyses and the fact that few 
courts or commentators have analyzed the relative importance of these 
factors to the question of bargaining power disparities mean that there is 
no predictable judicial standard for determining inequality of bargaining 
power. As a result, "inequality of bargaining power" can be fairly de-
scribed as a doctrine in search of content and substance. After almost a 
century of searching, the doctrine remains obscure. 
1. Bargaining Power Disparities, Meaningful Choices and 
Opportunities to Negotiate 
As noted, issues of inequality of bargaining power are most often 
explicitly raised in the context of the doctrine of unconscionability and 
the related concept of adhesion contracts. Specifically, inequality of bar-
gaining power often is used as a proxy for procedural unconscionabil-
ity.258 A contract is procedurally unconscionable when defects in con-
tract formation render the agreement "oppressive" or the party claiming 
unconscionability is "unfairly surprised" by the terms of the agree-
ment.259 Oppression is deemed to occur "if an inequality of bargaining 
power between the parties precludes the weaker party from enjoying a 
meaningful opportunity to negotiate and choose the terms of the con-
be expected to comprehend lengthy and complex lease provisions); cf EI Paso Natural Gas Co. 
v. Minco Oil & Gas Co., 964 S.W.2d 54, 62-63 (Tx. Ct. App. 1997) rev'd on other grounds, EI 
Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 1999) (status as merchant 
will not invalidate unconscionability defense, but such status may be considered in uncon-
scionability analysis). The doctrine has been invoked with success in the latter setting. Al-
though courts have acknowledged that commercial entities may be able to raise successful de-
fenses based upon doctrines such as unconscionability that are related to inequality of 
bargaining power, it is still rare for courts to find an inequality of bargaining power between 
merchants. See Mallor, supra note 42, at 1066. 
257. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 173-75, 180-
81 (Iowa 1975) (implicitly holding without analysis, beyond noting presence of fine print and 
that one party was insurance company, that owner of fertilizer plant lacked bargaining power 
in contracting with insurer). 
258. "[Ujnconscionability requires a two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are 
unreasonably favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the 
other party regarding acceptance of the provisions." Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 
F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Although some courts have held that 
gross disparity between the contract price and the value received may be give rise to uncon-
scionability standing alone, courts generally require both procedural unconscionability, i.e., 
oppression or unfair surprise in contract formation, and substantive unconscionability, i.e., 
terms that unreasonably favor one party, to hold a contract unconscionable. See, e.g., id. 
259. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (presence 
of oppression or unfair surprise was central to the court's analysis of whether contract was 
procedurally unconscionable). 
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tract."260 Similarly, adhesion contract doctrine explicitly incorporates 
inequality of bargaining power by defining adhesion contracts as those 
presented on a "take-it-or-Ieave-it" basis by a party with stronger bar-
gaining power to a party with weaker bargaining power.261 In both situa-
tions, courts rely upon (1) the absence of meaningful alternatives or some 
degree of "necessity," and (2) inability to negotiate or alter the terms of 
the proffered contract as evidence of inequality of bargaining power. 
a. Meaningful Alternatives 
In some ways, the lack of meaningful alternatives inquiry-often 
described in terms of need or necessity262-addresses whether the appar-
ently weaker party actually consented to the terms or was coerced into 
agreeing through some species of fraud or duress.263 Lack of meaningful 
alternatives and need are readily apparent in cases of extreme necessity, 
such as contracts for the rescue of ships at sea and provision of life-
saving services. These cases may potentially represent real inequalities of 
bargaining power where the weaker party literally faces a choice between 
loss of life and acceptance of the proffered terms.264 But such cases 
260. Id. 
261. See, e.g., Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 292-95 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (employing identical analysis for contract of adhesion and inequality of bargaining 
power analysis for purpose of determining applicability of unconscionability and reasonable 
expectations doctrines). The determination that a particular contract is adhesive often satisfies 
the question of whether the contract is procedurally unconscionable. "A contract of adhesion 
is one which is prepared by the party with excessive bargaining power who presents it to the 
other party for signature on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Alexander, 341 F.3d at 265 (internal 
citation omitted). "An adhesion contract is defmed as a standard form contract prepared by 
one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, [usually] a consumer, who has little 
choice about the terms." Lytle v. Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002) (internal citation omitted). The determination that a particular contract is adhesive often 
satisfies the question of whether the contract is procedurally unconscionable. See, e.g., Ingle, 
328 F.3d at 1172 ("Therefore, because Circuit City presented the arbitration agreement to 
Ingle on an adhere-or-reject basis, we conclude that the agreement is procedurally unconscion-
able."). 
262. See, e.g., Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Altmont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719,723 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ("Depending on the nature of the goods or services and the purchaser's 
needs, doing without mayor may not be a realistic alternative."); Tunkl v. Regents ofUniv. of 
Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) ("As a result of the essential nature of [medical ser-
vices], in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a 
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his ser-
vices."). 
263. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text; cf United States v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 315 U.S. 289,300 (1942) ("Duress. The word duress implies feebleness on one side, 
overpowering strength on the other."). 
264. See, e.g., James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1633-1637 
(1981) (discussing bargaining power disparities in context of sea rescue cases as means to 
promote substantial notions of justice and fairness within forced exchanges); William M. Lan-
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rarely involve a contractual model of bargaining265 and thus represent a 
marginal issue within the problem of inequality of bargaining power. 
Since apparently absolute disparities of bargaining power occur only in 
rare cases, the importance of such disparities for discriminatory purposes 
is likely minimal. 
Leaving aside the question of inequality of bargaining power raised 
in "absolute" situations, however, it is clear that courts lack a consistent 
approach to assessing either the alternatives truly available to the weaker 
party or the weaker party's ability to negotiate terms. In contrast to the 
stark choices available to the captain of a sinking ship or the bleeding ac-
cident victim on the sidewalk, bargaining power situations generally 
arise because of a SUbjective desire by one party for what another party 
can provide.266 Bargaining power in many cases is thus largely a matter 
des & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Eco-
nomic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 1. LEGAL STUD. 83, 128 (1978) (arguing, inter alia, in fa-
vor of judicially imposed price for sea rescues on basis that judicial intervention imposes eco-
nomically efficient outcome and prevents overinvestment in rescue equipment that would be 
made if rescuers could command prices "bargained" in forced exchanges). Even in the forced 
exchange situation, however, it is fallacious to argue that the captain of the ship in distress has 
no bargaining power. Harsanyi described the assumption that the rescuer would be able to ex-
tract any consideration for the rescue up to the value of the rescued ship as the "blackmailer's 
fallacy." See Harsanyi, supra note 172, at 232-33. Harsanyi observed that such a proposition 
is fallacious, however, because it implicitly assumes that the blackmailer has all of the bargain-
ing power in the situation and will be able to extract any terms up to the value of the rescued 
ship or the total cost of the proposed blackmail to the victim. !d. In reality, the blackmailer 
will profit at any price and rationally could choose to take less than the full value of the initial 
demand. [d. Thus, the situation of apparently absolute bargaining power disparities raises the 
possibility that our thinking on bargaining power has been fundamentally flawed. Too often 
courts and commentators fall into a narrative trap of assigning bargaining weakness to a party 
who fits into the expected mold of "weaker party." In the vast majority of situations, the party 
who successfully dons the guise of "weaker party" before the court is subsequently entitled to 
claim that he had no power to affect the outcome of the bargaining process. See, e.g., North-
west Acceptance Corp., 412 N.W.2d at 723 (fmding inequality of bargaining power because 
lessor of capital equipment executed lease contract on expedited basis and claimed he felt he 
"had a gun to his head"). But, as the blackmailer's fallacy demonstrates, there are actually 
very few situations in which bargaining is not possible and very few situations in which that 
process does not involve at least the potential for a give and take between the parties. 
265. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 264, at 83-85. Landes and Posner analyzed 
appropriate compensation for rescue across a broad range of fact patterns, including, for ex-
ample, (1) emergency medical services; (2) jettison of cargo by a ship at risk of sinking, or 
rescue ofa sinking ship by a salvor; (3) rescue of a drowning swimmer; (4) return of lost prop-
erty; and (5) trespass by a ship owner seeking refuge from a storm and observed that such 
situations are governed by several distinct doctrinal regimes ranging from restitution, admi-
ralty, tort, contract, and property law. !d. The variety of distinct doctrines governing in such 
cases of apparently absolute bargaining power illustrates that such cases rarely involve matters 
of pure contract doctrine. The necessities or situations giving rise to the apparently absolute 
disparities raise issues that cannot be measured under a contract model of offer, acceptance, 
consideration and capacity. 
266. See supra notes 118-22, 168-69 and accompanying text. 
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of individual choice and preference.267 Given the dynamic, changing na-
ture of parties' developing preferences and subjective desires between 
the initial moment of desire and the execution of a contract, the key to 
assessing bargaining power on the basis of meaningfulness of alterna-
tives often depends upon the time frame in which the court assesses those 
desires. 
At one extreme, some courts assess the alternatives available before 
that party actually decided to enter a contract with the allegedly stronger 
party. This approach maximizes the possible alternatives that the alleg-
edly weaker party could have explored rather than accept the proffered 
terms and generally justifies a conclusion that the apparently weaker 
party did not lack meaningful alternatives. In Deminsky v. Arlington 
Plastics Machinery,268 for instance, the court held that the plaintiff did 
not suffer from an inequality of bargaining power because there were al-
ternatives available to the plaintiff in determining whether to purchase 
plastic recycling machinery from the defendant manufacturer. First, the 
plaintiffs president conceded that he had considered purchasing the ma-
chinery from other suppliers, but chose the defendant manufacturer be-
cause of its location and offer to sell used machinery.269 Second, the 
court emphasized that the plaintiff could simply have exercised it's 
power to walk away from the deal altogether.270 
Likewise, in Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores,27 I the Utah Supreme Court 
held that an employee had meaningful alternatives to signing a boiler-
plate, pre-printed employment contract providing for at-will employ-
ment.272 The court explicitly rejected the employee's claims that he was 
267. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (assessing role of preferences and 
subjective value in determining relative bargaining power of parties); cf Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Danaher, 1., dissenting) (discuss-
ing subjective preferences in terms of "[w]hat is a luxury to some may seem an outright neces-
sity to others"); Blau, supra note 55, at 293 (noting that as individuals become accustomed to 
receiving regular rewards, a later loss of those rewards would be subjectively perceived as a 
loss, not a return to the status quo ex ante). 
268. 638 N.W.2d 331, 342-43 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). 
269. [d. 
270. [d. ("Moreover, Image could have elected to simply not expand its business to take on 
the new snow fence processing operation if a suitable machine was not available at a price and 
on terms it deemed acceptable. "). 
271. 972 P.2d 395, 403-04 (Utah 1998). 
272. The Ryan court actually applied a six-factor test for procedural unconscionability, of 
which the availability of meaningful alternatives was only the fifth factor. 
Factors bearing on procedural unconscionability include: (I) whether each party had 
a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms and conditions of the agreement; 
(2) whether there was a lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation; (3) whether 
the agreement was printed on a duplicate or boilerplate form drafted solely by the 
party in the strongest bargaining position; (4) whether the terms of the agreement 
were explained to the weaker party; (5) whether the aggrieved party had a meaning-
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coerced into signing the employment contract by the employer's refusal 
to give him his paycheck until he read the employment handbook and 
agreed to its terms. The court emphasized the meaningful alternatives 
available to the employee. He could have (1) signed the acknowledge-
ment form and received his paycheck; (2) refused to sign the form and 
receive his paycheck;273 or (3) signed the form, received his paycheck, 
quit, and sought employment elsewhere as the at-will terms explicitly au-
thorized him to do.274 
Importantly, the Deminsky and Ryan courts emphasized not only the 
existence of positive alternatives to the proffered bargains, but also that 
the parties had the ability to walk away from the deal altogether.275 This 
"walk-away" power represents the ultimate caveat to claims of inequality 
of bargaining power-there is always a choice, always an alternative to 
entering the deal. 276 That choice may be one among relatively unpleasant 
choices, but that alone cannot defeat the meaningfulness of the choice. 
But courts rarely acknowledge the power simply to do without or to seek 
alternatives to the proffered bargain. 
At the other end of the spectrum from Deminsky and Ryan, courts 
suggest that availability of alternatives to the weaker party is irrelevant 
ful choice or instead felt compelled to accept the terms of the agreement; and (6) 
whether the stronger party employed deceptive practices to obscure key contractual 
provisions. 
[d. at 403 (quoting Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added». The 
court acknowledged that because the agreement was presented by the employer on a pre-
printed form, the employee lacked an opportunity to negotiate the at-will term, but concluded 
that this inability to negotiate terms in a form contract could not alone give rise to procedural 
unconscionability. [d. at 404. 
273. Had the employer continued to withhold Ryan's paycheck, the court noted that Ryan 
could have sued and recovered attorney's fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-28-3, 34-
27-1. [d. 
274. See id.; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("If 'oppression' refers to the 'absence of meaningful choice,' then the 
existence of a 'meaningful choice' to do business elsewhere must tend to defeat any claim of 
oppression," holding that sophisticated investor had meaningful choice in competing IRAs). 
In reality, the Ryan court's ordering-sign, get paycheck, quit, and seek other employment-
ignores that employees routinely seek to improve their bargaining power with current and pro-
spective employers by seeking other employment while they are still employed. Such actions 
provide the employee substantial bargaining strength with prospective employers because 
there is no pressure to accept the proffered employment terms besides the inducement of the 
terms themselves and the employee's willingness to remain at the current employment. Simi-
larly, employees who have an alternative job offer in hand are in a much stronger bargaining 
position with respect to their current employers if they wish to renegotiate the terms of their 
employments. 
275. Cf FISHER ET AL., supra note 171, at 99-102 (advocating that negotiating parties de-
velop Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement ("BATNA") criteria to assist determination 
of when to walk away from offered deal). 
276. See id.; see also Dalzell, supra note 25, at 238-39. 
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and often define availability of meaningful alternatives to exclude the 
power to abandon a transaction.277 Instead of looking to what parties 
could have accomplished had they actually attempted to exercise bar-
gaining power, many courts assess available alternatives at the point that 
the weaker party has decided to contract with the other party. These 
courts then assume that subjective determination eliminates the possibil-
ity of contracting with other providers. 
For example, in Pardee Construction Co. v. Superior Court,278 the 
court held that the first-time homebuyer plaintiffs lacked meaningful al-
ternatives to the defendant developer's purchase and sale agreement, 
once they had decided to purchase a home within the defendant's devel-
opment. The court determined that the inequality of bargaining power 
between the homebuyers and the developer was oppressive, despite the 
developer's argument that the buyers should have been required to sub-
mit evidence that they "were unable to buy similar homes elsewhere un-
der purchase contracts that did not include judicial reference provi-
sions."279 Rather, the court held that the parties' economic positions and 
the fact that the developer had a large development eliminated the buy-
ers' alternatives and deprived them of meaningful choices: 
[A]s potential purchasers of entry-level homes, plaintiffs stood in an 
economic position well below Pardee, the developer of hundreds of 
homes in the master plan development. As also discussed, since judi-
cial reference provisions were contained in all agreements for pur-
chase of homes in the entirety of Pardee's master plan development 
of several hundred units, plaintiffs had no meaningful choice with re-
spect to accepting those provisions.280 
The court further reasoned that the unique nature of real property 
meant that plaintiffs were not able to go elsewhere and seek different 
terms.281 The mere fact that the plaintiffs had determined to purchase a 
277. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
("Moreover, in a given case, a contract might be adhesive even if the weaker party could reject 
the terms and go elsewhere.") (quoting Villa Milano Homeowners Ass'n v. II Davorge, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000» (emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted). 
278. 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
279. [d. 
280. [d. (emphasis added, citation omitted); see also id. at 292-93 (holding that purchase 
and sale agreement was contract of adhesion because of inequality of bargaining power). 
281. See id. at 293. But cf Lake County Trust Co. v. Wine, 704 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1998) (finding that "corporate landlord" of mobile home park did not exercise un-
equal bargaining power in terminating tenants' ground leases because, among other reasons, 
"the residents of Williamsburg were free to execute a lease with a different landlord if the 
terms of the lease were unacceptable"). 
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unique property was thus sufficient to eliminate any obligation on the 
part of the plaintiffs to shop elsewhere.282 
In Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc.,283 the 
Michigan Court of Appeals likewise focused on lack of alternatives ex-
isting after the allegedly weaker commercial equipment lessee deter-
mined to lease a rock crusher from the lessor.284 Relying on the lessee's 
statements that he had been forced to sign the lease after a 45-minute 
meeting in a restaurant without opportunity to read, study or consult oth-
ers, and that the lessee felt he "had a 'gun to his head,'" the court at-
tempted to define availability of meaningful alternatives: 
Implicit in the principle of freedom of contract is the concept that at 
the time of contracting each party has a realistic alternative to accep-
tance of the terms offered. Where goods and services can only be ob-
tained from one source (or general sources on noncompetitive terms) 
the choices of one who desires to purchase are limited to acceptance 
of the terms offered or doing without. Depending on the nature of the 
goods or services and the purchaser's needs, doing without mayor 
may not be a realistic alternative.285 
But beyond the lessee's assertions that "he felt he had a gun to his 
head" and that he inadvisably entered a bargain that later turned sour, 
Northwest Acceptance merely states that the lessee originally contacted 
the lessor after seeing an advertisement for the rock crusher in a trade 
magazine and decided to lease the machine after meeting with the les-
sor. 286 The court thus offers no basis to discriminate between bad busi-
ness decisions that should be enforced and situations involving oppres-
sion through inequality of bargaining power. 
As Pardee Construction, and Northwest Acceptance demonstrate,287 
courts often ignore the walk-away power described in Deminsky and 
282. See also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) ("the 
availability of other options does not bear on whether a contract is procedurally unconscion-
able") (citation omitted). 
283. 412 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
284. [d. at 720, 723. Northwest Acceptance potentially falls within a relatively small class 
of cases in which a merchant successfully asserted an unconscionability defense to a commer-
cial contract with another merchant. The lessee was an asphalt paving business that sought to 
lease a rock crusher to supply aggregate for its first large state highway job. See id. It is not 
clear from the opinion, however, whether the lessor was more sophisticated, larger, better fi-
nanced, or otherwise endowed with any traditional indicia of superior bargaining power. 
285. [d. at 723 (quoting Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 171 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1969)). 
286. [d. at 720. 
287. See also Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that cellular telephone customers had no meaningful alternatives to accepting contract 
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Ryan. Even in cases where abandoning the proffered deal may not be a 
realistic alternative, courts artificially limit the alternatives that can be 
considered within the bargain. Instead of focusing on possible actions 
available to both parties to an agreement, many courts limit the meaning-
ful alternatives inquiry solely to the alternatives existing after the weaker 
party has determined to transact with the stronger party, but before the 
parties actually executed the agreement. At that point, the only alterna-
tives are the possible universe of terms within the transaction. By limit-
ing the meaningful alternatives inquiry to the terms of the transaction at 
issue, these courts have conflated the availability of meaningful alterna-
tives with the question of whether the weaker party was able to negoti-
ate.288 
b. Opportunity for Negotiation 
The opportunity for negotiation inquiry, however, is similarly 
flawed because courts have failed to articulate what it really means for 
terms to be offered on a "take-it-or-Ieave-it basis" or without opportunity 
for negotiation. Rarely do courts ask whether a party could have negoti-
ated had he or she tried to do so. Instead, courts look primarily to 
whether a party actually did negotiate or whether the agreement was pre-
sented in a manner suggesting that the offeror would not negotiate. 
For example, in Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co.,289 the court 
rejected the defendant-employer's argument that the contract at issue was 
not oppressive because the plaintiff-employee had and actually exercised 
amendment mandating arbitration given costs to consumers in cancelling current service con-
tracts, losing current cellular numbers, and contracting with new service providers). 
288. The Ingle court made the conflation of the ability to negotiate and absence of mean-
ingful alternatives inquiries explicit by fmding the fact that the employer gave prospective em-
ployees three days to consider an arbitration agreement was irrelevant to the question of 
whether the agreement was oppressive: 
Circuit City argues that because Ingle had sufficient time-three days-to consider 
the terms of the arbitration agreement, the court should not find this agreement pro-
cedurally unconscionable. We disagree. The amount of time Ingle had to consider 
the contract is irrelevant. . .. [T]he availability of other options does not bear on 
whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable. Rather, when a party who en-
joys greater bargaining power than another party presents the weaker party with a 
contract without a meaningful opportunity to negotiate, oppression and, therefore, 
procedural unconscionability, are present. 
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omit-
ted). Notably, Ingle contrasts sharply the Ninth Circuit's decision in Navellier v. Sletten, 262 
F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001), where the court explicitly rejected an unconscionability defense 
because the defendant, among other reasons, "had adequate time to pursue other alternatives." 
289. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80,83-85 (Cal. Ct. App., 1993). 
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the opportunity to negotiate many of the contract terms.290 There, the 
parties orally negotiated an employment contract specifying the em-
ployee's commission rate, starting date, monthly draw, guaranteed sal-
ary, and standards for payment of the monthly draw out of collections.291 
The employer subsequently presented the employee with a written con-
tract characterized as a "formality which all employees signed," but 
which contained a merger clause and additional terms specifying that the 
employee would not be paid commissions on advertising fees received 
after the employee's termination.292 
The court held that the new terms were oppressive and therefore 
procedurally unconscionable despite that the employee actually had an 
opportunity to read the agreement and in fact negotiated several of its 
terms. According to the court, "[t]he mere fact that certain terms of a 
standardized contract vary among inferior parties does not demonstrate 
that the objectionable provision was actively negotiated nor eliminate the 
possibility that such a term is unconscionable."293 
Likewise, in Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 294 the court held that an em-
ployment contract between Supercuts and Stirlen was oppressive and 
procedurally unconscionable because Stirlen-the vice president and 
chief financial officer of Supercuts-Iacked a meaningful opportunity to 
negotiate, despite that he actually did negotiate several terms of the 
agreement. 
Supercuts maintains that the contract here is not adhesive because it 
did not have superior bargaining strength. It emphasizes that Stirlen 
was not a person desperately seeking employment but a successful 
and sophisticated corporate executive Supercuts sought out and 
"hired away" from a highly paid position with a major corporation 
"by offering him an annual salary of $150,000, and then agreeing to 
remunerative 'extras' not included in the standard executive em-
ployment agreement" such as generous stock options, a bonus plan, a 
supplemental retirement plan, and a $10,000 "signing bonus.,,295 
Disregarding that Stirlen actually negotiated the financial terms of 
his employment contract, the court held that the Supercuts standard em-
ployment agreement gave Stirlen "no realistic ability to modify the 
290. [d. at 84. Specifically, the employee negotiated his starting date, commission rate and 
amount of draw, among other terms. See id. 
291. [d.at81. 
292. [d. at 82. 
293. !d. at 84 (citation omitted). 
294. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
295. [d. at 146. 
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tenns"296 Consequently, the court detennined the employment agree-
ment was adhesive and thus procedurally unconscionable.297 
But the mere fact that a party does not negotiate does not logically 
require the conclusion that the party could not negotiate. In contrast to 
Stirlen and Ellis, the court in First Financial Insurance Co. v. Purolator 
Security, Inc. 298 specifically held that the plaintiff's failure to attempt to 
negotiate did not compel the conclusion that the plaintiff could not nego-
tiate. The First Financial plaintiff executed the defendant security com-
pany's fonn contract with exculpatory clauses limiting liability in case of 
burglary, and plaintiff believed all other security companies required 
similar tenns.299 Consequently, the plaintiff averred that it had no choice 
but to sign the contract. 300 The court held these allegations insufficient to 
show that the plaintiff actually lacked an opportunity to negotiate: 
[Plaintiffs] affidavit does not deny that the contract was entered into 
with full knowledge of the exculpatory provisions. [Plaintiff] asserts 
that all security companies use contracts containing similar provi-
sions; however, he does not indicate whether the currency exchange 
attempted to negotiate with defendant Purolator or one of its competi-
tors to change those provisions. Under these circumstances it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the provisions were unconscionably forced upon 
the currency exchange.301 
Thus, while some courts, such as Ellis and Stirlen, appear willing to 
declare inequality of bargaining power, oppression, and procedural un-
conscionability on the bare finding that the allegedly weaker party did 
not negotiate some tenns of the agreement, others such as First Financial 
impose higher standards before concluding that the weaker party lacked 
an opportunity to negotiate.302 As the distance between these possible 
standards demonstrates, a failure to negotiate demonstrates only that the 
weaker party did not attempt to negotiate for a better deal. Such a failure, 
however, does not show that the tenns were not negotiable. 
The bald assertion that some contracts or contract tenns are non-
negotiable or are presented on a take-it-or-Ieave-it" basis is misleading. 
296. Id. at 146. 
297. /d. 
298. 388 N.E.2d 17,21-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
299. Id. at 22. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. See also Lamoille Grain Co. v. St. Johnsbury & Lamoille County R.R., 369 A.2d 
1389, 1391 (Vt. 1976) (holding no oppression where plaintiff successfully negotiated change 
to price term in lease but failed to read remainder oflease). 
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Truly non-negotiable contracts or tenns are in fact likely to be rare.303 
On one level, to say that a tenn is "non-negotiable" actually means that 
the proponent of the tenn would demand more for altering the tenn to 
one preferred by the other party than the other party is willing to pay.304 
In other words, a non-negotiable tenn is one that the proponent has de-
cided to treat as a "blue chip" bargaining position-one that cannot be 
bargained away without destroying the deap05 Creating non-negotiable 
tenns is thus part of a rational bargaining strategy employed to some de-
gree by every bargainer. 
As a consequence of the universality of non-negotiable tenns, the 
legal significance of one party's refusal to bargain unless the other party 
acquiesces to the first party's preferred tenns is unclear. Any tenn can be 
monetized to reflect the risk the tenns seeks to allocate, regardless of 
303. Cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note 131, at 553-54 (arguing that between commercial 
entities, bargaining power is fixed prior to transaction and "is exercised in the division of the 
surplus, which is determined by the price term. Parties jointly choose the contract terms so as 
to maximize the surplus, which the price may then divide unequally"). 
304. See Leff, supra note 107, at 546 (noting "[t]here is no clause in a contract that is 
needed by a party" but rather only clauses that are useful to a party and-if excluded from the 
bargain-would merely be replaced by an increase in the price charged) (emphasis added, in-
temal citations omitted); cf POSNER, supra note 15, at 102-103 (observing that monopolist is 
not likely to differ from competitive sellers with respect to non-price terms). For example, 
buyers who regularly purchase large quantities of goods or services from a particular buyer 
generally-but not always-will have the ability to negotiate terms in a manner unavailable to 
the average consumer. Admittedly, there are some truly non-negotiable terms, but in analyz-
ing the efficacy of inequality of bargaining power as a tool for legal discrimination, it makes 
sense to limit non-negotiability to those cases in which no amount of money or other compen-
sation could convince a party to negotiate. Typically, this will occur only in situations where 
the subjective value placed upon a particular term approaches the infinite-for example, the 
proposed sale of a favorite child, family heirloom, and so on. Outside of such subjectively 
infinite values, the only real limitation on the negotiability of any contract term is the value the 
party desiring to change that term places upon the change. 
305. Although a complete survey of the literature is beyond the scope of this article, stan-
dard works on negotiation tactics often recommend that prospective negotiators identify 
roughly three types of contract terms before beginning the negotiation: (1) blue chip or manda-
tory terms which must be part of any deal; (2) desirable but not necessary terms; and (3) bar-
gaining chips that can be freely bargained away. See, e.g., CRAVER, supra note 132, at 
§4.01[2][a] ("Most legal representatives either formally or informally divide client goals into 
three basic categories: (1) essential; (2) important; and (3) desireable."); HENRY S. KRAMER, 
GAME, SET, MATCH: WINNING THE NEGOTIATIONS GAME 45-47 (2001) (defining "primary 
objectives," "secondary objectives," and "smokescreen objectives" for negotiation planning 
process). Fisher and Ury depart from this standard by eschewing "bottom line" terms in favor 
of establishing a "Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement" ("BA TNA"), against which to 
assess offers, but the effect is still to establish a point below which a party will refuse to con-
tract. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 53, at 97-103; see also BARNHIZER, supra note 140, at 
73-77,236-47 (1997) (adapting diagnostic methods of Eastern military strategists to creation 
of pragmatic definitions of victory and openness to creative solutions and recommending 
avoidance of fixed negotiation positions). 
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whether the term is negotiated or part of a form contract. 306 While many 
attempts by parties will end in a flat refusal to negotiate on certain 
terms,307 other terms-particularly price-are often negotiable.308 The 
assertion that "courts err when they treat a contract consisting largely of 
form terms as they would a negotiated deal simply because one of the 
terms has in fact been bargained out"309 may often be reversed. Where 
the parties are free to bargain on some terms, nothing justifies a court in 
determining that what was, or could have been, bargained does not com-
pensate for what was not. 
For example, the increase in contract value that an individual con-
sumer could obtain by attempting to negotiate away from standardized 
terms is often de minimis; the time and effort expended in so doing 
would not exceed the expected value of the preferred term.310 The couple 
attempting to purchase cruise tickets, for example, would obtain little 
benefit at the moment of contracting by attempting to negotiate an excep-
tion to standard terms printed on the back of the ticket requiring litigation 
of all disputes in Florida.311 Unless they are bad actors intent upon en-
gaging in fraud or similar misconduct, the forum selection clause is a 
classic example of Rakoff's "invisible terms," about which the non-
drafting party does not care at the moment of contracting because the 
risks and benefits are too small to evaluate.312 But precisely because 
those risks are small enough that one party does not care sufficiently to 
attempt to negotiate, changes in price or other visible terms that the ap-
306. See sources cited supra note 304. 
307. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. 
L. REv. 1173, 1225 (1983) (stating that penetrating hierarchical structure of business organi-
zations to find agent with authority to negotiate standard terms is costly and in many instances 
"there may in fact be no one at any level who is willing to bargain"). 
308. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 131, at 553-54 (arguing that business-to-business 
contracts will usually choose terms that maximize joint surplus which parties will then divide 
through price term). 
309. RakotT, supra note 307, at 1254-55. 
310. See id. at 1226 (noting rational decision by consumers not to incur costs of attempting 
to negotiate away from standard form contracts). 
311. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991) (Stevens, 1., 
dissenting) (noting that "only the most meticulous passenger is likely to become aware of the 
forum selection provision" printed on back of cruise ticket that passengers received after pur-
chasing cruise). 
312. Rakoff, supra note 307, at 1226, 1250-51. Rakoff acknowledges that "for most con-
sumer transactions, the close reading and comparison needed to make an intelligent choice 
among alternative forms seems grossly arduous" and that most consumers faced with form 
contracts lack the legal advice and experience to make sense of many contract terms. Id. at 
1226. Consequently, most consumers will rationally allocate their energies to understanding, 
shopping for, and negotiating the terms most important to them-i.e., price, warranty terms, 
immediacy of impact-which Rakoff called "visible" terms. !d. at 1226, 1250-51. Invisible 
terms, by contrast, include ~11 other terms that might be included in a form contract. See id. at 
1250-51. 
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parently weaker party is able to negotiate or shop may compensate for 
the increased risk expressed in the invisible terms. Or more precisely, 
some improvement in the negotiable terms may be sufficient to compen-
sate a buyer for whatever uncertainty remains in the contract. There is a 
price at which a reasonable consumer would-if explicitly asked-agree 
to most common standardized terms. If the contract price or other nego-
tiable terms can be improved sufficiently through shopping or negotiat-
ing, then the value of that improvement should compensate for the addi-
tional risk placed upon the consumer.313 
On another level, however, the determination that a term is non-
negotiable or is offered on a "take-it-or-Ieave-it basis" takes on a conno-
tation of moral judgment, rather than a device for legal discrimination.314 
Such judgments imply that a refusal to compromise is inappropriate or 
wrongful when practiced by an apparently stronger party. Thus, certain 
bargaining behaviors, including presenting consumers with pre-printed 
form contracts315 or informing potential employees that they must agree 
to the terms outlined in the employee handbook,316 are subject to an es-
sentially moral condemnation as unfair or oppressive. But given that 
every party comes to the bargaining table with non-negotiable terms, that 
one party acquiesced to another's non-negotiable terms does not justify 
judicial intervention into those terms. 
2. Bargaining Power and Status 
The meaningfulness of choice and opportunity for negotiation in-
quiries focus upon the contracting process and attack directly the propo-
313. Cf SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 26 (describing bargaining power as the power to 
value the transaction more accurately than the other party and the ability to contract more effi-
ciently than the other party). Both of Slawson's characteristics of bargaining power-which 
he attributes almost entirely to the producers of goods and services-relate directly to the cost 
of those goods and services to the purchaser. See id. Likewise, Epstein describes bargaining 
power solely in terms of costs-inequality of bargaining power exists where one party to a 
contract can claim a greater share of the surplus between what one party is willing to pay and 
what the other party is willing to accept. See Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 116, at 974-
75. 
314. See LetT, supra note 107, at 527 (discussing "the skewing of legal doctrine that may 
be caused by an emotional pressure to get a more heartwarming particular result"); Kennedy, 
Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 614 ("The most common justification for compulsory 
terms-in tort law as well as in contract-is that there was inequality of bargaining power be-
tween the parties."). 
315. See, e.g., Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 616 (describing use of ad-
hesion contracts as potential source of bargaining power); SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 30-31; 
see also Freidrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943). 
316. See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 403-04 (Utah 1998). 
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sition that the parties to the contract are participating in and consenting to 
a market transaction. In contrast to these transactional characteristics, in-
dividual, status-based characteristics relied upon by many courts appar-
ently approach inequality of bargaining power by asserting that certain 
classes of individuals are largely incapable of treating with others in a 
market-based transaction.317 Specifically, the status-based inquiry asserts 
that a form of market failure occurs when parties with disparate charac-
teristics-such as poverty or wealth, lack of education or business so-
phistication, consumer or merchant-attempt to transact. 
Admittedly, the distinction between status-based heuristics on the 
one hand, and the meaningfulness of choice and ability to negotiate in-
quiries on the other hand, is largely artificial. Instead, courts often imply 
a substantial overlap between the transactional characteristics and par-
ticular individual characteristics. Business sophistication, for example, 
may support an inference that the party had other meaningful choices to 
the proffered transaction.318 Likewise, a lack of education may justify a 
conclusion that the party lacked meaningful choices in determining 
whether to enter a deal, simply because she did not know of the existence 
of those choices.319 And monopolization of a particular market may cre-
317. Kronman provides an excellent example of the temptations faced by courts dealing 
with apparently weak classes of parties in the context of adhesive consumer contracts. See 
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763, 770-71 
(1983). In that context, Kronman observed, courts and legislatures are often inclined to inter-
vene in contract relationships to imply contract terms intended to counteract the perceived im-
balance of bargaining power between the consumer and the merchant provider of goods and 
services. See id. As providers react to these implied terms by redrafting their contracts to dis-
claim such terms, courts and legislatures often step in again to protect the consumer by making 
the implied terms non-disclaimable on the assumption that consumers as a class are incapable 
of protecting their own interests. See id. 
318. In Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc. v. Super. Ct., for instance, the court held that the real-
tor-a self-described "sophisticated investor"-should have been able to comprehend the chal-
lenged term in an individual retirement account contract and could have shopped at competing 
institutions that did not have the challenged term. 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989) (stating that "the 'oppression' factor of the procedural element of unconscionability may 
be defeated, if the complaining party has a meaningful choice of reasonably available alterna-
tive sources of supply from which to obtain the desired goods and services free of the terms 
claimed to be unconscionable"); see also Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 
824,828 (N.Y. 1988) (holding experience and education of party claiming unconscionability 
to be relevant to alleged lack of meaningful choice); State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (same). 
319. See. e.g., Layne v. Gamer, 612 So. 2d 404, 408 (Ala. 1993) (noting that rescission of 
contract for unconscionability is "usually reserved for the protection of the unsophisticated 
and uneducated") (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall v. Mercury Fin. Co., 550 So. 2d 1026, 
1028 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)). 
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ate the power to dictate the tenns and prices to other contracting par-
ties.320 
But courts also employ status-based characteristics as a direct proxy 
for bargaining power disparities without reference to meaningfulness of 
choice or opportunity to negotiate. In Weaver v. American Oil Co.,321 for 
instance, the court held that the defendant gas station franchisor had su-
perior bargaining power because the plaintiff lacked a high-school edu-
cation and was unable to understand the legal significance of a lease tenn 
requiring indemnification for negligent acts by the defendant-lessor.322 
Other cases have directly linked inequality of bargaining power with 
gender, poverty, race, employment, and consumer status.323 
The use of status-based characteristics to determine contract rights 
between two parties is often useful in the judicial decision making proc-
ess. Leff noted with respect to unconscionability analysis that discrimi-
nating among broad classes "on the basis of some common supra-
personal characteristics" saves substantial judicial resources by narrow-
ing the inquiry to whether a party before the court shares important char-
acteristics with either a protected or a disfavored class.324 Such discrimi-
nation on the basis of gross generalizations is the bread and butter of 
both courts and legislatures, and without it the modem administrative 
state would likely collapse under the weight of billions of individualized, 
subjective inquiries. 
But the use of status-based characteristics as proxies for inequality 
of bargaining power raises at least three fundamental issues-(I) over- or 
under-enforcement of contracts; (2) secondary economic, social, or psy-
chological impacts upon persons within status classifications deemed by 
courts and commentators to lack bargaining power; and (3) "fossiliza-
tion" of particular status-based power classifications leading courts and 
commentators to disregard dynamic changes in the bargaining power of 
groups and individuals over time. First, as with all status-based classifi-
cations, employing stereotypes as a detenninant for relative contract 
rights raises substantial possibilities of over- and under-enforcement of 
contracts: 
When faced with the difficulties inherent in deciding the bargaining 
fairness of any given transaction, the equity courts, in working out 
their unconscionability doctrine, similarly leaned heavily on rela-
320. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 15, at 102-04 (economic analysis of monopoly power 
with respect to contract). 
321. 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-46 (Ind. 1972). 
322. See id. 
323. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text. 
324. Leff, supra note 107, at 555-56. 
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tively gross classifications. In effect, they seem continually to have 
taken a kind of sub rosa judicial notice of the amount of power of 
certain classes of people to take care of themselves, often without too 
much inquiry into the actual individual bargaining situation. And it is 
arguable that sometimes they were wrong; not all old ladies or farm-
ers are without defenses. Put briefly, the typical has a tendency to be-
come stereotypical, with what may be unpleasant results even for the 
beneficiaries of the judicial benevolence.325 
Status-based characteristics such as gender, poverty, and education 
will thus only coincidentally capture actual inequalities of bargaining 
power, guaranteeing that a post hoc judicial review based upon these 
characteristics will imperfectly reflect the actual bargaining power be-
tween the parties.326 Reliance on these factors, however, raises the spec-
ter of promoting status-based rights within contract327 and unguided ju-
dicial discretion. For example, courts rarely find unconscionability in 
cases involving contracts between merchants, regardless of the relative 
size, wealth, business exigencies or other factors that may affect the par-
ties' bargaining power.328 Rather, the beneficiaries of unconscionability 
325. [d. at 556. 
326. Leff illustrates the problem of over- and under-enforcement with reference to the rule 
prohibiting minors from executing binding contracts-although most legislatures have decided 
that minors are incapable of consenting to a contract, that legislative determination is merely a 
proxy for deciding whether some individuals are capable of forming consent. See id. at 555-
56. Some minors will be extremely mature for their age and possess all the mental and emo-
tional faculties necessary to exercise consent, while some who have attained their majority 
may never possess the required maturity. See id. 
327. See, e.g., Mark Petit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the 'Rise and Fall', 79 
B.U. L. REv. 263, 278-79 (1999) (noting risk of paternalism inherent in legislative "correc-
tions" to freedom of contract regime). Admittedly, some status-based rights are inevitable and 
even directly flow from basic principles of contract law themselves. Infancy, for example, 
provides minors the right to reject otherwise legitimate contracts for any reason. The status of 
infancy represents part of the core of contract-we enforce contracts to which the parties have 
objectively consented. Because infants are legally incapable of consent except in specialized 
circumstances, we limit their obligations even when otherwise objectively reasonable. See 
Kronman, supra note 317, at 787 (discussing limitations on enforcement of contracts with mi-
nors). As Duncan Kennedy observed, such exceptions are not antithetical to a freedom of con-
tract regime, but rather are part of the core doctrine necessary to legitimate the system. See 
Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 577. 
328. See, e.g., Morant, supra note 7, at 245-46, 266 (noting that small businesses are often 
subject to actual disparities of bargaining power in dealing with vendors and other sophisti-
cated bargainers but are usually denied access to contract doctrines otherwise available to con-
sumers and other parties presumed to have little bargaining power); Adler & Silverstein, supra 
note 26, at 48 ("In fact, the courts have generally been unreceptive to unconscionability claims 
by middle class purchasers or by merchants against other merchants."); Mallor, supra note 42, 
at 1067 (noting "virtual presumption against unconscionability" commonly asserted by courts 
assessing enforceability of contracts between merchants); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability 
in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 479 (1995) ("A 
consensus exists among courts and commentators that [U.C.c.] Section 2-302 is more likely to 
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determinations are most often members of particular c1asses-
consumers, the poor, and women.329 The source of this disparity may 
largely be attributed to courts' explicit or implicit use of inequality of 
bargaining power as a necessary precondition to unconscionability.330 
This critique of status-based determinations of relative bargaining power, 
however, is relatively unconvincing--courts regularly rely upon proxies 
and heuristics to streamline the judicial decisionmaking process. So long 
as the errors are merely marginal and do not excite reproach or percep-
tions of injustice, such marginal over- and under-enforcement of con-
tracts is not remarkable.33I 
Second, the potential economic and psychological effects upon the 
class of individuals who are deemed to lack bargaining power may have 
a potentially drastic impact upon the ability of individuals within those 
classes to escape their perceived lack of bargaining power. Repeated ju-
be available to consumers than to merchants."); see also FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 
F.2d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 1980) ("While Illinois courts will readily apply the unconscionability 
doctrine between consumers and skilled corporate sellers, they are reluctant to re-write the 
terms of a negotiated contract between businessmen."). Cf Kerr-McGee Corp. v. N. Utils., 
Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 330 (lOth Cir. 1982) (contract between public gas utility and natural gas 
producers held not unconscionable where contract was product of experienced negotiators and 
parties negotiated terms over several months); Graziano v. Tortora Agency, Inc., 359 N.Y.S.2d 
489,491-92 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (holding that unconscionability defense was unavailable to 
corporate tenant and sophisticated principal). But see SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 25, 143 (as-
serting that modern courts do not discriminate against merchants on the basis of bargaining 
power). 
329. See Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New 
Framework For u.c.c. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1,30-31 (1981) (discussing dan-
gers of "creating an overbroad category of consumers entitled to the presumption of non-
assent" with respect to standard form contracts); Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 48 
("The vast majority of successful unconscionability claims involve poor, often unsophisticated, 
consumers challenging oppressive adhesion contracts foisted on them by retail merchants or 
credit sellers. "). 
330. See Mallor, supra note 42, at 1068-70 (asserting inequality of bargaining power is 
generally a necessary but not sufficient justification for unconscionability); Adler & Silver-
stein, supra note 26, at 29 (discussing situations in which inequality of bargaining power will 
"produce inequities so pronounced that the law must step in to protect the weak"); CALAMARI 
& PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9.40 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that "inequality of bar-
gaining power is an important element in the unconscionability determination"); Reiter, supra 
note 100, at 368-70 ("The courts are concerned with preventing the exaction of too great an 
advantage from positions of power, irrespective of whence the power derives."). 
331. Notably, however, the reason for generalized perceptions that courts are not unjustly 
imposing unjust outcomes upon the parties may itself be unjust. The "legal myth" that large 
providers of goods or services with a relatively poor public image, such as insurance or to-
bacco companies, have greater bargaining power or grossly disparate bargaining power with 
those who purchase or depend upon those entities may foster.a tendency by courts and the pub-
lic to perceive any judgment against those entities to be just. The relationship between bar-
gaining power disparities and the concept of legal myths will be explored in a future article. 
See supra note 15 (discussing need for further study of whether bargaining power is a useful 
legal concept). 
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dicial declarations that poor, uneducated, female consumers, for exam-
ple, lack bargaining power vis a vis providers of goods or services332 
may create a legal identity for members of that class of individuals that 
potentially could bleed over into how those individuals develop their 
own self-identities with respect to other actors in the marketplace.333 
Similarly, such continued declarations of powerlessness by the legal sys-
tem may affect those individuals' perceptions of self-entitlement to par-
ticipate in the market and thereby alter their economic or social situa-
tion.334 Additionally, at least one commentator has suggested that a 
tendency by courts to interfere too often with party autonomy in contract 
may have negative psychological effects upon the affected individu-
als.335 
Third, and most importantly, many status-based classifications ap-
ply a static, outcome-based analysis to a determination of whether a 
given class lacks or possesses bargaining power. By freezing a particular 
class of individuals within a perceived framework of bargaining power 
attributes, courts may end up ignoring the dynamic nature of actual 
power relationships. Whether power relationships are altered because of 
broad social gains-or losses-by any particular group or class or be-
cause of the individual efforts of one of the contracting parties, a sophis-
332. See, e.g., Ahem v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787,792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (implying that 
elderly female consumer with limited knowledge of air conditioner repair lacked bargaining 
power in dealing with aggressive repainnan); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 
F.2d 445,448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (suggesting that single mother with seven children may have 
lacked bargaining power in dealing with merchant). 
333 .. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411,2412-13 (1988): 
The dominant group creates its own stories, as well. The stories or narratives told 
by the ingroup remind it of its identity in relation to outgroups, and provide it with a 
fonn of shared reality in which its own superior position is seen as neutral. The sto-
ries of the outgroups aim to subvert that ingroup reality. In civil rights, for example, 
many in the majority hold that any inequality between blacks and whites is due ei-
ther to cultural lag, or inadequate enforcement of currently existing beneficial 
laws-both of which are easily correctable. For many minority persons, the princi-
ple instrument of their subordination is neither of these. Rather, it is the prevailing 
mindset by means of which members of the dominant group justify the world as it 
is, that is, with whites on top and browns and blacks at the bottom. 
334. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 445, 447-48 (1994). Harrison suggests that "social class and the resulting 
sense of entitlement have an impact on the tenns of private orderings" and thus individuals 
from higher social classes (who have a correspondingly higher sense of entitlement) are able to 
affect the tenns of exchanges with individuals with lower socio-economic standing to favor the 
higher class individual. [d. at 447. Cf Gordley, supra note 264, at 1621 (stating that "if a 
court steps in too often and too readily, the parties will lose their incentive" to bargain toward 
the market price of the goods or services at issue). 
335. See Feldman, supra note 113, at 528 (discussing negative psychological impact upon 
parties when courts interfere with party autonomy). 
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ticated legal model of inequality of bargaining power must retain the ca-
pacity to recognize such changes. 
For example, courts may fail to discern that the consumer-merchant 
power disparities described in Henningsen336 or Williams337 have 
changed dramatically since those cases were decided forty or fifty years 
ago. Consumer insurance contracts provide one of the best examples of 
the potential for radically altered power relationships. Specifically, con-
sumers are no longer completely helpless with respect to insurance con-
tracts-traditionally a paradigmatic case of a bargaining power disparity 
between insurer and consumer.338 The Internet permits consumers to ob-
tain in minutes competing price quotes for numerous levels of coverage 
from hundreds of potential insurers.339 Nor are consumers restricted 
solely to shopping between insurers on the basis of price-consumers 
can, with a few minutes of research, shop on the basis of many different 
terms of coverage and obtain ratings of different aspects of customer re-
lations with the provider. 340 
Even more importantly, insurance consumers can obtain substantial 
reputational information regarding prospective insurers from both gov-
ernment and privately run Web sites. Reputational information is crucial 
to promoting competition among suppliers on non-price terms because 
consumers must rely upon a firm's reputation for satisfying consumer 
336. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. 
338. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hirose, 884 P.2d 1138, 1147 (Haw. 1994) (holding that 
"insurance policies are contracts of adhesion") (quoting Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Co., 684 P.2d 960,964 (Haw. 1984»; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 789, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (describing insurance contracts as paradigm adhesion con-
tracts); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 567 (Pa. 1983) 
("[I]n light of the manifest inequality of bargaining power between an insurance company and 
a purchaser of insurance, a court may on occasion be justified in deviating from the plain lan-
guage of a contract of insurance. "). 
339. The number of Internet-based insurance shopping services is too large to include a 
comprehensive list. Some of the apparently leading competitors include SelectQuote Insur-
ance Services, at http://www.selectquote.com (last visited Oct. 12,2004) (specializing in term 
life insurance quotes and purporting to compete based upon accuracy of quotes); InsWeb In-
surance Services, Inc., at http://www.insweb.com (last visited Oct. 12,2004) (offering compet-
ing quotes from hundreds of insurers); Insurance Shopping Network, at http://www 
.insurecom.com (last visited Oct. 12,2004) (purporting to review prices among "thousands of 
insurance companies"); ReliaQuote, Inc., at http://www.re1iaquote.com (last visited Oct. 12, 
2004) (same). 
340. See, e.g., Consumer Reports, HMO or PPO: Picking a Managed Care Plan (October 
2003), available at http://www.consumerreports.orglmainlcontentldisplay_report.jsp? 
FOLDER%3C%3Efolder_id=344515&ASSORTMENT%3C%3EasUd=333147 &CONTENT 
%3C%3EcnUd=329181&bmUID=1071613628776 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). Cf Bianco, 
supra note 213 (discussing increased power of small groups of consumers in segmented mar-
kets and describing attempts by producers to customize products and services to meet demands 
of targeted markets). 
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needs341 as a proxy for the "fairness" of the finn's contracts.342 Al-
though little empirical infonnation is available, the perceived wisdom 
among consumer relations specialists is that one satisfied customer will 
typically cause one additional customer to come through a seller's 
doors,343 but a single dissatisfied customer will typically cause several 
additional customers to avoid the seller.344 While consumers may not be 
able to negotiate or shop non-price insurance contract tenns effectively, 
they will pay attention to such proxies as finn reputation for customer 
satisfaction as a substitute for the uncertain tenns contained in the con-
tract.345 
341. Professors Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, for example, have proposed a model of 
fairness in exploiting bargaining power that suggests that fInn reputation for fairness in some 
situations "may explain why some fIrms do not fully exploit their monopoly power." Ernst 
Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. 
ECON. 817,817 (1999). Fehr and Schmidt point out, however, that the importance of such 
reputational inputs in restraining "unfair" behavior by fIrms depends largely upon the business 
context within which the fum operates, including whether the transaction takes place in a 
competitive market or a bilateral bargaining situation. /d. at 817-820, 825. 
342. See, e.g., Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 116, at 967-68 (discussing propensity 
for reputational damage to limit fInn's ability to abuse bargaining power in employment con-
text); but see Darr, supra note 36, at 1848 ("In some segments of the market, bargaining power 
occurs not because of inadequate numbers of players, but because information becomes rela-
tively costly to acquire."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 
HARV. L. REv. 741, 778-80 (1982) (discussing market failures with respect to New York City 
retailers specializing in "one shot sales" allowing huge markups because consumers lack accu-
rate price information); DiMatteo, supra note 21, at 292 (high search costs may lead consum-
ers to contract with fIrst fum they approach regardless of contract terms); SLAWSON, supra 
note 42, at 27-28 (arguing reputational effects are often insufficient to change producer con-
tracting behavior in favor of consumers). 
343. Cf TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE RESEARCH PROGRAMS, INC., COCA-COLA COMPANY, 
MEASURING THE GRAPEVINE: CONSUMER RESPONSE AND WORD OF MOUTH 13-14 (1981) 
(reporting that "complainants whose problems were not satisfactorily resolved said they told 
twice as many people about their negative experiences than satisfIed complainants told about 
their positive interaction" and concluding that "negative word-of-mouth is a powerful deterrent 
to sal es "). 
344. See, e.g., Robert Johnston, The Effect of Intensity of Dissatisfaction on Complaining 
Behavior, II J. CONSUMER SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION AND COMPLAINING BEHAV. 69-
77 (1998) ("One often quoted 'statistic' suggests that dissatisfIed customers tell on average ten 
others."); L. Jean Harrison-Walker, E-Complaining: A Content Analysis of an Internet Com-
plaint Forum, 15 J. OF SERVICES MARKETING 397, 399 (2001) ("The tendency of dissatisfIed 
customers to engage in negative word-of-mouth often results in the communication of deroga-
tory infonnation about the seller to a dozen or more friends and acquaintances.") (internal cita-
tion omitted); John Goodman, Basic Facts on Customer Complaint Behavior and the Impact of 
Service on the Bottom Line, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, June 1999, at 2, available at 
http://www.tarp.com/research.asp( .. Onaverage.twice as many people are told about a bad 
experience than they are about a good experience."); cf JULIA TIPLER, SUCCESSFUL 
NEGOTIATING: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR THINKING AND WORKING SMARTER 15 (2000) 
(noting likelihood of dissatisfIed consumers infonning others of dissatisfaction and warning 
others away from doing business with supplier perceived to have failed to act in good faith). 
345. Admittedly, reputational data may not help those who have the initial unfortunate ex-
periences that lead to a poor fum reputation. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The 
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Even if these seat-of-the-pants "statistics" are not true, they are 
widely accepted and acted upon by finns.346 Before the infonnation age, 
finns could be content that a single disgruntled individual might feel 
compelled to infonn only a handful of others that, say, his 1995 GMC 
pickup went through several manual transmissions before it reached 
100,000 miles. Everything is different now. Numerous private "Corpo-
rate Complaint Sites"347-including the imaginatively named "All-
stateInsuranceSucks.com,"348 and "Allstate or Allsnake: You be the 
Judge,"349 as well as the less-imaginatively named "Fraud and Racket-
eering by the Insurance Industry" Web site350-record hundreds of hor-
ror stories about individual consumer dealings with various insurers.351 
Similarly, many state insurance regulators now post data regarding con-
sumer complaints and bad faith denials by insurers.352 Cumulatively, 
these sites receive hundreds of thousands of hits, meaning that consum-
ers now have greater access than ever before to competitive infonnation 
Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 449-50 (1996) 
(discussing role of negative reputation for transactors perceived to have engaged in hold-ups in 
raising "costs of doing business in the future"). As Klein points out, however, finns should 
compare the expected short-tenn gain from opportunistic hold-up behaviors with expected 
losses from future private sanctions based upon reputational losses resulting from such hold-
ups. See id. Consequently, the threat of future private sanctions based upon reputation may 
still restrain some firms from engaging in opportunistic behavior. Cf Janet T. Landa, A The-
ory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Con-
tract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 351-358 (1981) (assessing role of extra-legal institutional 
and reputational mechanisms in reducing transaction costs among traders operating in legal 
regimes with poorly developed contract enforcement mechanisms). 
346. See sources cited supra note 344. 
347. See Charles Wolrich, The Best Corporate Complaint Sites, FORBES.com, August 21, 
2002, at http://www.forbes.comJ2002/08/21/0821hatesites....Print.html. 
348. http://www.allstateinsurancesucks.com (last visited Oct. 12,2004). 
349. http://allstateinsurance.org/default.html (last visited Oct. 12,2004). 
350. http://graham.main.nc.us/-bhammeUins.html(last visited Nov. 19,2004). 
351. For example, one such educationaUcharitable organization-FBIC ("Fight Bad Faith 
Insurance Companies")--has compiled extensive legal resources and infonnation regarding 
the perfonnance of individual insurance companies from numerous sources relating to bad 
faith refusals of coverage by insurers. See http://www.badfaithinsurance.com (last visited Oct. 
12,2004). Indeed, on the basis of my research in this area, I will be switching insurance com-
panies as soon as the demands of the current publication cycle are past. 
352. The Michigan Department of Labor & Economic Growth Office of Financial and In-
surance Services, for instance, maintains Web sites detailing infonnation on insurance com-
pany complaint statistics (http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607, 7 -154-10555_12902_12912---
,00.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004», insurance company complaint ratios 
(http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607, 7 -154-1 0555_12902_129 I 6---,00.html (last visited Oct. 
12, 2004», prohibitions and enforcement actions (http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-
10555_12902_12920---,00.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004», and insurance financial infonna-
tion (http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0.1607.7-154-10555_12902_18956---.00.html(last visited 
Oct. 12,2004». 
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necessary to shop between numerous potential insurers.353 The dramatic 
reduction in consumer information costs allowed by the Internet and 
similar information retrieval systems means that information-based bar-
gaining power disparities between consumers and producers of goods 
and services are less pronounced than in previous high-information cost 
regImes. 
The point is not that consumers have somehow achieved equality 
with producers because of the Internet.354 Such parity is unlikely ever to 
exist for a prolonged period given the substantial edge manufacturers 
have in evaluating their repetitive contract costs and risks.355 Market im-
perfections will always create some bargaining power disparities that no 
consumer will be able to counteract.356 And finally, in a market econ-
omy, it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate all bargaining power 
disparities-as long as bargaining exists, so too will variations in the 
ability of social actors to achieve their preferred goals at a lower cost 
than other actors.357 
Rather, the point is that courts unnecessarily limit themselves to a 
dead-hand vision of class-based power relationships when they fixate 
upon such rules as proxies for bargaining power disparities. At a certain 
353. For a broad analysis of the effects of the Internet upon individual power within the 
American market economy, see generally ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: 
HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE 
KNow (1999). 
354. See, e.g., SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 25-35 (discussing ability of producers, through 
superior knowledge of their product and market, to impose unfair terms upon consumers and 
asserting that consumer information sources are inadequate to remedy the apparent disparity of 
bargaining power); but see THOMPSON, supra note 131, at 24 ("The wealth of information 
available for free on thousands of Web sites has nearly leveled the playing field for car buyers 
and sellers. Some would even say the buyer now has the advantage."). 
355. See SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 25-35. 
356. For example, Barry Reiter notes that in many contexts, consumers may have substan-
tial power to affect relations with producers despite the apparently harsh terms of form con-
tracts: 
[I]n many fields nominally delegated to private autonomy, the market and other re-
lated pressures operate to produce socially acceptable levels of performance. While 
contracts as \vritten may well seem to be quite harsh, few businesses could survive 
if the harsh terms reflected the level of performance that the term-imposer antici-
pated delivering, (or more importantly, the level of performance actually achieved). 
Reiter, supra note 100, at 362. But Reiter further notes that such extra-contractual pressures 
on producer behavior do not resolve gross power imbalances in all instances, particularly with 
respect to fly-by-night providers who are unaffected by market pressures and markets in which 
the transaction costs of seeking or proving redress are extreme. See id. at 362-63; see also 
FISHER ET AL., supra note 53, at 97 ("No method can guarantee success if all the leverage lies 
on the other side."). 
357. See MICHAEL 1. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 (1993) 
("[M]arket economies depend on significant degrees of inequality to give effective reign to 
individual incentives, upon which their efficient functioning is critically dependent, and thus 
may generate higher degrees of inequality than traditional or command economies. "). 
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point, the actual power disparities shrink to the point that the margin of 
error and degree of disparity make the expenditure of judicial resources 
to regulate that relationship inefficient. In the insurance context, for in-
stance, the competition among insurers created by the Internet may have 
drastic consequences for the consumer-insurer relationship that would 
increase consumer power in many circumstances.358 Likewise, it cannot 
seriously be argued that the class or status-based power relationships that 
courts used as proxies for inequality of bargaining power are unchanged 
even from a decade ago. Not all of these changes will have resulted in a 
rebalancing of bargaining powers, but mere stereotypes substantially un-
changed from decade to decade cannot accurately reflect the nuances of 
bargaining power over time. 
V. REFORMING THE DOCTRINE OF INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER 
The dialectic of bargaining power disparities likely is permanently 
entrenched in the vocabulary of contract law.359 The historical develop-
ment of the doctrine, steeped in the quasi-Marxist language of class war-
fare and labor relations,360 raises political barriers to attempts by courts 
or legislatures to curtail claims by litigants that traditionally benefit from 
claiming disempowered status.361 Courts likely will continue using the 
doctrine to attempt to police power relationships between contracting 
parties for the foreseeable future, both on an explicit basis as with the 
doctrine of unconscionability and on a less visible basis as with interpre-
tation and the parol evidence rule.362 
But the substantial disconnect between the practical analysis, under-
standing and exercise of power contrasted with the assessment of power 
by the legal system demands a deeper investigation into the reasons for 
that disconnect and the potential for resolving it. Current legal ap-
proaches to problems of bargaining power asymmetries are deeply 
flawed. The courts' focus upon availability of meaningful alternatives, 
opportunities for negotiation, and the status of the contracting parties is 
superficial and, as discussed above, fundamentally tactical. Each of these 
358. Indeed, some recent consumer-oriented negotiation texts have incorporated the dra-
matic increase in potential consumer power wrought by the Internet into their advice on pre-
paring for a negotiation. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 131, at 24 ("By the time you see car 
dealers, you should know as much as they do ..... The wealth of information available for 
free on thousands of Web sites has nearly leveled the playing field for car buyers and sellers. 
Some would even say the buyer now has the advantage."). 
359. See supra notes 15 and 223. 
360. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. 
361. See supra notes 225-41 and accompanying text. 
362. See sources cited supra Part II and accompanying text (discussing importance of ine-
quality of bargaining power within numerous contract doctrines). 
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three main legal approaches to analyzing power examines only a narrow 
band of party behaviors, tactics and psychology while failing to account 
for power from less obvious sources or forms. Moreover, each of these 
three approaches ignores the characteristics of power discussed in Part 
III-power is omnipresent, complex and dynamic. Consequently, courts 
should develop a more sophisticated approach to analyzing problems of 
bargaining power that more closely follows the practical analysis of 
power. 
A. Assessing Power Strategically 
As a legal concept, inequality of bargaining power requires a shift in 
the fundamental paradigms supporting judicial analysis of the phenome-
non. Current assessments of bargaining power approach power from a 
tactical standpoint, as if the court were examining the parties' positions 
on a chessboard at an arbitrary point in the game and declaring a winner. 
Such a tactical approach to power is misleading and ultimately fruitless. 
For every oppressive bargaining tactic that a court identifies, the market 
will find another to take its place. The tactical focus on bargaining power 
disparities focuses upon discrete moments in time and fixed relations be-
tween the parties, both in terms of the individual contract before the 
court and in terms of the moment at which the court will assess the par-
ties' relative strengths. Ultimately, tactics will change but the underlying 
issue will remain. 
The tactical approach to assessing and regulating bargaining power 
disparities virtually ignores the omnipresence, complexity and dynamism 
of power. The legal tactical approach to power fails to account for the 
fact that all parties have power of some kind. Thus, courts often err by 
assuming that party characteristics or the subject matter of the transaction 
wholly eliminated the ability of the apparently weaker party to consent to 
the bargain.363 Similarly, legal decisionmakers and commentators often 
ignore the complex nature of bargaining power in favor of overly sim-
plistic models based in gross status classifications, superficial examina-
tions of alternatives, or just unfounded knee-jerk conclusory assertions of 
bargaining power disparities. Rather than acknowledge that real power 
contests also involve hidden, deceptive and unexercised forms of power, 
the legal system remains wedded only to the most obvious conceptions 
of power. Finally, courts ignore the dynamic nature of power by focusing 
363. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing tendency of courts to view 
residential lease transactions as creating an inherent bargaining power deficiency in the pro-
spective tenant because the transaction involved a necessity such as housing). 
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on fixed characteristics that fail to account for the role of party choice in 
creating the apparent power imbalances. 
To conform the legal analysis of power to the actual and practical 
use of power by parties acting in the real world, courts should abandon 
the tactical approach to power and develop a more strategic framework 
in which to assess bargaining power. A strategic analysis must first ac-
knowledge that the practical use of bargaining power is complex and 
thus assess forms or arise from sources not immediately obvious from a 
superficial review of the transaction and the relative status of the parties. 
Second, courts should recognize that all parties to a transaction have 
some form of power by assessing the options reasonably available to the 
parties that could have altered the power relationship. Finally, courts 
should analyze bargaining power as it changes dynamically throughout 
the parties' bargaining process, not simply at a single period within that 
relationship. 
1. Assess All Forms of Power 
If courts continue to attempt to police inequality of bargaining 
power, they should abandon fixed, status-based approaches to bargaining 
power and adopt a standard that promotes inquiry into the full array of 
possible forms of bargaining power. Importantly, current approaches to 
the inequality of bargaining power doctrine and contract doctrines that 
explicitly assess bargaining power disparities as an element already per-
mit an open and wide-ranging inquiry.364 Indeed, some courts do address 
these alternate forms of power, albeit on a haphazard basis.365 
But without an explicit acknowledgment that power depends at least 
as much upon intangible, unseen factors such as subjective perceptions 
of the other side's resources by the parties, unspoken risk assessments, 
error, willingness or lack of willingness to use power, and so on, courts 
are likely to miss significant aspects of the power relationship. Simply 
because visible displays of power are often the easiest to prove does not 
mean that the rest of the power equation is unimportant. Rather, an hon-
est analysis of any power relationship requires courts to recognize the 
potential for all forms of power-the hidden, the deceptive, the unexer-
cised-to affect the bargaining power of the parties. 
364. Cf John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 
931, 938-40 (1969) (noting intentional use of vague terms and standards by Karl Llewellyn in 
drafting unconscionability rule ofU.C.C. § 2-302). 
365. See supra Part IV.B. 
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If visible real power provides such an incomplete and changeable 
picture in practical contexts, such as military and business endeavors,366 
where interested parties possess both incentive and resources to measure 
opponents' power-there is far less reason for courts to rely primarily on 
manifestations of the power relationship in their post hoc assessments. 
Judicial over-reliance upon visible, real power is comparable to the old 
saw about the man searching for his keys under a street lamp. Passersby, 
upon learning the keys were dropped in a nearby dark alley, asked why 
he was wasting time looking under the street lamp. "Because the light's 
better over here," the searcher replied. Bargaining power is not just the 
visible or the real. Hidden and deceptive power are integral to the bar-
gaining process.367 Likewise, power can arise from many different 
sources beyond obvious ones like status, education, wealth or gender.368 
Consequently, the attention paid to whether a particular term was actu-
ally bargained or whether a party was poor or had less formal education 
than the other, or if one of the parties had substantial business experi-
ence, shows only a small part of the power relationship between the par-
ties. 
The crucial issue here is the purpose of judicial attempts to regulate 
the practical effects of bargaining power disparities by assessing the rela-
tive bargaining powers of contracting parties and assigning legal conse-
quences to gross disp'arities of bargaining power. If that purpose is to en-
force a normative moral rule that justifies modification of contractual 
duties created under a bargaining power asymmetry, then the courts 
clearly should reform the legal standards for assessing bargaining power 
to conform accurately to power relations as they actually existed. 
Nor is it a sufficient argument in favor of the status quo to charge 
that such an undertaking would be beyond the capabilities of the courts 
or prohibitively expensive. Clearly, increasing the judicial inquiry into 
sources and forms of power not readily observable would increase the 
cost of proving a disparity of bargaining power. But ease of proof cannot 
be relevant to actual measures of power where so much of the use of 
power must remain hidden, deceptive and/or unexercised to be effective 
and where sources of power can vary so widely depending on situation 
and context. 369 Given the gaping holes in current judicial approaches to 
analyzing bargaining power, the suggestion that courts should continue 
366. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
367. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
368. See supra Part IlI.B.2.a. 
369. Cf Norton, supra note 42, at 502-04. "[N]ormal ethical standards are sometimes 
abandoned in negotiations ... [and] people do not always bargain the way they live." Id. at 
504. 
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to rely upon flawed heuristics and gut instincts to assess relative bargain-
ing power misses the point. The solution to the question of how to assess 
bargaining power inexpensively is not to create arbitrary heuristics that 
are incapable of accurately assessing power relations. Such false reme-
dies only obscure what should be the real debate-whether courts should 
be making any attempt at all to assess and regulate the effects of bargain-
ing power asymmetries. 
2. Assess Not Just What the Parties Did, But What They 
Reasonably Could Have Done to Improve Their Bargaining 
Power 
To paraphrase Sun Tzu, power is a statement of potentiality, not ac-
tuality.370 For Sun Tzu, the key to obtaining a preferred outcome-i.e., 
crushing one's opponent like an insect-was the accurate assessment of 
one's own and one's opponent's positions before engaging the enemy 
and then adjusting one's strategy as the situation required or allowed.371 
Power comprised the means of achieving a preferred outcome, and the 
use of power necessarily envisioned and operated within a dynamic and 
unfolding process. The study of power as a practical phenomenon has 
primarily addressed this central issue of how parties can accurately as-
sess the power relationship and then alter it to suit their own preferences. 
Compared to this practical concept of power, the legal concept of 
bargaining power is unsophisticated and "flat." Judicial analysis of bar-
gaining power promotes and perpetuates a view of power that artificially 
limits the ability of decision makers to assess accurately the real power 
relationship between the parties. First, the judicial approach to analyzing 
power often begins and ends with an initial determination that one of the 
parties was "weak" while the other was "strong." Following that initial 
determination, the inquiry ceases,372 and courts fail to check whether the 
party could have done anything to alter the power relationship. At the 
level of individual cases, once the court determines that a party is "weak" 
or "strong," individual strategies or events that significantly alter bar-
370. See SUN Tzu, supra note 163, at 89-91 ("[T]he victories of good warriors ... are not 
flukes because they position themselves where they will surely win, prevailing over those who 
have already lost. ... Therefore a victorious army fIrst wins and then seeks battle .... "). 
371. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. 
372. See, e.g., Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 292-94 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (determining that fIrst-time homebuyers lacked bargaining power in dealing with 
developer after homebuyers had subjectively determined to purchase home in developer's sub-
division); see supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text (observing that Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 208 cmt. d identifIes power disparities on the basis of what the "stronger" 
party does to or knows about the "weaker" party without standards for determining which of 
the parties is "stronger" or "weaker"). 
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gaining power rarely enter the post hoc assessment to test the parties' 
power relationship, even if a party had the capacity to alter that relation-
ship. 
This judicial failure to look beneath the superficial indications of 
power carries additional consequences on the macro level. Stereotypes of 
the weak and the strong have largely frozen themselves into the judicial 
consciousness.373 Thus, even when societal, economic, political, techno-
logical or other developments alter or adjust the actual balance of power 
between classes of actors,374 courts largely fail to acknowledge those de-
velopments in assessing bargaining power. For example, modern con-
sumers, even though they likely continue to lack bargaining parity with 
producers of goods and services, nonetheless have gained access to in-
formational, political, and legal tools not imagined forty years ago.375 In 
contrast, small businesses may be losing substantial bargaining power in 
the modern domestic and global economy as large firm mergers acceler-
ate and foreign competition increases. The rapid socio-economic changes 
wrought by processes of globalization have increased competition and 
permitted business giants the ability to dictate terms and prices to their 
small-scale suppliers.376 
Second, the legal approach to inequalities of bargaining power in 
many cases ignores party responsibility in creating and maintaining that 
power relationship. Specifically, the judicial analysis of power does not 
ask whether the first-time homebuyers in Pardee Construction Co. could 
have improved their bargaining power.377 Nor does the judicial analysis 
inquire into whether the employees in Ellis and Stirlen could have nego-
tiated further or otherwise improved their bargaining position.378 Instead, 
courts tend to ignore what parties could reasonably have done to change 
the balance of power and look at what actually happened-so long as the 
party receives an initial conclusion that it was "weaker" than the other 
party to the relationship.379 
373. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (discussing unavailability ofIBP-based 
defenses to merchants and the middle class, reserving those doctrines primarily for the poor, 
the consumers, and the uneducated). 
374. See supra notes 338-57 and accompanying text (discussing impact of lowered infor-
mation costs for consumers in shopping for insurance contracts). 
375. See supra notes 339-56 and accompanying text. 
376. See, e.g., Abigail Goldman and Nancy Cleeland, The Wal-Mart Effect: An Empire 
Built on Bargains Remakes the Working World, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at Al (describing 
ability ofWal Mart negotiators to dictate contract terms and prices to would be suppliers). 
377. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text. 
378. See supra notes 289-302 and accompanying text. 
379. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (assessing unconscion-
ability in terms of weaker and stronger parties without explanation of how court should iden-
tify "weak" party and "strong" party). 
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In contrast, courts commonly decry attempts by so-called "sophisti-
cated businesspersons" to gain judicial assessment of their bargaining 
power relative to a more sophisticated party,380 even though similar con-
tract terms and bargaining would be closely scrutinized if applied to a 
traditionally protected class of "weak" parties. Caveat emptor is alive 
and well in such situations regardless of the power realities. As a conse-
quence, classes of contracting parties traditionally viewed as "strong" or 
at least "not-weak" will often be prevented from demonstrating that a 
real inequality of bargaining power in fact existed because the courts' 
initial, unsophisticated take on their bargaining power is determina-
tive.381 Likewise, members of presumptively "weaker" classes of bar-
gainers-such as consumers, the poor, and those lacking higher educa-
tion-have a strong claim to the protection of inequality of bargaining 
power doctrines even if they could reasonably and at minimal cost have 
improved their bargaining position.382 
In many cases these status-based determinations will be correct-
poor, uneducated consumers often lack bargaining power, and sophisti-
cated, financially healthy businesses often are sufficiently savvy to avoid 
gross power disparities.383 But the key question is whether the parties 
380. See, e.g., Geldennann & Co. v. ~ane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 576-77 (8th Cir. 
1975) (rejecting claim of unequal bargaining power by allegedly sophisticated party who read 
and understood contract tenns before signing); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. N. Utils., Inc., 673 F.2d 
323, 330 (lOth Cir. 1982) (rejecting unconscionability claim where "experienced negotiators 
for both parties entered into an agreement after several months of give-and-take"). But cf Stir-
len v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (fmding inequality of 
bargaining power between chief financial officer and employer); Northwest Acceptance Corp. 
v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719,721-24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (fmding inequality of 
bargaining power between business owners). 
381. See, e.g., Morant, supra note 7, at 237 ("Contractual equity ... can be quite limited, 
particularly for small businesses. Rules that offer possible relief from inequitable bargains 
apply more readily to consumers rather than business entities."); Edwards, supra note 42, at 
455-56 (same). 
382. See Hillman, suprtJ note 329, at 30-31 ("Some consumers have the power to compare 
prices or resist purchases."). 
383. As a result, this Article does not suggest that courts should ignore such heuristics al-
together if they continue to use inequality of bargaining power as a relevant factor in contract 
disputes. As Blake Morant observed in commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, one 
possible way to preserve the usefulness of status-based power assessments would be to have 
courts explicitly refine their analyses of bargaining power to use such status-based heuristics 
as triggers for a more searching inquiry into the parties' relative power. Importantly, adopting 
a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to bargaining power would not bar recognition of 
systemic power imbalances that may be relevant to individual cases. Rather, a more sophisti-
cated approach to bargaining power should acknowledge the potential that some actors within 
a traditionally disadvantaged class or a traditionally "strong" class will have special advan-
tages or disadvantages that must also be assessed. Cf supra note 324 and accompanying text; 
Hillman, supra note 329, at 30-31 (asserting that status-based characteristics applied without 
distinction "would nullify a principal advantage of judicial intervention: the opportunity to 
evaluate the facts of particular cases"). 
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suffered some actual disability that the l~w should redress through doc-
trines employing the legal concept of inequality of bargaining power or 
whether one of the parties simply made a bad deal. If a party, through 
improvidence, haste, negligence or just plain bad luck executed a losing 
contract, courts generally will not remove the consequences of that bad 
bargain.384 On the other hand, many courts have accepted a norm permit-
ting or even requiring intervention where bargaining power disparities or 
other flaws in the contracting process impair the ability of the disadvan-
taged party to express true consent to the agreement. 385 
Consequently, the importance of party responsibility to the actual 
power equation, along with the dynamic and changeable nature of the 
power relationship, requires that courts assess whether the parties could 
reasonably have altered that relationship.386 While there is arguably a 
justification for regulating bargains imposed as a result of gross dispari-
ties of bargaining power,387 that justification is diminished where the ap-
384. See, e.g., Nelson v. Rice, 12 P.3d 238,243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) ("Courts should not 
assume an overly paternalistic attitude toward the parties to a contract by relieving one or an-
other of them of the consequences of what is at worst a bad bargain .... ") (citation omitted); 
Adams v. John Deere Co., 774 P.2d 355, 359 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) ("It is directed against one-
sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts, and not against the consequences per se of 
uneven bargaining power or even a simple old-fashioned bad bargain.") (citation omitted); cf 
ANDERSON, supra note 248, at § 2-302:92 ("[U.C.C. § 2-302] is not designed to relieve a per-
son from what proves to be a bad bargain, for the principle is not aimed at 'disturbance of allo-
cation of risks because of superior bargaining power."') (quoting Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. 
Scholitz Brewing Co., 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966». 
385. See Mallor, supra note 42, at Ion (noting relationship between inequality of bargain-
ing power from exploitation of weaker party's necessity and lack of consent by weaker party); 
cf ANDERSON, supra note 248, at § 2-302:104 (discussing negation of party choice resulting 
from inequality of bargaining power). 
386. Such a notion of conditioned rights based upon party responsibility is described at 
length in Weinreb's secular theory of natural rights. Thus, for Weinreb-as for most of us-
the statement that a party can control whether an event occurs or does not occur is also a state-
ment that a party is responsible for the occurrence or non-occurrence of that event. See Lloyd 
. n L. Weinreb, A Secular Theory of Natural Law, n FORD. L. REv. 2287, 2292-94 (2004) ("The 
notion of human responsibility requires that our acts be free, that is to say self-determined and 
not determinate."). Where a party exercises a right to determine its conduct-as when a thief 
steals a wallet or a contracting party chooses not to employ power at his or her disposal-it 
follows as a matter of course that the party is responsible for the consequences of that action 
where that choice is self-determined. See id. at 2295-97 (observing that thief exercising right 
to liberty to determine his conduct to steal a wallet is responsible for that conduct if it is self-
determined and therefore responsible for that act). For an in-depth analysis of Weinreb's 
analysis of the relationship between rights and individual responsibility, see generally LLOYD 
L. WEINREB, OEDIPUS AT FENW A Y PARK: WHAT RIGHTS ARE AND WHY THERE ARE ANY 
(1994). 
387. See, SLAWSON, supra note 42, at 23-26 (asserting inequality of bargaining power as 
moral justification for contract reformation); Overby, supra note 107 at 620-22 (arguing in 
favor of paternalist judicial interventions into private contracts to enforce international norms 
of sustainable economic development); Kessler, supra note 315, at 640-42 (arguing for greater 
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parently weaker party forbore taking reasonable action to improve its 
power.388 Likewise, where a party could do little to improve its bargain-
ing power, to the extent that a gross disparity of bargaining power justi-
fies contract reformation, it follows that the party that lacked power 
through no fault of its own has a stronger claim for reformation. 
The practical effect of the incorporating a reasonableness inquiry 
into the legal bargaining power analysis would be to refine and limit the 
impact of the broader inquiry into non-obvious forms and sources of 
power, suggested above, to those cases where the weaker party actually 
lacked power rather than merely failed to use it. It is thus unlikely that a 
reasonableness inquiry would significantly affect current analyses of the 
bargaining power of traditionally "weak" parties because the typical in-
quiries already indicate that those parties lack reasonable options to im-
prove their bargaining power. Most consumers, for example, will con-
tinue to lack the education, business sophistication, finances, time, 
information or other resources that would permit reasonable steps to im-
prove their bargaining power when faced with an adhesion contract. At 
the margins, courts may require greater party responsibility depending on 
the significance of the transaction or the enhanced abilities or resources 
of the party before the court as those factors render greater expenditures 
of resources to improve bargaining power reasonable. Likewise, the rea-
sonableness inquiry may incorporate socio-economic or technological 
changes that increase the tools that a typical consumer may reasonably 
apply to increase her bargaining power into the legal analysis of bargain-
ing power. Overall, however, traditionally disadvantaged parties will 
likely continue to lack reasonable means of improving their bargaining 
power. 
The primary benefit of requiring courts to investigate whether the 
parties could have taken reasonable steps to improve their bargaining 
power would instead refine the more complicated analysis of whether 
traditionally "strong" or "non-weak" parties such as small businesses and 
middle income consumers actually lacked bargaining power389 or merely 
judicial intervention in refonning contracts of adhesion to prevent powerful industrial and 
commercial interests from "impos[ing] a new feudal order" upon weaker consumers). 
388. See Jan Narveson, Consumers' Rights in the Laissez-Faire Economy: How Much Ca-
veat for the Emptor?, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 181, 199 (2004) (arguing in favor oflimited version of 
caveat emptor in regulating consumer transactions that holds consumer responsible for deci-
sions within her control-"there must be a region in which the consumer makes his own deci-
sions and takes responsibility for them"). 
389. As Schwartz and Scott recently argued, fum to finn transactions typically adopt a 
model of contract negotiation that more closely resembles the Willistonian model involving 
negotiation over time and relatively equal bargaining power. See Schwartz & Scott, supra 
note 131, at 54445 (identifying fum to finn transactions as the "main subject of what is com-
monly called contract law" where fInns are defmed as comprising "sophisticated economic 
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made a bad bargain. By expanding the initial question of whether a party 
lacked bargaining power to include hidden, deceptive and unexercised 
forms of power, and to examine non-obvious sources of power, courts 
increase the opportunities for parties to claim a lack of bargaining power. 
Forcing courts to consider whether those parties could have taken rea-
sonable steps to improve their bargaining position would limit improper 
claims of bargaining power disparities where the apparently weaker part 
merely made a bad judgment in negotiating its contract. 
3. Assess Bargaining Power Before, During and After the 
Execution of the Contract 
The point in the parties' relationship at which a court assesses their 
bargaining power is critical on two fronts. First, as discussed above, the 
relative bargaining power of the parties can shift throughout their interac-
tion.390 But courts have no consistent approach to the point at which they 
will assess inequality of bargaining power. Some courts, for example, 
analyze relative bargaining power at the time of the initial offer.391 Oth-
ers look to the bargaining power existing at the time of contracting392 or 
even at the eventual outcome of the parties' bargain.393 Given the dy-
actors" that "understand how to make business contracts"). Such a model is inherently more 
complex with respect to bargaining power disparities than contracts involving traditionally 
"weak" parties, and involve more opportunities for the parties to adjust their relative bargain-
ing power. 
390. See supra notes 162-212 and accompanying text (discussing dynamic nature of power 
relationship). 
391. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (find-
ing procedural unconscionability upon mere presentation of standard form employment 
agreement by employer to employee). 
392. See, e.g., L & E Corp. v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 992 F.2d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1993) (as-
sessing unconscionability as a function of "grossly unequal bargaining power at the time the 
contract is formed") (citations omitted); Lang v. Derr, 569 S.E.2d 778, 781 (W.Va. 2002) 
("The second factor normally considered in determining whether a contract is unconscionable 
is whether the parties were in unequal bargaining positions at the time they entered into the 
contract. " (emphasis added». 
393. Price unconscionability cases may provide an example of situations in which the out-
come of the parties' interaction is used as a surrogate for their bargaining power. Typically, 
courts acknowledge that a finding of unconscionability must be supported by both procedural 
and substantive unconscionability. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. In price un-
conscionability cases, however, courts regularly hold that the substantive unfairness of the 
challenged provision is so great that there is no need to assess procedural unconscionability. 
See, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Maxwell v. 
Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (noting that substantive unconscionability 
alone may support finding of unconscionability); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 382-83 
& n.8 (Alaska 1986) (explaining that procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability 
must be assessed on sliding scale such that great substantive unconscionability alone may jus-
tify finding that contract is unconscionable); Bracey v. Monsanto Co., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 946, 
953 (Mo. 1992) (same). Notably, however, substantive unconscionability cases often include 
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namic nature of the power relationship on the level of individual con-
tracts, the choice of timing for analysis will significantly affect that 
analysis. 
Second, the choice of timing rule is indicative of whether courts are 
measuring relative bargaining power or something else. In practical 
terms, bargaining power refers primarily to the ability to affect an out-
come. Measuring relative bargaining power means measuring the parties' 
potential to obtain their preferred terms in a transaction. While the out-
come of the parties' interaction may evidence the parties' relative bar-
gaining power, that is only true where the parties have used their bar-
gaining power to realize that outcome. But where parties have failed to 
take reasonable steps to protect themselves against their opponent's bar-
gaining tactics, the outcome of their transaction does not say anything 
about their actual bargaining power. In this sense, a judicial focus upon 
the outcome of the transaction does not measure bargaining power, but 
rather whether the outcome offends the judge's sense of fair play or dis-
tributive ethics. 
To the extent that courts purport to regulate disparities in bargaining 
power, and not merely substantive unfairness or some violation of their 
internal sense of fair play and distributive justice, inequality of bargain-
ing power as a legal concept must adopt a timing rule that accurately re-
flects the power relationship throughout of the bargaining process. There 
is no single point at which relative bargaining power can be assessed that 
reflects the parties' actual potential to obtain their preferred terms 
throughout the contract process. Depending on the context of the transac-
tion, the parties' relative bargaining power may wax and wane between 
the moment of execution, the moment the parties begin negotiations, or 
at various points during the negotiations. While each of these points has 
some relevance to the parties' actual bargaining power, they also provide 
an arbitrarily incomplete picture of the power relationship. 
A timing rule focused upon the moment of execution, as that ap-
plied in Pardee Construction394 for instance, would provide information 
regarding the parties' relative bargaining power at the crucial moment 
the legal obligation came into being and also provides an easy, bright 
line standard for when to assess bargaining power. But such a rule also 
ignores whether one of the parties could or should have backed out of the 
indicia of oppression or unfair surprise or other evidence of unequal bargaining positions in the 
substantive analysis. See Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 59-60 (noting that substantive unconscionabil-
ity may be shown by oppression and unfair surprise). Consequently, price unconscionability 
cases arguably rely solely upon the unfair outcome of the bargain to establish a presumption of 
inequality of bargaining power or other procedural problems without requiring evidence of any 
procedural failings in the transaction. 
394. Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288,294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
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deal at an earlier point, reasonably should have invested in greater infor-
mation before execution, "negligently" failed to engage in reasonable 
due diligence regarding readily available alternatives or the terms of the 
deal, or taken other steps to improve its bargaining power. Likewise, a 
timing rule such as that applied in Northwest Acceptance,395 looking to 
the time the allegedly weaker party first started shopping for the equip-
ment through the parties' negotiations accounts for the power of the par-
ties to abandon the deal or seek alternatives but does not account for 
costs incurred in searching and negotiating, nor does it account for the 
forms or sources of power brought to bear during the negotiation. 
The balancing test required by a multi-point timing rule is clearly 
more complex than any of the bright-line timing rules discussed above. 
The rule must identify salient points in the parties' interaction at which to 
assess relative bargaining power and then weigh the varying importance 
of the power balance at each of those times. 396 In this analysis, the out-
come of the bargaining process-the terms of the agreement-will be 
only one indicium of whether a bargaining power disparity existed. In 
addition, courts should also examine evidence of the parties' bargaining 
positions throughout their interaction, including points at which the par-
ties could have altered the power relationship. Although the terms of the 
bargain will continue to be highly indicative of bargaining power dispari-
ties, parties that unnecessarily place themselves in a weakened bargain-
ing position at a point in the process at which they had other alterna-
tives397 should be less able to claim the protections of doctrines based 
upon bargaining power disparities. 
B. A Program for Future Study 
Refining the judicial analysis of bargaining power disparities within 
doctrines where bargaining power is an explicit element of analysis only 
395. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719,721-23 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1987). 
396. Such a balancing calculation-as with virtually every aspect of the attempt to con-
form legal analysis of bargaining power with the practical reality of that phenomenon-is con-
text sensitive. Significant transactions taking place over time, such as the home purchase in 
Pardee Constr. Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294, and the heavy equipment purchase in Northwest 
Acceptance, 412 N.W.2d at 723, will usually involve multiple salient periods in which the 
buyers could have taken reasonable steps to improve their bargaining power including shop-
ping for other contracts, reading the proffered contract, seeking legal advice, or attempting to 
bargain or obtain more time for review. Less significant transactions or transactions occurring 
over a short time frame would involve fewer salient periods for such assessments. 
397. Cf Pardee Constr. Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292-94 (assessing bargaining power only 
after prospective home purchasers had made subjective decision to purchase home in defen-
dant's development). 
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resolves a small part of the general incoherence of inequality of bargain-
ing power as a legal concept. Beyond the specific failings of courts to 
harmonize the actual exercise of bargaining power with the judicial 
analysis of that phenomenon, the primary failing in the current jurispru-
dence regarding inequality of bargaining power is that, despite a century 
of development, the doctrine remains essentially a rhetorical device that 
has infected analysis throughout the law of contracts.398 An honest and 
complete investigation of the appropriate role of bargaining power dis-
parities within contract law should focus primarily upon three issues. 
First, courts and commentators have largely failed to agree even on the 
terms of the debate over the place-if any-that a doctrine of inequality 
of bargaining power should occupy within contract law. Specifically, it is 
not clear whether inequality of bargaining power represents an overt de-
cision-making criterion concerned with discerning the actual relative 
bargaining power of the parties or whether the doctrine is merely a cover 
for a deeper sociological inquiry about wealth, power and status. Second, 
substantial work remains in identifying the implicit and explicit roles that 
bargaining power plays throughout contract law. And finally, inequality 
of bargaining power may ultimately prove unworkable as an outcome de-
terminative legal standard because of the inherent indeterminacy of the 
concept. Beyond the incredible complexity involved in assessing relative 
bargaining power based upon observable factors, the concept of bargain-
ing power may promote systemic cognitive errors and biases based en-
tirely upon the powerful narratives and motifs invoked by that concept. 
1. Acknowledging the Debate Over the Proper Role of 
Inequality of Bargaining Power Within Contract Doctrine 
The significant disconnect between the legal analysis of bargaining 
power disparities and attempts to assess, maximize and exercise power in 
non-legal contexts indicates one of three primary possibilities.399 One 
possibility is that the judicial system just has not caught up with what is 
known about power in other contexts. As noted above, the systematic 
study of power by the social sciences is a relatively recent phenome-
non.400 The final incorporation of the inequality of bargaining power 
doctrine into the general law of contracts coincided within a few decades 
398. See supra notes 225-41 and accompanying text. 
399. There are almost certainly other explanations for the substantial disconnect between 
the judicial picture of the power phenomenon and the analysis of power in other contexts. The 
three theses discussed here, however, offer possible insights that are particularly useful to cre-
ating a rational basis upon which to discuss power in the judicial context. 
400. See Dahl, supra note 49, at 79 (describing the systematic study of power as "very re-
cent"). 
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of the beginnings of the systematic study of power in the social sciences 
and the legal academy's systematic approach to negotiation tactics.401 
Consequently, the legal concept of bargaining power disparities may 
have been almost completely incorporated into contract law by the time 
studies of power began to reveal the difficulty and uncertainty inherent in 
assessing relative bargaining power in social interactions. 
An alternative thesis suggests that Leffs argument regarding the 
value of status-based characteristics in assessing legal criteria can apply 
profitably to bargaining power disparities.402 Weighing and assessing 
relative bargaining power is expensive to parties during the time of con-
tract negotiation and execution.403 The costs of accurately developing 
that same information post hoc through the adversarial process certainly 
would be greater than at the time of contracting and likely prohibitive in 
many cases. Consequently, courts may rely on a two-dimensional ap-
proximation of power because the costs of developing greater informa-
tion regarding the parties' actual balance of power would be too great. 
Further, the common perception that the legal doctrine of inequality of 
bargaining power is explicitly relevant to only a few areas404 may dimin-
ish incentives to promote such development of standards for assessing 
and weighing relative bargaining power. 
A third-and much more cynical-possibility begins with the rec-
ognition that bargaining power disparities may mean different things to 
different actors within the legal system. Some actors may be using the 
legal concept of inequality of bargaining power as an approximation of 
some general and common societal or judicial understanding of the prac-
tical concepts of bargaining power, and measurement of bargaining 
power. That sense represents an essentially moral judgment by the legal 
system that gross disparities of bargaining power between transacting 
parties can so corrupt the contracting process that the resultant agreement 
is tainted and should not merit the legal protection accorded contracts 
that more closely adhere to the traditional Willistonian paradigm of con-
tract formation. In this sense of the term, gross disparities of bargaining 
power may interrupt whatever theoretical basis of enforceability-the 
parties' wills, the objective manifestations of assent, or the parties' con-
401. See id.; see also supra notes 225-41 and accompanying text. Specifically, inequality 
of bargaining power entered the generallaw of contract beginning in the 1930s and culminat-
ing with the 1952 promulgation of V.C.C. § 2-302, while the systematic study of power as a 
social phenomenon appears to have begun in earnest in the late-1950s and early '60s. 
402. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text. 
403. See Adler & Silverstein, supra note 26, at 10-11 ("Given the numerous factors, both 
subtle and obvious, required for the calculation [of parties' relative bargaining power during 
negotiations], the task may prove impossible."). 
404. See supra notes 24-44 and accompanying text. 
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sent to the bargain-judicial decision makers would require to uphold the 
contract. 
But other legal actors may be using inequality of bargaining power 
in a wholly unrelated sense as merely a device to permit the free rein of 
judges' paternalist or redistributionist impulses. In this sense, inequality 
of bargaining power provides an apparently overt justification for the 
judge to accomplish covert primary goals.405 
If this second thesis is correct, then clearly the rhetoric of "inequal-
ity" and "bargaining power" merely confuses and obfuscates the debate 
over whether paternalist or redistributionist impulses are appropriately 
exercised by judicial decision makers. As Duncan Kennedy implicitly 
acknowledges, that debate can only proceed if all sides mean the same 
thing by "inequality of bargaining power."406 Accordingly, substantial 
positive analysis of current judicial and scholarly treatments of the legal 
concept must be developed to determine whether the debate over the 
proper use of inequality of bargaining power is appropriately framed in 
terms of "power," "bargaining power," and "inequality," or in the terms 
of distributive justice and the propriety of paternalist impulses. 
2. Empirical Analysis of the Importance of Inequality of 
Bargaining Power Through Contract Doctrine 
Additional research and study is required to identify the actual role 
of bargaining power disparities within the law of contracts. Specifically, 
405. See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Book Review, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1187, 1211 (1978) 
(reviewing MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 
(1977». 
[d. 
Of course, when a party escapes from contractual ties on the basis of alleged ine-
quality of bargaining power, he is better off; and since he is typically less prosper-
ous than the other party, it appears that the court has struck a blow for equality. The 
middle class judge is thus able to leave the bench that evening enjoying the warm 
inner glow of a Robin Hood. 
406. See Kennedy, Motives in Contract, supra note 47, at 615-24. Kennedy observes on 
the one hand that "[t]here are a number of different things people seem to be referring to when 
they identify a situation as involving unequal bargaining power." /d. at 615 (noting (I) the 
"public" nature of an industry; (2) the use of adhesion contracts by the seller; (3) size; (4) mo-
nopoly power; (5) necessity; and (6) shortage as possible, but ultimately unjustifiable, tests for 
presence of inequality of bargaining power). Kennedy further notes that the use of inequality 
of bargaining power to justify imposition of compulsory contract terms "masks [the paternalist 
motive] by presenting as a defense of the weak what is often in fact a critique of their spending 
habits." [d. at 623. Given the covert distributionist motives of some legal actors (and the anti-
distributionist motives of others), there is little point in even debating the standards to apply 
unless the covert rules are made overt. Cf id. ("The doctrine [of inequality of bargaining 
power] exists not in a vacuum but as a weapon in the war against the conservative program of 
reinforcing all kinds of social hierarchy."). 
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bargaining power disparities are relevant to many contract doctrines be-
yond those that explicitly employ the legal concept as an element. For 
example, the empirical analyses of the impact of bargaining power dis-
parities on application of the parol evidence rule by Lawrence, and Chil-
dres and Spitz demonstrate the potential for disparate treatment of simi-
larly situated entities in that context.407 Similarly, Morant's empirical 
analysis of the impact of bargaining power disparities upon small busi-
nesses demonstrates that the failure to extend the protection of contract 
doctrines based upon inequality of bargaining power to small businesses 
can impose substantial costs upon those parties despite real bargaining 
power disparities they face in dealing with vendors and customers.408 
Despite such empirical studies, the full legal impact of bargaining 
power disparities between litigants is unclear. The study of inequality of 
bargaining power as a legal concept has proceeded little beyond Lord 
Denning's intuition that disparities of bargaining power may be one of 
the first order moral rules that underlies many contract defenses.409 The 
potential impact of inequality of bargaining power narratives upon the 
judicial decision making process requires identification of the affected 
doctrines and the extent of that impact. 
3. Myth, Cognitive Bias and the Subconscious Narrative of 
Inequality of Bargaining Power 
The rhetoric of inequality, bargaining, and power is a powerful nar-
rative. On one level, as discussed above, bargaining power issues per-
vade contract law and potentially affect disputed outcomes across a wide 
range of contract doctrines. Inequality of bargaining power as a legal 
concept implicates notions of fairness, equity and justice, and often justi-
fies judicial intervention into facially valid contracts. This article at-
tempts to identify flaws in current judicial approaches to this rational, 
conscious conception of the legal doctrine of inequality of bargaining 
power and suggests potential means for improving the courts' ability to 
assess asymmetries of bargaining power. 
But the concept of inequality of bargaining power also operates on 
subconscious levels that straddle the line between purely legal analysis of 
the problem and the practical application of power between contracting 
parties. First, the correlation between bargaining power disparities and 
recent advances in legal decision theory may provide a more reasoned 
407. See sources cited supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
408. See Morant, supra note 7, at 246,267. 
409. See L10yds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, 1975 Q.B. 326, 339 (Eng. C.A. 1975); see also supra 
notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
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basis for incorporating a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power into 
the law of contracts.410 Specifically, to the extent legal decision theory 
can identify and quantify systematic exploitation of cognitive biases and 
errors by experienced bargainers to manipulate the inexperienced, the 
courts may be able to police those manipulations as an abuse of bargain-
ing power asymmetries. Alternatively, the indeterminacy involved in ap-
plication of recent advances in legal decision theory to contract law, and 
the costs of paternalist contract interventions suggested by some schol-
ars411 may provide a justification for removing the doctrine from con-
tract altogether.412 
Second, beyond the potential relationship between inequality of 
bargaining power and cognitive bias, bargaining power disparities may 
also profitably be analyzed as "legal myths."413 The adversarial process 
has often been described as the trading of competing stories or narratives 
that suggest a legal outcome in the proponents' favor.414 Myths likewise 
are narratives that operate both on a conscious and a subconscious level. 
At the conscious level, myths tell stories-for example the descent of 
Theseus into the labyrinth and Orpheus into the underworld-that are en-
tertaining in themselves and are recounted often for their narrative values 
alone. But on the subconscious level, myths communicate powerful ar-
chetypes and motifs against which the listener often lacks defenses. The 
stories contained in myths thus often communicate essential truths about 
the deepest levels of the human psyche at a level below the conscious 
mind's ability to rationalize and evaluate.415 
410. See, e.g., Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damage 
Clause: A Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REv. 27, 53-69, 
95-99 (2001) (advocating that courts deem intentional manipulation of known cognitive biases 
in contract formation to be procedurally unconscionable). 
411. See id. 
412. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.l. 67, 86-87 
(2002) (arguing that legal decision theory's bounded rationality model of human behavior that 
assumes different individuals apply cognitive biases with "uncanny consistency" is incorrect in 
light of growing empirical evidence that cognitive biases vary widely among different indi-
viduals); cf Feldman, supra note 113 (surveying arguments of behavioral economics in favor 
of greater judicial intervention in contracts to counter problems of bounded rationality in con-
tract formation and arguing that overregulation could have significant negative impacts on 
party psychological well-being). 
413. See supra note 331 and accompanying text. 
414. See Ronald l. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 373, 393 
(1991) ("The central question [ofiitigated cases] is often whether a richly textured human epi-
sode occurred, and if so, its nature."); cf My COUSIN VINNY (Twentieth Century Fox 1992) 
(describing the use of evidence to create narratives that compel a decision in the proponent's 
favor and that display gaps in the narrative propounded by the opposing side). 
415. See generally Carl G. lung, Approaching the Unconscious, in MAN AND HIS 
SYMBOLS (Carl G. lung ed., 1964) (discussing wider, symbolic, and unconscious aspects and 
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The problem with myths in the legal setting is that they raise sig-
nificant potential for undermining the reliability and rationality of the le-
gal decision making process. Unlike "legal fictions"--conceptual devices 
that act as known short form descriptions for complex analogical argu-
ments-legal myths inappropriately influence legal outcomes on a sub-
conscious level against which neither party can respond. Subconscious 
biases and influences are a fact of life in the legal system.416 But, par-
ticularly where those biases are identifiable and systemic, exposing those 
biases to rational evaluation promotes the ability of the legal system to 
respond appropriately to the truths or falsehoods underlying those biases. 
Inequality of bargaining power provides a unique avenue for explo-
ration into the impact of such legal myths upon legal analysis. The un-
derdog and the Robin Hood motifs occupy a powerful place in the my-
thos of American law.417 Similarly, legal commentary and analysis often 
recognizes the propensity for the judicial system to provide special 
treatment to those perceived-rightly or wrongly-to lack power com-
pared to their adversary.418 Legal myth thus opens a psychological and 
anthropological window of analysis into the question whether the legal 
system can or should respond to perceived power differences between 
bargaining parties. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Bargaining power disparities will always exist. In the worlds of 
business, politics, war, economics, and all other human relationships, so-
cial actors strive with one another to maximize their respective abilities 
to influence the outcome of their interactions. While there remain sub-
stantial questions regarding the appropriate legal consequences to attach 
to bargaining power asymmetries, it is clear that current standards are in-
sufficient guides to determine the existence and extent of such dispari-
meanings of symbols and concepts perceived on a conscious level); JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE 
INNER REACHES OF OUTER SPACE: METAPHOR AS MYTH AND AS RELIGION (1986) (exploring 
relationship between mythic motifs and human psychology). 
416. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
417. The ubiquitous "widow and orphan" problem, for example, is often employed to ex-
plain decisions that appear otherwise unjustifiable under existing doctrines. See, e.g., Leff, 
supra note 107, at 527. Llewellyn implicitly acknowledged the importance of discerning the 
impact of such influence upon the judicial decisionmaking process by explicitly espousing the 
unconscionability doctrine ofU.C.C. § 2-302 as an overt mechanism for policing inappropriate 
contracting behavior that judges had previously addressed only through covert mechanisms. 
See LLEWELLYN, supra note 231, at 364-65; Spanogle, supra note 364, at 940. 
418. See, e.g., LetT, supra note 107, at 527, 536-37 (noting that equity law is replete with 
"dramatic vignettes with which the Chancellors were continually faced-the abused old and 
unsophisticated young, the slicker and the farmer, the money lender and the expectant heir"). 
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ties. To the extent that courts attach legal consequences to such power 
struggles, they must develop and employ more sophisticated standards 
that reflect the omnipresent, complex and dynamic reality of power. 
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